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Cover
Ashurbanipal, the last great king (reigned
668–27 B.C.) of the ancient Assyrian Empire,
centered in what is today northern Iraq.
In the previous century, the Assyrians had
overrun the northern part of Israel and
invested, but did not take, Jerusalem, to
the south—a conquest achieved in the
next century by the Chaldeans, under
Nebuchadnezzar II, with whom President
Saddam Hussein has famously identified
himself. Ashurbanipal was a patron of the
arts, architecture, scholarship, and religion;
by late in his reign he claimed to control
“the whole world.” But within two decades of his death, the Assyrian Empire
had been destroyed. Our lead article, by
one of the most prominent American specialists on Southwest Asia, examines the
elements that are likely to shape Iraq after
the Hussein regime—which seems likely
to be destroyed as well, and with even
greater suddenness.
Our cover is a detail of a bas-relief hunting scene, c. 645 B.C. (now in the British
Museum), from Ashurbanipal’s palace in
Nineveh. As was apparently characteristic
of Assyrian wall-mounted reliefs of the
era, it was originally painted; traces of
pigment are still detectable.
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Some feel that we can afford to relax our security and return to
business as usual. But the fact is, the terrorists are not defeated;
they have not lost their determination and cunning nor their zeal
for suicide attacks.

IN MANY WAYS THE ONGOING TERROR WAR caught us by surprise. The

warning signs were clear, but we simply failed to take adequate notice and action; we didn’t understand. We treated events such as the Pan Am Flight 103
crash over Lockerbie, Scotland, the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon,
the destruction of U.S. embassies in Africa, and the bombing of USS Cole in
Yemen as discrete events rather than a series of battles in a new kind of war. Now,
in responding to a war we did not choose, we must apply serious military power
together with our friends and allies to bring this reign of terror to a halt.
Going on the Offensive
The United States has responded to the 11 September 2001 attacks with commitment and action to root out and punish terrorists and go after those who harbor,
facilitate, and finance them. The war against terrorism will be unconventional,
broad, and sustained. It has military, legal, financial, and diplomatic dimensions. The Terror War is being fought not only by the United States but also by a
coalition of nations offering a variety of assistance.
U.S. military units and a large number of coalition forces in Afghanistan have
driven the Taliban from power, allowing the establishment of a transitional government. They have captured hundreds of detainees, who are providing valuable
intelligence about al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist networks. They have created the
conditions that allowed schools and hospitals to reopen, and they have facilitated the airdrop of more than two million humanitarian food rations into
Afghanistan.
On any given day, over sixty thousand American service members are deployed around the world in the war against terror—more than seven thousand
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
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on the ground in Afghanistan alone. Others are in the Philippines, Yemen, and
the Republic of Georgia, continuing to train and support local forces. Our coalition is strong. More than ninety nations have arrested or detained over 2,500 terrorists and their supporters. More than 150 countries have offered or are
providing assistance in the Terror War.
Who Attacked Us?
A year ago, after 11 September, the first question Americans asked was: “Who attacked our country?” We subsequently learned it was al-Qa‘ida, which is an
Arabic term for “the Base.” Al-Qa‘ida is not a single group but rather a terrorist
network with operatives around the world. Al-Qa‘ida is to terror what the Mafia
is to crime. But unlike criminals, the goal of al-Qa‘ida is not making money; its
goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs and its formula for
how to live on people throughout its region of influence. People have wondered
what kind of a war this is—is it a war for territories, resources, or hegemony? We
have learned that this is not a war about religion, nor a religious war. It is a war
about freedom, and about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill everyone in their way, all who
do not believe as they do. Especially, their goal is to kill Americans, and in so doing they make no distinction between military and civilians, including children.
We have discovered there are thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty
countries. We have learned that they are recruited from their own nations and
neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are
trained in the tactics of terror. Then they are sent back to their homes or to hide
in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. The terrorists are
traitors to their own faith. The enemy of America is not the Muslim faith; it is
not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.
Why Do They Hate Us?
A year ago, on 11 September, Americans asked, “Why do they hate us?” We have
learned that they hate what we see in every community in America. They hate
the fact that Americans enjoy and cherish freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of independent thought, freedom of religion, freedom to assemble, freedom to disagree with each other, and the freedom to believe what we
want and live as we wish—as long as we don’t impose on others. This is a vastly
different philosophy of life than the one embraced by the shadowy forces of terrorism. Instead, their leaders are self-appointed. They want to overthrow existing governments—many in Muslim countries—such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Jordan. They brutalized people in Afghanistan. Women were not allowed to
attend school. People were jailed for owning a television. Religion could only be
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practiced as the terrorist leadership dictated. Men could be jailed if their beards
were not long enough.
These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of
life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from
the world and forsaking its friends. As President Bush has said, “They stand
against us because we stand in their way.” Our nation and our values are founded
on “live and let live,” not on imposing our ways on others. What we are fighting
for are our basic beliefs and freedoms as Americans, the freedoms guaranteed us
by our Constitution, Bill of Rights, and the democratic rule of law. These freedoms were violently taken away from those who died in lower Manhattan, at the
Pentagon, and in the field in Pennsylvania. That is why we must act.
How Do We Fight the Terror War?
A year ago, after 11 September, Americans asked: “How will we fight and win this
war?” We need to go after those things that, if we are successful, will cause the enemy to collapse. The president has helped us in defining who our enemies are—
not only terrorists and their support networks but, more importantly, “nations
that provide aid or safe havens to terrorism. . . . Any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime.”
The only successful defense against terrorism is a good offense. President
Bush noted last spring that “we cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the words of tyrants who solemnly
sign nonproliferation treaties and then systematically break them. If we wait for
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . The war on terror
will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy. . . . In the
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.”
We must not wait until there is another Pearl Harbor–like attack before we
defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies. If we know that rogue states or
groups have weapons that could kill hundreds of thousands of people, it doesn’t
make sense to wait until they use them. A growing number of countries are investing enormous sums to develop weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them.
Hostile powers will soon have the ability to strike U.S. cities with nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. They will have the power to hold us hostage
to blackmail and terror.
Some believe that the familiar notion of nation-states doesn’t apply in the
Terror War. However, history reminds us that pirates, bandits, and others who
live outside the law cannot long survive if the states they live in pursue them with
diligence. It is safe haven and the support of sympathetic nations that enable the
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terrorists to go on. So it really does come down to nation-state versus nationstate—those that harbor terrorists versus those that abhor them. Nations that
believe in the rule of law cannot rationally support terrorism at the same time.
Our president has called for waging war against any nation that continues to
harbor or support terrorists. The president has said: “We must take the battle
to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they
emerge.”
This means that we must deal with terror cells wherever we find them. We
must confront regimes that sponsor terror, and we must persistently work toward an end state where there is nowhere for a terrorist cell to flourish and
grow—no money, no recruits, and no haven. They will be constantly hounded by
local authorities. That is the only way we know to end the reign of terror.
We should remember that there are at least thirty-one different foreign terrorist organizations; al-Qa‘ida is only one. Each has differing agendas, and each
will need different strategies to deal with it. But we are 280 million Americans,
who as a society are unbelievably affluent. We enjoy economic, political, racial,
and religious freedoms that are the envy of the world. We simply want to protect
our rights—our lives and property.
How Will We Win?
We have directed every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy,
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial
influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and defeat of
the global terror network. Skillful use of diplomacy is critical. America has a rich
past in leading the way in the World War II alliance, holding the Nato partnership together, and orchestrating the coalition to liberate Kuwait. But the challenge for our diplomats in this war is to stay the course in a way that continues to
foster unity over time, and help to reduce the inevitable friction among a global
community that sees aspects of the world differently. It will be a difficult job
indeed.
There are some people who ask how America has changed since 11 September. What have we learned about ourselves since the attacks? We have learned
that the terrorists were wrong, that they miscalculated. They thought their attacks would expose us as soft, spoiled, decadent, and divided. Instead, Americans have become united, committed, more patriotic, and determined to stand
and fight terrorism to preserve our way of life.
It has been over a year since the 11 September attacks, and it is fair to stop and
ask the question: Are we prepared to do what it takes to win this war? In the beginning, the support for the terror war was universal. Following the attacks, the
Congress of the United States voted overwhelmingly to authorize use of force in
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the Terror War. The United Nations Security Council affirmed its unequivocal
condemnation of the terrorist attacks, and the General Assembly agreed. This
degree of international support was unprecedented. We need our friends and allies more than ever; the United States cannot go it alone. The lynchpin to our
success is working with our counterparts in other countries, shoulder to shoulder. We need a team effort—an international team.
There are indications, however, that the world seems to be growing weary of
the Terror War. The voices of dissent in Europe and other places would have us
retreat and rest on our successes to date. Even here in America, we are beginning
to hear people say we have already won. We drove the terrorists out of Afghanistan, and they are on the run in the Philippines and elsewhere. Some feel that we
can afford to relax our security and return to business as usual. But the fact is, the
terrorists are not defeated; they have not lost their determination and cunning
nor their zeal for suicide attacks.
“More than any time in recent history, America’s destiny is not of our own choosing. We did
not seek, nor did we provoke an assault on our freedom and our way of life. We did not expect, nor did we invite a confrontation with evil. Yet the true measure of a people’s
strength is how they rise to master that moment when it does arrive. . . . The streets of
heaven are too crowded with angels, but every time we think we’ve measured our capacity
to meet a challenge, we look up and we’re reminded that that capacity may be limitless.
We will do what is hard, we will achieve what is great. This is a time for American heroes
and we reach for the stars. God bless their memory. God bless you. And God bless the
United States of America.”
—President Bartlet
The West Wing, “20 Hours In America”
Written by Aaron Sorkin
© 2002 Warner Bros. All Rights Reserved

Now is the time we Americans—and our friends—must be strong. If we back
off, if we turn to other things, if we let our guard down, the terrorists will have
won, and attacks will continue. This is virtually guaranteed. We can win this war,
if we want to. It will be no easy path, and all of us must adapt. We must endure
continued long lines at our airports. We must continue to bear security checks at
our major sporting events, our theme parks, and our major historic landmarks
and buildings. In fact, domestic security requires a new mind-set. But we will not
give up our civil liberties or any of our essential freedoms. To do that would be to
let the terrorists win. Those freedoms will not be marginalized for the sake of security. We must be as secure as we can be, but we must retain our freedoms. We
need to appreciate right now that the Terror War won’t have a victory party. We
won’t see a ticker-tape parade in New York City. This was and will be a constant
struggle, a chronic condition; it may turn out to be very much like the Cold War.
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What Can We As Americans Do?
Ultimate victory can be ours, but it will require America and its allies to demonstrate the following attributes.
Perseverance and Commitment. This will not be a short war. Our history is replete with examples of our citizens and their leaders who underestimated the
level of effort required to win. The opening battle of the Civil War at Manassas,
Virginia, was witnessed by buggies full of spectators who traveled thirty miles
from Washington to see the Union troops quickly send their Confederate brothers running for the hills. Each side thought that the other was weak, untrained,
and ill equipped to fight; it took five bloody years to restore peace to the Union.
In World War II, over seven million American men and women served in uniform, and nearly three hundred thousand died. In September 1950, the U.S.
Eighth Army drove the North Korean army all the way to the Yalu River; General
Douglas McArthur said he was going to have the troops home by Christmas. The
war went on, with numerous casualties, for three years, and even today, a
half-century later, armed forces face each other across a fortified demarcation
line. The conflict in Vietnam has been called America’s longest war, lasting for a
decade. We suffered fifty-six thousand killed and three hundred thousand
wounded. The lessons of history are clear: never underestimate the enemy, and
always be prepared for a lengthy engagement and many casualties. To what level
of effort are we willing to go to win the Terror War and reestablish a sense of
peace and security at home?
Awareness and Vigilance. We, as a people, must become more aware of the world
around us. This means everything from being aware of threats to local facilities
or events to understanding the ebb and flow of world politics and clearly defining radical movements. We must remain on guard and be prepared to deal with
attacks on our persons and upon our freedoms. The level of security of our
power plants, transportation systems, and computer and telecommunications
networks must be increased on a permanent basis. Detecting abnormal activity
around us must become second nature. As citizens, we automatically adjust our
threat sensitivity when we find ourselves in a crime-ridden area late at night; we
must do the same in addressing terrorism. We still do what we must do to conduct our lives, but we do so with a heightened sense of urgency when the environment requires it. Our world has changed; we must adjust our living habits as
necessary to address the increased danger that the specter of terrorism brings.
Tolerance and Understanding. This is perhaps the most important attribute of a
free society. The American people must redouble efforts to find ways to address
the root causes of the hatred we find in the hearts of generation after generation
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of impoverished people throughout the third world. The gap between the haves
and have-nots continues to widen. We must engage the nearly unlimited resources of our nation (and of our allies) to address the poverty, poor standards
of living, and inadequate education that provide fertile ground for terrorism
and anti-Western agendas.
Suicide bombings, from airplanes or from car bombs, are signs of desperation. America will not be safe until our would-be enemies see for themselves a
future in this world rather than embrace the desperation of martyrdom.
The concept of “America” is one of more than a higher standard of living and
resource consumption. We must do more to ensure that the rest of the world has
a greater understanding of what America is really all about. We must employ the
many tools of the globalized media to tell our positive story about freedom and
democracy. We must aggressively seek to counteract the negative teachings
about Western society that are breeding ill will and contempt within a whole
new generation of young people throughout the developing world. We must
mobilize the charitable and relief efforts of both governmental agencies and private organizations to reach out to the needy of the world and assist them with
education and means to achieve decent standards of living. We must revitalize
our Peace Corps to focus on the areas of the world where Americans are least understood. In the final analysis, killing terrorists is clearly not enough to break
this cycle of violence. As the hope of the world, the beacon of freedom, we need
to work to help others understand us and what makes America great.
These are challenging times. But what times have not been? The key is to face
these challenges without being consumed by them. We must go ahead with our
lives. We must make plans for our future. We must love and support our families
and our friends. In the final analysis, we will prevail as individuals and as a nation because of the inherent strength of our democratic institutions, our belief
in freedom, and our way of life.

RODNEY P. REMPT

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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IRAQ “THE DAY AFTER”
Internal Dynamics in Post-Saddam Iraq
Phebe Marr

O

f all the unknowns facing policy makers in Iraq, the greatest is what kind
of leadership is likely to come after Saddam Husayn. Much, of course, will
depend on the means of unseating him. However, little hard thought has yet
been spent on who might replace him, what orientation and policies alternative
leaders might have, and the processes by which leadership can be selected and
legitimated over the long term. These gaps need to be addressed, though the answers may have to remain somewhat speculative.
Regime replacement will be one of the most difficult decisions facing the U.S.
administration, because of the absence of good options. Inside Iraq, there is no
alternative political leadership available. Well qualified leaders may exist, but
they will be difficult to identify beforehand. It is clear that no such leadership
can emerge while Saddam Husayn’s regime is in place. By definition, political
leaders must have followers and at least some rudimentary organization. Under
Saddam Husayn’s security system, no such activity can take place. The absence
of clearly identifiable alternative leadership leaves a great deal to chance and to
last-minute efforts at organization by would-be successors the “day after”—not
a good foundation for exercising control over the situation.
Some attempt to identify sources of leadership inside Iraq can be undertaken
beforehand. The best framework for such a process is probably examination of
Iraq’s institutional framework and of the leadership below the top levels, which
will inevitably depart with Husayn. Such institutions obviously include the military, elements of the bureaucracy, the educational establishment, and even the
Ba’th Party itself. But there is a problem here. These institutions have been
heavily infiltrated by party members and clan relations of Saddam Husayn, and
anyone with experience in administration and in the exercise of authority is
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likely to have been influenced by their thinking and orientation. How much
change is likely to result from such leadership?
Outside of Iraq, alternative political leadership does exist. The “outside” opposition has been operating among Iraq’s exile community—in Europe, the
United States, and the Middle East—for over a decade, and its members can be
clearly identified. However, the various groups constituting this opposition have
different agendas and some deeply held but divergent views about Iraq’s future,
preventing coalescence around a common direction or leader. Meanwhile, aside
from the Kurdish parties, it is not clear how much support the outsiders have inside Iraq. Hence, if an outside opposition element is to become Iraq’s alternative
government, it will have to be put in power by the United States.
These factors present the United States with a policy dilemma. The major justification for a policy of “regime change” advanced by the Bush administration
rests on U.S. interests, not the benefits it would bring to the Iraqi population, although these may be substantial. Paramount among American interests are an
end to Iraq’s program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and institution
of a regime that would be more friendly—or at least not hostile—to U.S. aims,
including cooperation in the “war on terrorism” and achievement of regional
stability. The alternative leadership most likely to produce these results is the opposition in exile, most of whom have been in the West for an extended period of
time and have absorbed Western ideals and aims. However, installing this leadership would be the most expensive option for the United States; it would require U.S. forces on the ground and other military support for some time. A
change from inside Iraq, initiated by as-yet-unidentified leaders, would be the
least costly for the United States, as presumably avoiding long-term occupation
and possibly even destructive military action. But such leadership, especially if it
emerges from inside the regime, may not be able—or willing—to guarantee a
long-term change in WMD policy or a new, more friendly, political orientation.
It may also have difficulty in maintaining domestic order and control.
THE “INSIDE” OPTION
Should the regime in Baghdad disappear, by whatever means, what potential
leadership forces would the United States have to work with inside Iraq? What is
it likely to find? A critical factor in this regard is that in the decade since 1991,
Iraq has become more fragmented—socially, culturally, and even politically—
than at any time since the Second World War. This is not to say that Iraq is likely
to break up into its three main ethnic and sectarian components—a Kurdish
north, an Arab Sunni center, and a Shi’i south. Such an eventuality is highly unlikely, because of the demographic mixture of these communities in many large
1
cities and because none of these communities is itself homogeneous. But Iraq’s
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cohesion as a state and its sense of identity as a nation could break down. Indeed,
this cohesion has been eroding steadily over the decade, owing to the alienation
of all Iraqi communities from a repressive, narrowly based government that has
kept itself in power by, in part, relying on one sectarian group and playing off
one community against another. As a result, keeping Iraq together and reconstituting a spirit of unity will be more difficult than it would have been a decade
ago, and a failure of the central government in Baghdad to maintain control over
the country could have more serious consequences.
In the North
In the north of the country, in a zone encompassing about 10 percent of Iraqi
territory, the Kurds have been governing themselves for over a decade. In 1992,
after the upheavals of the uprising, an exodus of refugees (almost half the population), and the establishment of a safe haven and a no-fly zone by the United
States and its allies, the Iraqi government withdrew its forces and administration
from an area that extends from Zakhu in the north through Irbil in the center to
al-Sulaymaniyyah in the south. Kurdish political parties took control. However,
despite an election in 1992 and the
establishment of a Kurdish Regional
TURKEY
Government (KRG), the Kurds were
Zakhu
not able to establish and maintain a
Mosul
Irbil
al-Sulaymaniyyah
unified government. After several
Penjwin
Kirkuk
years of civil conflict between the
SYRIA
Halabjah
two main Kurdish parties, the
IRAN
Kurdish region split in two. In the
J Baghdad
northeast, the Kurdistan DemoIRAQ
Karbala
cratic Party (KDP), under Mas’ud
Hillah
Barzani, governs the territory from
al-Najaf
JORDAN
Zakhu, on the Turkish border, to
al-Diwaniyyah
Basra
Irbil; in the southwest, the Patriotic
SAUDI
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), under
ARABIA
Persian
Gulf
Jalal Talabani, governs the remaining
ter r i tor y f rom i t s c a p i t a l i n
al-Sulaymaniyyah. A slice of territory on the Iranian border around the town of
Halabjah has come under the control of religious parties, leaving the Kurdish bor2
der open to hostile forces from Iran or Iraqi territory under Saddam’s control.
Nonetheless, the Kurds have produced real political leadership, with recognized political parties, and effective control of a portion of Iraqi territory. Their
peshmergas (militias) maintain security, their parties administer the region, and
in recent years, with some help from outside, a measure of prosperity and
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greater freedom has come to the north. This new reality and the bargaining
power it gives the Kurds will have to be recognized in a post-Saddam Iraq.
However, although the Kurdish political parties can be expected to join a
post-Saddam government—indeed, they would certainly bargain for a hefty
share of power in it—they cannot provide alternative political leadership for the
country as a whole. In this sense, the Kurdish parties are not comparable to the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The real issue is whether the Kurds would be
willing to cooperate with other Iraqi groups across ethnic and sectarian lines to
establish a unified Iraq. Indeed, they may instead seek to enlarge their territory
to include Kirkuk and the oil fields of the north. (The Kurds have consistently
claimed this territory in bargaining with the central government and have just as
consistently been refused, foreshadowing a future, post-Saddam problem.)
The Kurdish parties have demonstrated time and again that they are interested in greater self-government in the north, not leadership of a government in
4
Baghdad. The PUK has shown more willingness to cooperate with Arab opposition groups to overthrow the regime than has the KDP, which has preferred to
5
solidify its base in the north. But neither party has shown much of a desire to
lead an Iraqi state; in fact, the degree of self-government to be accorded to Kurds
in a future Iraq has been a bone of contention in all opposition discussions. A
decade of self-government by these parties, including the development of separate institutions of government and the extensive use of the Kurdish language—
weakening the facility to use Arabic—will pose problems of integration in the
post-Saddam period.
An alternative leadership exists among the Kurds—one that is less nationalist
and more interested in integration into Iraq—but it shows little evidence of being able to displace the two dominant political parties. This leadership centers
on tribal leaders, such as the Baradostis, the Surchis, and others, who used to be
affiliated with the central government’s apparatus of control in the north. These
leaders commanded tribal contingents who worked with the Iraqi army in defending the border against Iran (and from the Kurdish parties). The 1991 rebel6
lion, in which they played leading roles, ended in their displacement as leaders.
Interestingly, some of them have formed an association with Arab tribes in territory under Saddam’s control, with a view to working for a new government. Their
group comprises Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shi’ah, giving more promise of inte7
gration. However, their tribal organization cannot now match that of the two political parties, although the tribal leaders could play supportive roles in a new
government.
A small “Islamic” enclave on the border with Iran has produced alternative
leadership vested in, notably, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK),
under Mullah ‘Uthman ‘Abd al-’Aziz, and other smaller Islamic parties. These
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groups and the support they command are far too small to play a role in any alternative government in Baghdad, but as Sunni Islamists they represent a new trend
in Iraq, one that may have increasing appeal to Arab Sunni youth as well as Kurds.
In fact these Islamic groups have been a destabilizing force in the north, frequently
fighting with military forces of the
PUK, in whose neighborhood they
In time, even Iraqis who initially greet the
change of regime with relief and delight would operate. In fact, news reports claim
that this region is harboring militurn against a foreign occupying force.
tant Islamic groups, such as the
newly formed Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), that would come under U.S.
8
definitions of terrorist. This small enclave suggests the larger dangers that could
emerge in case of the collapse of centralized control in Baghdad.
In the South
South of Baghdad, the Shi’ah population, accounting for at least 60 percent of
Iraq’s inhabitants, has over the past decade become more alienated from the central government and more isolated from the outside. They have borne much of
the brunt of two wars, a rebellion that was brutally put down in 1991, and the effects of neglect and sanctions. The result has been smoldering unrest and repressed animosity toward a Sunni-dominated regime. These factors have
encouraged a greater Shi’i identity, although this Shi’i voice lacks a sense of direction and a domestic outlet for expression. Whatever form this Shi’i identity
may take in the future, it shows as yet little evidence of separatism. Rather, the
Shi’ah, virtually all Arabic speakers except for a small minority of fayli, or Shi’i
Kurds, consider themselves indigenous Iraqis; they want a say in Iraq’s government commensurate with their numbers. Increased Shi’i identity may well
translate into a demand for a Shi’i-dominated government, which would change
fundamentally the dispensation of power in Baghdad.
The problem for the Shi’ah will be translating this potential vision into reality. As yet, they have no indigenous leadership or organization that effectively
represents their interests. The best-known Shi’i group is SCIRI (the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), which has at least a recognized leadership, an administrative hierarchy, and some irregular military forces (the Badr
Brigade). These, however, are all situated outside Iraq, mainly in Iran. How
much support SCIRI can call on inside Iraq is a question. It can probably count
on a core constituency in such Shi’i strongholds as the holy cities (al-Najaf,
Karbala) and the marsh area (or what is left of it), and underground in southern
cities and towns. But these supporters are probably a minority of the heterogeneous Shi’i community; the ability of Shi’i groups like SCIRI to recruit
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widespread support may be limited by their ties to Iran, their clerical leadership,
and their strong religious agenda.
Inside Iran, SCIRI has an elaborate organization, consisting of an executive
council of about fifteen, a larger assembly (a potential parliament in exile), and a
military wing of five to ten thousand soldiers. While SCIRI does include some
Kurds and Turkmen, the overwhelming majority are Arab Shi’ah, some of Persian origin and background. In 1982, when it was founded, SCIRI was an umbrella organization for various Shi’i religio-political organizations, including
al-Da’wah (“The Call,” the original Iraqi Shi’i party, founded as an underground
movement in the late 1950s), the Islamic Action Organization, SCIRI itself, and
others; since then it has mainly become a vehicle for Muhammad Baqir
9
al-Hakim, an ayatollah from a well known Najaf clerical family.
The base of the movement is mainly Iraqi Shi’i exiles in Iran, whose numbers
have been estimated at anywhere from 250,000 to a million (the latter figure is
probably too high). While some of these people are poor refugees in camps
along the border with Iraq, many others are middle class and have integrated
into Iran’s cities and towns. Many of these would have to relocate to Iraq if
Hakim was to have a base in the country.
SCIRI suffers from several other drawbacks in addition to its foreign location.
The movement and its leadership have undergone a number of splits, particularly over issues of Shi’i ideology—such as support for Ayatollah Khumayni’s
concept of the vilayat al-faqih (rule by the Islamic jurist), now incorporated into
the Iranian government. The most pronounced difference has occurred with
members of the Da’wah, some of whom have retained a distance from SCIRI.
Factional fighting among followers of various clerical leaders has also taken
place. Far more important, however, has been SCIRI’s tie to Iran, which has hurt
Hakim’s movement in two ways. First, Iran’s support (indeed, control and domination) of the movement has been used by the regime to justify repression of the
Shi’ah—expulsion of Iraqi Shi’ah to Iran, especially during the Iran-Iraq war;
arrests and executions of Shi’i activists; and gradual reduction of the mobility of
Shi’ah into government—as a result of which Shi’i ability to affect policy and attitudes in the center has virtually disappeared. Second, SCIRI’s ties to the adversary against which Iraq fought an eight-year war has hurt the group’s potential
for recruitment. It is generally agreed that during the rebellion of 1991, when
Shi’ah raised banners displaying Hakim’s picture, a number of potential recruits
were alienated.
At the same time, SCIRI has not had the benefit of a strong outside patron.
Iran provides aid and support, but it is itself a weak and politically fractured polity, not in a position to overthrow the regime in Baghdad. SCIRI and other Iraqi
Shi’i opponents of the regime have complained (with justification) of too little
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help from Iran, which has been far more concerned with its own national interests and with preserving the peace along its border with Iraq.
The religious seminaries in al-Najaf and Karbala, the usual sources of Shi’i
leadership, have been greatly weakened by repression over the last two decades.
Attacks on Shi’i clerics and their followers began in the mid-1970s and reached a
climax in 1980 with the execution of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, a militant and
popular Shi’i figure who had been a founder of al-Da’wah in the late 1950s. Expulsions and persecution continued during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1991, after the
Shi’i rebellion, the chief marja’ (religious authority), Ayatollah Abu-l-Qasim
al-Khu’i, was forcibly taken to Baghdad, made to appear on television in support
of the government, and then put under virtual house arrest. This incident was
followed in subsequent years by the unexplained deaths of a succession of reli10
gious leaders. The most recent (February 1999) was that of Muhammad Sadiq
al-Sadr, a chief marja’ who had been selected by the regime for his “moderation”
but who sealed his own fate when he began to exercise real leadership on behalf
of the Shi’i community, generating widespread popularity. These executions
and deaths have stripped the community of religious leaders capable of organizing opposition to the government. Under whatever circumstances, however,
clerical leadership has always been somewhat problematic for the Shi’ah, since it
mobilizes religious followers but tends to raise anxiety among the secular Shi’i
community, as well as among Sunnis, Arab and Kurd, who fear sectarianism.
Tribal groups also represent a certain potential for leadership in the Shi’i
community (as is true for Arab Sunnis). In towns and rural areas of the south,
tribal ties have always been stronger than in Baghdad, and in recent years the regime has strengthened tribal leadership as a means of shoring up a failing local
administration. Tribal leaders who are loyal are rewarded with land, positions in
the military for their sons, and other favors. Many new clan and tribal leaders
have been appointed by the regime, to ensure their loyalty. Nonetheless, as tribal
leaders have been given more local authority and opportunities to acquire
wealth, they have used it to increase their power and status—some might turn
against the regime. In the 1991 rebellion, for example, a number of tribal leaders
helped galvanize their districts and communities, particularly in Hillah and
al-Diwaniyyah. But tribal leadership too is problematic. Traditionally, tribes
have been better at rebellion than at the construction of new political formations. Their leaders collaborate across tribal and ethnic lines only with difficulty.
Moreover, tribal ties do not constitute a desirable basis for a modern state.
Since 1991, the south has been the locus of sustained unrest. Roads have been
cut, government installations attacked, and on occasion riots unleashed. Such
11
events have been intermittent but a constant factor over the decade. Neglect of
the region and decline in its economy have caused an outflow of its population;
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once Iraq’s second most populous city, Basra is now fifth. This decline has produced resentment, but it has not yet produced groups or leaders that can mobilize the population. This growing alienation in the south from the regime—and
the Sunni center—may make cooperation more difficult in any new regime.
In the Center
The geopolitical center of the country is focused on Baghdad, a demographically
mixed city, but it includes the predominantly Arab Sunni cities along the Tigris
River north to Mosul and the Euphrates west to Syria—a zone often called the
12
“Sunni triangle.” This central region has provided the bulk of the leadership
for Iraq, not only under the current regime but under previous regimes as well.
13
Never, however, has any regime been as narrow in its base as the present one.
Even if the top levels of the current regime are removed, leadership at lower levels is likely to continue to come from the center, which contains most of the
Iraqis with the experience and capacity to govern. Moreover, the center is most
likely to provide new political leadership at the top, if change is engineered from
inside. Aside from Saddam and his coterie, what are we likely to find here?
The current regime rests on three pillars: the kinship network that surrounds
and supports Saddam; the institutions of party and state that implement his
orders; and a small economic elite that enjoys most of the benefits of the statecontrolled oil resources. It is within this nexus that we must look for what we are
likely to get if the regime is replaced from inside.
Saddam himself refers to the first two pillars as, respectively, ahl al-thiqah
(the people of trust—that is, those on whom one can rely for loyalty), and ahl
al-khibrah (the people of expertise—the technocrats and professional administrators). While there is some overlap, these two groups are, for the most part, distinct and separate.
The “people of trust” are drawn almost wholly from Saddam’s kinship group,
and it is to their kinship tie that they owe their positions. At the top of the system
is a thick network of people from Saddam’s extended family and clan, the Albu
14
Nasir, or Bayjat. Much has been written on this phenomenon, which has consistently grown over the last three decades but has reached an apogee since the
15
rebellion of 1991. Saddam’s own extended family, whether descendent from his
father (the Majids) or his stepfather (the Ibrahims) or his uncle (the Talfahs),
and now including his sons, has, during his long tenure, occupied key posts in
the security system and the Republican Guard, helping to keep the regime in
power. A system of marriages within the clan has strengthened this extended
family and its hold on power. Allied with the Bayjat, for purposes of recruitment, are other Sunni tribes and clans from the central area, among them the
16
Ubayd, the Jubur, and the Dulaym.
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This political structure, now solidified in Iraq, raises several policy questions
relating to “the day after.” First, while any change must replace Saddam Husayn
and his entire extended family, as well as the secret police and the top of the security system, how much of the clan network can be removed without bringing an
end to law and order—indeed, without a serious outbreak of retribution? In the
military as well, much of the clan network may remain, particularly if new leadership emerges from the military. Second, if new political leadership emerges as
a result of a coup or a struggle within the regime, will another clan or tribal
group replace the Albu Nasir? How much of the clan system will persist? Above
all, how can the kin/clan network be replaced with more modern institutions,
open to all, and less dependent on personal loyalty and ties? Whatever leadership
comes to power, the clan system, now deeply imbedded in key structures, will
have to be dealt with.
The ahl al-khibrah—the experts, technocrats, and educated professionals—
are much more numerous than the “people of trust,” and they are to be found in
the various institutions of state. Chief among these are the Ba’th Party, the bureaucracy, the educational establishment, and the military. While in a change of
regime the party itself is likely to collapse, many of its cadre would remain.
Much of the education establishment, including the elaborate
Should the regime in Baghdad disappear, by
university system, would also enwhatever means, what potential leadership
dure, although much of its adforces would we have to work with inside Iraq? ministration has been “Ba’thized,”
What are we likely to find?
especially at the upper levels. The
bureaucracy, which together with
the educational establishment employs about 17 percent of the workforce (exclusive of the military), is the repository of much of Iraq’s educated middle class,
17
and it will remain as the bulwark of government after any regime change.
Iraq’s military, for its part, is a key repository of potential leadership. Iraq has
several militaries, not just one. The regular army, greatly weakened by sanctions,
is an old, pre-Ba’th institution with some degree of independence and a sense of
national identity. The Republican Guard—smaller but more effective, and more
carefully recruited, trained, and vetted for loyalty—is presumed to be a main
base of regime support, but it could fracture in the event of a change. The various special forces protecting the president and the members of the regime would
certainly disappear with Iraq’s leader.
The educated technocrats are also more mixed in background and more reflective of Iraqi society as a whole than the ahl al-thiqah. They include substantial numbers of Arab Shi’ah, as well as Kurds, Turkmen, and urban Sunnis
outside the clan system. What can be expected of the “people of expertise”? One
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segment of this class—in its middle to late forties or older—may be Western educated, often in Britain or the United States. They are generally secular and culturally Western. They are also likely to be energetic, well disciplined, and
competent managers and professionals. A second layer of the bureaucracy, and a
larger one, has been educated in Iraq. Many have gone through the Saddam University system, which includes a variety of faculties, from law and political science to medicine. While regime loyalty is necessary for entrance, its students are
drawn from the best-performing high school graduates. The selection process
provides the best students a channel for upward mobility and gives the regime
competent apparatchiks and managers. Military officers, whether regular or Republican Guard, are generally educated in Iraq; their exposure to the English
language and foreign environments may be more limited than those of preceding generations. But officers, especially in the regular army, represent a cross section of the Iraqi population, and many do not identify with the regime.
While most of these professionals and technocrats will adapt to a new order, a
number are Ba’th party members and have imbibed a number of attitudes inculcated in the last two or three decades that may be difficult to change. As in the
Soviet Union, the old ideology and predilection for an authoritarian order may
remain among the core.
The third pillar of support is a growing wealthy elite, sometimes referred to as
an “economic mafia.” This group includes Shi’ah and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs,
most of whom owe their positions to patronage from the regime, which controls
the oil revenues that flow through the state’s coffers. While this revenue has been
limited under sanctions, it has increased since the “oil for food” program began to
take effect at the end of 1996. Many members of this elite are contractors and new
entrepreneurs, but almost all are dependent for their income on their relationships to the regime. While some economic and financial expertise may reside in
this group, it cannot be expected to produce new political leadership.
Future political leadership from inside Iraq would more likely come from the
first two pillars and probably the second. Among Iraq’s institutions it is the military—or even remnants of the Ba’th Party—that is most likely to provide alternative leadership; it is less likely that new political leaders would come from the
bureaucracy or the educational establishment, whose members have been more
accustomed to following orders than to leading. However, the presence of competent, experienced administrators and military officers bodes well for a transition. Once new political leadership is in place, the country can be defended and
an administration put in place.
However, should new leadership emerge from within this establishment,
questions would arise for the future. Could political leadership from the center—
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most likely Arab Sunni—accommodate the pent-up desires and aspirations of
the Kurds and Shi’ah, and would it be willing to cede to them appropriate shares
of power? Will such a leadership be trusted by other communities? And would it
be able to establish control over the country, or would it face rivals for power? If
the leadership were military, additional problems of civil-military relations
would arise; few Iraqis want the return of military rule, which in the 1960s
brought instability, coups, and dictatorship.
A second set of questions relates to the degree of change a new centrist leadership would bring, particularly with respect to policies of concern to the United
States. Would a new military leader be willing—and able—to forgo the entire
Iraqi WMD program and still maintain the support of the armed forces? How
far would such a leadership go to accommodate the United States and the West,
after decades of hostile propaganda from the regime, as well as actual hostilities
and a decline due to sanctions? U.S. support for the regime—in the short term—
would be essential for its survival. Above all, political attitudes and practices, acquired under an authoritarian—indeed, a totalitarian—regime might be difficult to change, especially in the short term. The political nature of the regime and
its willingness to be inclusive will affect the degree of U.S. support for it.
THE “OUTSIDE” OPPOSITION
Unlike potential leaders in Iraq, “outside” opposition leaders can be clearly identified and are fairly well known, especially to U.S. policy makers; the key actors
are briefly described below. Over the past decade, many of them have been exercising political leadership among the Iraqi exile community and within key constituencies of Western governments. Their views and their disputes are public—
because, of course, they are operating in an open, Western environment.
The flaws of this outside opposition are also clear and need not be elaborated
on here. First, of course, is their fragmentation and their inability to cooperate,
even among like-minded groups. While some, like the Shi’i religious organizations and the Iraq Communist Party, have mutually exclusive agendas that make
real collaboration difficult, even moderate, middle-of-the-road groups, such as
the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord, have been unable to
bury personal and political rivalries to cooperate constructively. Collaboration
across ethnic and sectarian lines (the Kurdish parties with SCIRI, for example)
has been difficult. While all agree on the need for regime change, none yet agrees
on the formula for replacement. (These deep-seated differences may be a good
reflection of the kind of struggle that may ensue “the day after.”)
The second problem with the outside opposition is the degree of support they
command inside Iraq, and among which constituencies. If they should return to
Iraq, would they be able to mobilize support from a sufficiently large political
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spectrum to maintain stability? Or does their present fragmentation presage a
future struggle for power, spreading instability, even a collapse of the central
government? The regime in Baghdad has charged that many opposition leaders
have been outside Iraq for so long that they have no ties with anyone inside. It is a
fact that once out of the country, it is difficult to continue regular contacts
within Iraq, let alone engage in political mobilization. The Kurdish parties are
on Iraqi territory, but support beyond their own areas is limited. It is worth noting that the opposition inside faces the same dilemma.
The Iraqi National Congress. The INC, headed by Ahmed Chalabi, is the best
known of the opposition groups in the West. Founded in 1992 as an umbrella
group, it originally included the two Kurdish parties, the Iraq Communist Party
(ICP), some Arab nationalist groupings, and, at least nominally, SCIRI, as well as
various individuals and smaller bodies. A number of opposition groups continue to belong to the INC, but most have since gone their own ways, leaving the
INC primarily a vehicle for Chalabi and his supporters. Chalabi’s strength lies in
his intellect (he is a graduate of MIT and the University of Chicago, a former
mathematics professor and banker) and his political skill and tenacity in lobby18
ing for support in the West, especially within the American political system.
For a time he tried to put down roots in northern Iraq. However, he has alienated
many leaders who resent his attempts to keep the strings of power in his own
hands. He has also been controversial in American policy circles. The main
question with Chalabi and the INC is whether it can command support inside
Iraq.
The Constitutional Monarchy Movement. The Constitutional Monarchy Movement, now attached to the INC, is headed by Sharif ‘Ali bin al-Husayn, one of the
19
few surviving members of the Hashimite royal family of Iraq. Raised and educated in the United Kingdom, he has proposed a liberal, parliamentary regime in
which, if chosen by the population, he would play the role of a constitutional
monarch. There is in fact nostalgia among Iraqis for the Hashimite period, seen
in retrospect as more moderate and democratic than its successor regimes, but it
is not clear how much support this option would enjoy inside Iraq “the day
after.”
The KDP and PUK. The two Kurdish parties have already been dealt with. Both
the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are legitimate political parties, with leaderships, organizations, and irregular military
forces at their disposal. In the summer of 2002, they were variously estimated to
number from forty to seventy thousand, altogether. They are already “on the
ground” in Iraq, controlling between them, as noted, about 10 percent of Iraqi
territory. They would have to supply the backbone of any domestic military
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move to oust Saddam Husayn and would seek to have significant roles in formulating a new political order in Iraq, as well as in a replacement leadership. But
their aspirations—and ability—to lead regime change in an Arab Iraq are marginal, although they could hold the balance of power in a new government.
The PUK, under Jalal Talabani, has given more evidence of a willingness to
cooperate with other groups in overthrowing the regime than has Mas’ud
Barzani and the KDP, which is reluctant to upset the status quo without guarantees from the United States and assured American protection. The rivalry between these two parties, though currently submerged, could flare up again over
any new allocation of power after a regime change.
SCIRI. The main base of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
is outside Iraq, within the large exile community in Iran, many members of
which may wish to return to Iraq and would need to be integrated. SCIRI’s actual support for change, its contribution to military operations through the
Badr Brigade, and the extent of its cooperation with the United States would be
largely determined by Iran. How much actual support it would get from Shi’ah
inside Iraq is a major unknown, given its affiliation with Iran and its strong support for the concept of an Islamic republic in Iraq. Although SCIRI has verbally
espoused a democratic regime in Iraq, its long commitment to Islamic Shi’i
causes worry for some Iraqi Sunnis and many secular Shi’ah. Hakim, its leader,
may have a role to play in a new government, but installing him as the leader of
such a government would be counterproductive in the extreme.
The Iraqi National Accord. The INA, formed in 1990, is a centrist organization
composed mainly of dissident Ba’thists who have broken with the party. The
INA, led today by Ayyad Alawi, a neurosurgeon, a Shi’i, and a former Ba’thist,
has attracted a number of members who played a role in the regime and its military in the 1970s and 1980s. This
group claims to have an “insider”
If an outside opposition element is to become
understanding of the regime, as
Iraq’s alternative government, it will have to
well as continuing contacts with
be put in power by the United States.
military and civilians who work
for the regime but are committed
to its replacement. However, an attempted coup in 1996, with U.S. support,
failed because the INA had been penetrated by Saddam’s agents and supporters.
As before, it is not clear how many levers the INA can pull, or whether a group
with previous ties to the regime would find support in the country as a whole.
Defecting Army Officers. The opposition in recent years has been joined by a
number of defecting military officers, including generals. Chief among these are
Nizar al-Khazraji, former army chief of staff; Wafiq al-Samarra’i, former chief of
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military intelligence; and Najib al-Salihi, former Republican Guard commander.
They and others have formed several opposition associations. A number of these
officers aspire to head a new, centrist regime, but most are cooperating with civilian groups, such as the INC, and with the U.S. government. While all these defectors claim to have important contacts in Iraq, the degree to which they could
sway military units is a question. Outside, their organization is still weak, and
they have yet to win Western support for the dominant roles to which they aspire. Their military backgrounds, while an advantage in terms of leadership
skills, may prove a liability with respect to civilian support, especially from
Kurds and Shi’ah.
The Iraq Communist Party. One group that has not received much notice from
the West is the ICP, one of the oldest and best organized opposition groups in
Iraq. Outlawed in Saddam’s Iraq, the ICP now has members abroad, especially in
Syria and in Western and Eastern Europe. It may survive underground inside
Iraq, but little has been heard from it in recent years, aside from remnants in the
north, where they have some Kurdish supporters and are allowed to operate. The
ICP organization is small and weak inside Iraq, and the party lost its patronage
with the collapse of the USSR. However, leftist, even Marxist, views are popular
in Iraq in intellectual circles, and they appeal to Kurdish and Shi’i dissidents, as
well as the lower classes, which have grown in recent years with sanctions. The
party’s anti-Western, anti-imperialist stand has prevented it from taking part in
U.S.-supported opposition activities. In a “day after” scenario it could emerge as
a significant intellectual force, but not one likely to condone a Western-oriented
regime or support U.S. aims in Iraq. The same can be said for a number of
smaller nationalist and leftist opposition groups, situated in Syria, that are unlikely to play a role in a U.S.-sponsored regime change.
THE POLICY DILEMMA
As this brief survey of the outside opposition indicates, the major problem with
exile groups lies in the fact that they would have to be put in power by the United
States, and probably maintained there by American forces if they are to survive
until a new constitutional regime can be established. With the exception of the
Kurds, who cannot take over Baghdad on their own, the opposition’s leadership
and organization is outside Iraq. While some groups could generate domestic
support if they were placed in power under U.S. forces, how much and in which
constituencies remain in question. They would have to contend with forces, institutions, and individuals already in place and desirous of maintaining their
positions in the hierarchy. In short, putting the outside opposition in power in
Iraq would require the occupation of the country. Invasion and occupation of
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Iraq is the most costly policy option for the United States, not only in military
and economic terms but politically as well. In time, even Iraqis who initially
greet the change of regime with relief and delight would turn against a foreign
occupying force. Regional states would do so even earlier. The level of military
support would have to be carefully calibrated—enough to sustain the new regime but not enough to generate increased anti-American sentiment in the region. Such feeling would impede the war on terrorism.
Although installation of the outside opposition is the most costly scenario for
the United States, it is the option most likely to effect genuine change in Iraq
over the long term. The exile opposition is the most Westernized Iraqi community; it is most likely to agree to eliminate WMD and reorient foreign policy in a
productive way. It has also had the most extensive exposure to democracy and
hence is most capable of leading a transformation of the system in that
direction.
By contrast, a change of regime from inside Iraq is the least costly option for
the United States. Such a change is likely, at least initially, to bring a centrist regime. This kind of change could be induced in a number of ways—most of
which must remain speculative. American pressure, including military, could
cause the regime to crack and important elements inside it to turn against
Saddam, to prevent an invasion and to assure survival of the regime in some
form. Regime change could also be brought about by military action from the
United States, including forces on the ground. The United States could then select a provisional local council from among forces inside Iraq, necessarily relying
heavily on technocrats and others with experience in administration. How to select such a group and on what basis is one of the major uncertainties with this
option. If the regime is overturned without U.S. troops on the ground, Washington will have little control over the sequel.
Any change from the center is likely to replicate the current distribution of
power, with heavy reliance on the Arab Sunni population and on the military
and bureaucratic institutions that currently run the country. Such a regime is
less likely to bring real change. If the military played an important role in the regime, several questions would arise. Would it be willing to relinquish all weapons of mass destruction? Would it be friendly to the United States and willing to
reorient foreign policy in a Western direction, or would nationalism resurface?
Above all, would such a regime be able to stabilize itself without the assistance of
U.S. forces? Would it be more inclusive of Kurds and Shi’ah, more open and
democratic? Infusing such a system with perhaps four or five thousand people
from the vast Iraqi exile community who had been persuaded to return, even if
temporarily, would help set the transformation on a desirable path. But these
outsiders would have to be welcome to the new centrist regime.
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In general, any change from inside Iraq will probably have to rely on the second tier of leaders, military and civilian, now in place. The new regime would
have, first of all, to establish a modicum of stability in and control over the country—a difficult task. It would have to incorporate more Kurds and Shi’ah into
the central government, to provide this stability. It would have to accommodate
the aims and goals, especially on WMD and foreign policy, for which the United
States would have spent so much political, diplomatic, and even military capital.
In the end, how much support a new leadership has inside Iraq may not be
the most important question facing the opposition but rather how much it has
from the United States. The primary American interest in regime change is an
end to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and to its hostile behavior. A more
democratic government is an important, but secondary, consideration. From
the perspective of the United States, the fall of the current regime may be the easiest part of the undertaking. Replacing Saddam’s regime with a new leadership
that is willing and able to satisfy U.S. strategic demands may prove costly, and it
may require a long-term American presence on the ground. The United States
may be about to learn that “empire” cannot be achieved on the cheap.

NOTES

1. As is well known, Iraq is a multiethnic,
multisectarian country. The three main communities consist of the Arab Sunnis (15–20
percent of the population), who inhabit
Baghdad and the cities and towns of the
Tigris and Euphrates north and west of the
capital; the Arab Shi’ah (over 60 percent),
who inhabit Baghdad (a Shi’i-majority city)
and the territory south to Basra; and the
Kurds (about 17 percent), who inhabit the
mountains and plains of the northwest. Iraq
also has sizable minorities of Turkmen and
various Christian minorities.
2. The PUK has contested control over this area,
but its authority is weak. The region has been
under strong Islamic influence; there have
been numerous press reports of hostile foreign groups penetrating the region (see the
Washington Post, 21 August 2002). On 2 April
2002, Barham Salih, the PUK’s prime minister, was nearly assassinated and a number of
his bodyguards were killed, presumably by
these forces.

or five years, and they were observed by the
author during visits to the region in 1992,
1993, and especially 1998.
4. During the rebellion of 1991, despite some
cooperation with other opposition parties,
the Kurdish parties were not willing to sacrifice their own aims or extend their control
beyond the Kurdish area.
5. In 1995 and 1996, the PUK cooperated with
the Iraq National Congress (INC) in failed
military attempts to overthrow the regime, an
indication of PUK willingness at that time to
go beyond Kurdish aims.
6. The 1991 rebellion broke out in Basra in February and March, in the wake of the Persian
Gulf War. Violence, especially among the
Shi’i population, spread to other cities, including Baghdad, and inspired a parallel uprising in the Kurdish north. Iraqi forces
brutally quelled the uprising in the following
months, first in the south, then in the
Kurdish zone.

3. These conditions have been frequently described by visiting journalists in the past four
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7. Published statement of the Tribal Alliance of
Iraq, 5 May 2002 (photocopy furnished to
author).
8. The origin and nature of the Ansar is not
clear. The PUK accuses it of ties to al-Qa‘ida.
Associated Press, Ankara, Turkey, 29 April
2002.
9. Hakim’s father was Muhsin al-Hakim, the
chief marja’ from 1955 to 1970.
10. A son of al-Khu’i, Muhammad Taqi, was
killed in 1994. In 1998, two senior clerics
were killed—Ayatollah Shaykh Murthdhal-Burujardi in April, and Grand Ayatollah
Shaykh Mirza ‘Ali al-Ghawari in June.
11. For example, there were clashes between government and opposition forces in the Basra
province in August 1996 and in April 1997.
In 1998 Vice President Izzat al-Din Ibrahim
was nearly assassinated in Karbala, and in
1999 there were attacks on Ba’th Party headquarters in Basra in April, and on a Republican Guard unit in May. ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid,
one of the regime’s henchmen, was finally
put in charge of security in the south—
temporarily.

MARR

Sunni; there were only three Shi’ah, and one
Christian. Geographically, twelve were from
the “Sunni triangle” in the center, one from
Baghdad; only four were from the rest of
Iraq, excluding the area under Kurdish control. Isam al-Khafaji, “State Terrorism and
the Degradation of Politics,” in Iraq since the
Gulf War, ed. Fran Hazelton (London: Zed
Books, 1994), pp. 28–9.
14. Technically, the Albu Nasir is Saddam’s tribe,
and the Bayjat his clan. In practice the two
are virtually interchangeable.
15. See, for example, Amatzia Baram, Building
toward Crises (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998),
chap. 2; and Faleh A. Jabbar, From Storm to
Thunder (Tokyo: Institute for Developing
Economies, 1998), chap. 1.
16. One author has posed a hierarchy of clans in
the current power structure, with the Bayjat
on top, followed by the Tikritis, the Duris,
and various clans from Anbar Province,
Samarra’, and the Juburis. Jabbar, p. 6.
17. Ibid., p. 12.

12. These areas include the provinces of Baghdad, Ramadi, Nineveh, Anbar, Salah-al-Din,
and Diyala.

18. Chalabi is under a cloud in Jordan for allegations of banking fraud stemming from his
previous management of the family banking
business.

13. For example, of the seventeen members of
the Regional Command of the Party elected
after the 1991 rebellion, thirteen were Arab

19. He is a maternal cousin of Faysal II, the last
king of Iraq, killed when the monarchy was
overthrown in 1958.
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NATO’S EUROPEAN MEMBERS
Partners or Dependents?
Richard L. Russell

T

he transatlantic relationship is fraying at the edges. The Europeans are increasingly uneasy over the George W. Bush administration’s national security policy, judging by the pronouncements coming from government officials.
While the tragedies of 11 September 2001 garnered Americans broad sympathy
in Europe, emotional support since has steadily eroded. What had been European sympathy on a personal level to American pain and suffering is gradually
giving way to anxiety about this nation’s preponderance of global power, mixed
with an awareness—if in many instances only subconsciously—of Europe’s
own shortcomings, particularly in the realm of international security.
Certainly, European capitals are lending a hand in the diplomatic, intelligence, and police work needed to track and round up al-Qa‘ida operatives who
use Europe as a hub for international operations. Nevertheless, Europeans are
weary of an American “war on terrorism” that has become an open-ended campaign that may drift into areas where European and American interests diverge.
They are uneasy that Washington may have cast too
The author is professor, Near East–South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies, the National Defense University,
wide a net in labeling North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as
and associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
constituting an “axis of evil.” The Europeans fear that
Georgetown University. He is the author of George F.
the American ego has been unduly inflated by the imKennan’s Strategic Thought: The Making of an
American Political Realist (1999).
pressive military campaign that ousted the Taliban reThe author would like to thank Kristin Archick for comgime in Afghanistan and disrupted the al-Qa‘ida
ments and Richard Tuong Do for research assistance in
network, and that the victory (of sorts) in Afghanistan
preparation of this article.
will fuel American ambitions to take on their erstThe views expressed are those of the author and do not
represent those of the U.S. government, the Department
while enemy Saddam Hussein. While Washington is
of Defense, or the National Defense University.
inclined to see the advantages of Saddam’s removal
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1
from power, the Europeans dwell on potential dangers
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of unintended consequences, particularly the negative impact of an American
military campaign on Arab political opinion toward the West. Even the most
stalwart of American allies in Nato, the United Kingdom under Prime Minister
Tony Blair, is facing an uphill battle in persuading its public of the wisdom of
taking on Saddam.
The debate about war with Iraq is touching a raw European nerve that is exposed by bouts of conflict but subsides in times of peace. European prestige—or
reputation for power—has taken a beating in the post–Cold War period, which
has been characterized more by conflict than by peace. Europeans over the past
twelve years have been reminded repeatedly of the decay of their military capabilities—in the Persian Gulf War, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and most
recently in Afghanistan. They have talked loudly about the need to redress military shortcomings, but their actions have not been commensurate with their
words. Even if European political sentiment were to be turned around by the
Bush administration’s diplomatic efforts to persuade Nato capitals to support a
war against Saddam, the Europeans would be able to make little real military
contribution to the campaign. A war with Iraq would be yet another entry on the
growing list of international security challenges in which the Europeans were
not up to the task.
Much ink has been spilt in the political debate over Nato enlargement, but
less on combat power—the litmus test for a military organization, which Nato
still purports to be. On the whole, the military capabilities of Nato members—
with the exception of the United States—are seriously declining. Nato’s dwindling military capabilities, moreover, have now been dissipated by numerous
new arrivals to alliance ranks—the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. Candidates for Nato membership share important characteristics—they bring potentially large security burdens but few military resources.
Nato’s security balance sheet is already in the red with respect to its core
members, and it is poised to deteriorate further with new arrivals. An outside
observer more interested in seeing Nato buttress its military capabilities than
in its political pomp and circumstance is compelled, like the child watching
the parade, to cry out, “The king has no clothes!”
ATROPHYING MILITARY POWER
Nato militaries in the 1990s had taken halting steps in downsizing,
professionalizing, and making their forces more mobile and readily deployable
for operations outside of Europe. These steps are designed to convert large
standing armies—filled with conscripts and designed to fight a war with the
Warsaw Pact in Central Europe—to forces suitable for new and, more often than
not, unanticipated security challenges outside Nato’s traditional area of interest.
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The British and French militaries have made the longest strides and of the Nato
forces are now the most capable of deploying abroad.
The other major European power, Germany, is lagging far behind. Berlin still
clings to the old notion of a large military with conscript troops for territorial
defense; it looks to smaller forces
The Europeans have belatedly recognized their of volunteer soldiers to fill operational assignments abroad, such
profound military shortcomings, but their reas in the Balkans. As Mary Elise
form efforts are moving at a glacial pace.
Sarotte points out, “The majority
of policy-makers, practitioners
and even academic theorists in Germany consider conscription not only well
1
suited but also essential to facing today’s security challenges.” The Germans
have been slow to grasp the reality that ten-month conscripts simply cannot be
trained sufficiently to perform the tasks of modern militaries and that sustaining them siphons off funds needed to invest in professional soldiers and modern
arms and equipment.
The lack of adequate funding generally impedes the modernization of European forces, which are largely obsolescent in their weapons and equipment. European publics and politicians have been loath to fund their militaries at the
expense of social welfare programs. The European Union (EU) has 375 million
people, compared with the American population of 280 million, but the fifteen
EU members collectively spend on their armed forces a figure amounting to
2
about 57 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Moreover, the few military acquisition programs that the Europeans have been able to undertake are proving inordinately expensive in comparison to equivalent American systems. The
Europeans, driven by the political incentives to sustain employment in arms industries and by a desire to avoid dependence on the United States for major
weapons systems, are sinking substantial amounts of money into domestic arms
procurement. Such programs as the Eurofighter and a new military transport
aircraft have been plagued by cost overruns and delivery delays.
If one could set aside issues of employment and prestige, one could argue that
the European militaries would be far better off buying American weapons systems. Large purchases of American armored vehicles and transport and combat
aircraft would lower per-unit costs for buyers on both sides of the Atlantic. The
American weapons systems are also more capable and easier to sustain than
their untested European counterparts. In such a case, though the Europeans
would in fact be more dependent on the United States for major weapons systems than they would wish, their political voices would carry more weight in
Nato councils, because they would have military means.
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As it is, the European militaries, broadly speaking, are about thirty years behind those of the United States; their capabilities are roughly equivalent to those
of the American military in the Vietnam War. The Europeans lack, for instance,
strategic bombers, military transport aircraft, air-to-air refueling, precision munitions, rapid deployment capabilities, cruise missiles, and spaceborne surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications assets. These shortcomings in
comparison with U.S. forces, moreover, probably will grow larger as Washington
exploits transformational technologies to modernize its own forces. The Europeans are poorly situated to exploit the rapid information-technology advances,
3
which are critical to command, control, computers, intelligence, and logistics.
The Europeans for the foreseeable future will be unable to maximize destruction of enemy forces while minimizing “collateral damage” to innocent civilians.
Without accurate, time-sensitive intelligence coupled with precision munitions,
European militaries will not be able to wage war within the moral parameters
expected by European public opinion. As Nato secretary general Lord Robertson
has said, the Europeans need precision munitions, “which are the only things
4
you can now use to satisfy international law and international public opinion.”
The Europeans have belatedly recognized their profound military shortcomings, but their reform efforts are moving at a glacial pace. As Robert Hunter observes, the most important innovation at the EU summit at Helsinki in
December 1999 was the setting up of a “Headline Goal” to become able by 2003
to deploy and sustain forces capable of performing humanitarian, peacekeeping,
and peacemaking operations. The summit envisioned a force of up to fifteen brigades with fifty to sixty thousand troops, plus support and rotation elements of
two hundred thousand more, ready for deployment in sixty days and sustainable
5
for a year. A former chairman of Nato’s Military Committee and one of the
most insightful military thinkers in Europe, General Klaus Naumann of Germany, however, estimated in 2001 that the EU needs a decade to build up sub6
stantial power-projection capabilities.
The gap in military capabilities is growing so large that some Americans
question the value of combined operations with Nato partners, particularly for
missions involving substantial force projection, such as the campaign in Afghanistan. David Gompert, Richard Kugler, and Martin Libicki perceive a vicious circle: “Because it cannot bank on the Europeans to join in projecting
power to defend common interests, the United States makes it unnecessary for
them to do so. Because they are not needed, the Europeans, already skittish
about such a controversial strategic mission for their forces, fail to invest in the
capabilities and technologies that might begin to satisfy the Americans that it is
7
prudent to include allies in their plans to project power.”
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FAILING COMBAT TESTS
The military contingencies facing Nato in the post–Cold War period have proliferated and made painfully clear the deleterious effects of the downward spiral in
European military spending and modernization. To be sure, Nato states have
played important supporting roles in post–Cold War conflicts, granting overflight rights and logistic and base support, and rendering invaluable economic,
financial, and political assistance. The United States, though, has performed the
“heavy lifting,” providing the bulk of combat power, in all of these cases. Such
combat power as Nato states have contributed has done little to destroy the
armed forces of adversaries; it has amounted to little more than symbolism, representing political support of American projection of its own combat power.
The war in Kosovo in 1999 marked the largest military endeavor in the alliance’s history. The Kosovo campaign was publicly hailed as a great Nato achievement that forced Serb forces out of the province, stopped the terrorizing of the
Kosovo population, and allowed refugees to return home. In the corridors of
power, however, the Kosovo war was perceived as a blow to European prestige. It
required a more intense application of military power than had Nato operations
in Bosnia earlier in the decade, when American airpower was used only periodically to pressure the Serbs. The scale of those operations was dwarfed by the
Kosovo air campaign. Europeans were humiliated by the demonstration of the
fact that without the United States they lacked the military means even to take
on a minor power like Serbia, in their own neighborhood. In that campaign
Nato aircraft released 23,614 munitions, 30 percent of which were precisionguided munitions—a sharp increase from the 10 percent dropped in the Gulf
War. The number of precision-guided munitions expended by European allies,
however, was only 7 percent of the overall total in the war against Serbia, reflect8
ing a shortfall in European inventories. In addition, European Nato members,
lacking support aircraft, largely left such work as air-to-air refueling and airborne electronic warfare, surveillance, and reconnaissance to U.S. aircraft,
which flew about 70 percent of the twenty-seven thousand support sorties flown
9
during the war.
After the battle, the Europeans were hard pressed to marshal resources for
peacekeeping in Kosovo. Secretary General Lord Robertson acknowledged that
Nato’s European members struggled to deploy forty thousand peacekeeping
troops to Kosovo—only 2 percent of the combined total of about two million
soldiers they had in uniform. The struggle reflected the reality that despite
post–Cold War rhetoric, European militaries today look much as they did dur10
ing the Cold War, when they were organized for territorial defense. It is important to note that European militaries had suffered peacekeeping failures in
Bosnia and had turned to the United States for help on the ground to shore up
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the tenuous peace. The humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo
were significantly less demanding than what would have been required had
Slobodan Milosevic not ordered his forces to withdraw. On the eve of
Milosevic’s capitulation, Prime Minister Blair alone pressed President William
Clinton to contemplate a massive ground intervention to expel Serb forces from
Kosovo. Milosevic thus saved continental European military prestige from another body blow, for it would have been American and British ground forces doing the expelling.
In fact, even at what was presumably the zenith of Nato combat power,
shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, European partners were poorly prepared to wage high-intensity warfare. Although Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM involved a “coalition of the willing” and were not formal Nato
undertakings, twelve Nato members contributed forces: Turkey provided critical air-basing rights; Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and
Greece supported air operations; others sent naval forces to participate in the
maritime interdiction effort. Only the British and French, however, contributed
substantial combat forces. The British on the eve of the ground war had in the
Gulf region thirty-five thousand troops, 170 tanks, and seventy aircraft, while
the French had sent 13,500 troops,
Nato’s dwindling military capabilities are soon forty tanks, and fifty-six combat
11
to be dissipated by numerous new arrivals to
aircraft. Nonetheless, the United
alliance ranks.
States provided the lion’s share of
the strategic lift and logistics as
well as 75 percent of the combat aircraft, 85 percent of the combat sorties, and 90
12
percent of the ground forces that retook Kuwait.
The European combat contribution to the Gulf War was helpful in, but by no
means critical to, the campaign to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait. British ground
13
forces advanced quickly and overran about three Iraqi divisions. Although the
French defense minister objected to the Bush administration’s orchestration of
the war, more strategically nimble minds in Paris prevailed, and the French contingent, an airborne division, seized an Iraqi air base (well away from the center
14
of the American-led effort). At the time of the Gulf War, the Germans were
constrained from participation by their constitution, which was subsequently
redefined to allow the dispatch of German combat troops to Bosnia.
In the aftermath of 11 September, great fanfare accompanied Nato’s activation of Article 5 of its charter in support of the United States. However, the volume of military assets that Nato members have since offered in fulfillment of the
“self defense article” has been underwhelming. To be fair, as Philip Gordon
points out, Nato partners had made offers of assistance that the Pentagon declined.15 The Pentagon undoubtedly worried that integrating European assets
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into the Afghan campaign would have diverted too much attention from the war
effort. Also, the political constraints that each European government would
have attached to the use of its respective contingent would complicate command
and control, all for little or no payoff on the battlefield.
Nato contributions to the campaign in Afghanistan, then, much like those to
the Gulf War, have been at the margins, with the notable exception of the British,
whose able forces—the Special Air Service, Special Boat Service, and Royal
Marines—were in the heat of battle. Soldiers from the United Kingdom, France,
and Canada frequently participated in Afghan operations, while Danish, Norwegian, and German forces did so to a lesser extent. Allies flew at least three
thousand sorties on relief, reconnaissance, and other missions, and Nato
AWACS* aircraft assisted U.S. airspace patrols. French aircraft flew bombing
missions in Operation ANACONDA, the British fired several cruise missiles, and
16
the Netherlands and Italy deployed ships to the Arabian Sea. The allies may yet
play a larger role in Afghanistan as the campaign shifts from warfare to peacekeeping and “nation building”—much as they have done in the Balkans—as evidenced by Turkish command of the peacekeeping mission in Kabul.
CONTEMPLATING A GULF REMATCH
Sentiment in Nato capitals is decidedly against American overtures to join in a
military campaign against Iraq. The Bush administration may yet, by adroit diplomatic maneuvers, reduce this opposition—save that of Paris, which has traditionally curried favor with Baghdad. As Bush the elder managed to bring the
Europeans along before the Gulf War, Bush the younger may be able to convince
them to accept the strategic rationale for taking on Iraq anew.
To do so, the United States needs to lay out the case that a convergence of
American and European interests exists in the use of force to rid Iraq of Saddam
and his weapons of mass destruction.17 The Europeans and Americans both
wish to ensure that no one power dominates the Gulf and its oil. Iraq’s military
was weakened substantially by the Gulf War, and international sanctions have
prevented new infusions of military equipment—primarily from Russia,
France, and China—but Iraq’s forces remain formidable vis-à-vis the conventional forces of the Gulf states. If Saddam were clandestinely to acquire nuclear
weapons, his conventional forces could storm Kuwait and the eastern province
of Saudi Arabia while he held U.S. forces at bay with the threat of nuclear attack.
Under such a nuclear umbrella, Saddam could capture the lion’s share of Gulf
oil-producing areas and thus dominate the global market—the proceeds from
which would fund a Gulf empire centered on Baghdad.
* AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System, based on the E-3 Sentry aircraft.
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The United States needs to persuade European partners that such a scenario
is not fanciful but decidedly within the realm of plausibility for a megalomaniac
like Saddam Hussein. After its experiences with the likes of Hitler and more recently Milosevic, Europe should need no reminder of the dangers posed by megalomaniacs. Milosevic, fortunately, lacked the means to exercise power on the
international stage; that is not the case with Saddam, who, if left to his own devices, could wield power that poses grave risks to the West and the Gulf region.
However, even if Washington were to elicit acquiescence in a war against Iraq
from most Nato capitals, their militaries are not capable of any better combat
performance than they have turned in over the past twelve years. In a renewed war
against Iraq, the United States would again carry the burden of high-intensity
conflict, while the European partners again play auxiliary roles. After an American military occupation of Iraq, the Europeans could assume larger roles in policing and peacekeeping, perhaps under multinational or United Nations
auspices. The manpower demands of administering post-Saddam Iraq, however, would outstrip the resources of most Nato allies, whose militaries are already fully occupied in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. A notable
exception would probably be Turkey, which has consistently made manpower
contributions to multinational operations, whether in the Balkans or in Afghanistan, though they have escaped the international limelight.
LOOKING FOR MILITARILY CAPABLE ALLIES
The events of 11 September brought on a war of necessity to destroy the terrorist
network that, with its political backers, had caused the slaughter of thousands of
innocent civilians on American soil. To fight this war, the United States has been
able to tap the military capabilities largely nurtured during the Cold War. More
recently, it has begun to see the necessity of recapitalizing and “transforming” its
armed forces, of exploiting the “revolution in military affairs,” to prepare for
further such unforeseen threats. The European Nato partners, in contrast, do
not have the military wherewithal to deal with post–Cold War contingencies. If,
as it appears in retrospect, European Nato members were “coasting” in their military commitments in the last stages of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the prospect of the so-called peace dividend, they got off their
bicycles entirely.
Balkan operations have drained the limited military resources that remain to
the Europeans, forcing them to increasingly rely on American power, even at the
expense of their political prestige. The Europeans fret that the Americans, to
meet the needs of their war on terrorism, will be compelled to pull up their military stakes in the Balkans. While some hold that such a U.S. move would jeopardize transatlantic ties, others argue, and with greater merit, that it would be
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healthy for an increasingly bureaucratized and militarily ineffective alliance.
Nato has 18,400 troops in Bosnia, of which 3,100 are American, and thirty-nine
18
thousand troops in Kosovo and Macedonia, including 5,700 Americans. European Union assumption of the role of Balkan peacekeeper would show European parliaments and publics the benefits and necessity of budgetary support to
their beleaguered militaries. The need to conduct Balkan operations effectively
without American assistance would prompt European politicians to make the
tough political decisions needed.
Nato is standing at the abyss of military irrelevance. There can be no gainsaying
the importance of political, intelligence, diplomatic, and police assistance that
Nato partners have lent to the United States in the war against al-Qa‘ida. These
are indeed critical instruments of national power that need to be brought to
bear, primarily on a bilateral basis, not through the alliance’s bureaucracy. But
the Nato allies were woefully unable to contribute in the military sphere to the
campaign in Afghanistan and would be largely militarily irrelevant to a renewed
fight against Iraq. Nato’s political efficacy in the past was in no small measure attributable to its military power. In the Balkans, none of the plethora of the multinational security organizations with purviews in Europe—the former West
European Union, the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe, or even
the United Nations—could have changed the political-military situation on the
ground in the Balkans to the extent Nato could, by virtue of its military capabilities. Today, however, Nato’s comparative advantage, absent American military
power, is seriously eroding, making the alliance barely distinguishable from the
political forums that dot the European landscape.
This inability of Nato’s European members to make ends and means match
should compel statesmen to take a hard look at the strategic rationale for further
alliance enlargement. Nato’s ability to prosecute a war under the governance of
nineteen political leaderships was tested and found wanting in the Kosovo campaign. More Nato members will only make the command and control more
cumbersome, to the detriment of the alliance’s ability to achieve political goals
through military means. Nato’s new and potential members, moreover, bring a
host of potential new security requirements for the alliance but little by way of
19
resources. Extending membership to the Baltic States in particular strains the
efficiency of the alliance; Nato would be hard pressed to mount an Article 5 (collective self-defense) mission should the Baltic States become embroiled with
Russia. Making the Baltic States Nato members might work to bring about a
large war rather than to deter or defuse a crisis.
As it stands today, the United States, with respect to its transatlantic alliance,
is losing security partners and gaining security dependents. Washington has
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more to fear from the steady erosion of military capabilities of Nato partners
than from the potential distancing that might attend an institutionalized “European security and defense policy” (ESDP). The United States should back ESDP
efforts to the extent that they promise a political, military, and economic environment in which European states might reverse the downward spiral of their
defense spending and commitments. ESDP could prove to be of potential
“blowback” value to Nato capabilities. It might be the means by which Europeans shoulder primary responsibility for security in and around Europe, which
could free up American forces for security demands in the Middle East and Asia,
to which the Europeans cannot project their power. Over the longer run, European forces could work alongside American expeditionary forces in major contingencies outside Europe.
In the final analysis, the United States needs reliable and capable military
partners in Europe. The United States and Europe share history, culture, values,
and traditions, and they pursue an array of mutual interests. These interests are
likely to come under assault from a variety of adversaries, and from unanticipated directions; no one foresaw, for example, several months before the Kosovo
war that the alliance was on the verge of its first major conflict. The new challenges to American and European interests may stem from in or around Europe,
or farther afield in the Middle East or Asia. Unless the Europeans reverse course,
the United States will find itself with nowhere to turn for military help in Europe
and will suffer, ironically, criticism for “unilateralism,” “hegemony,” or
“hyperpower” from once-stalwart allies now smarting from wounded pride. If
left on its current trajectory, Nato will become yet another European “talk shop,”
plush with lofty rhetoric but devoid of the military accessories needed to protect
Western interests in a violent world.

NOTES

1. Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform
and European Security, Adelphi Paper 340
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001),
p. 22.
2. “If Only Words Were Guns,” The Economist,
24 November 2001, p. 47.
3. For a thorough examination of the dimensions of the problem, see David S. Yost, “The
NATO Capabilities Gap and the European
Union,” Survival, Winter 2000, pp. 97–128.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

4. Steven Erlanger, “Europe’s Military Gap,”
New York Times, 16 March 2002, p. A1.
5. Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and
Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion—or Competitor? (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002),
pp. 63–4.
6. Quoted in Sarotte, pp. 57–8.
7. David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and
Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a
Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ.
Press, 1999), p. 5.

43

40

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 26

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

8. John E. Peters, David Shlapak, and Timothy
Liston, “Allied Power Projection Capabilities,” chap. 4 in Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions, ed.
Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, and
F. Stephen Larrabee (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2001), p. 75.

and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict,
1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New
World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 349–52.
15. Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11 September,” Survival, Winter 2001, pp. 92–3.

10. Cited in “The NATO Capability Gap,” Strategic Survey 1999/2000 (London: Oxford Univ.
Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 16.

16. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, pp.
48–50. For details of allied and coalition military contributions to operations in Afghanistan, see the USCENTCOM Website at http://
www.centcom.mil/Operations/joint.htm.

11. John E. Peters and Howard Deshong, Out of
Area or Out of Reach? European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995), pp. 7, 16.

17. For an argument for waging war against Iraq,
see Richard L. Russell, “War and the Iraq Dilemma: Facing Harsh Realities,” Parameters,
Autumn 2002, pp. 46–61.

12. Richard Sokolsky, F. Stephen Larrabee, and
Ian Lesser, “The Allies and Energy Security:
Perspectives and Policies,” chap. 3 in Persian
Gulf Security, ed. Sokolsky, Johnson, and
Larrabee, p. 34.

18. Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Asks NATO to
Shift to Wide Fight against Terror,” New York
Times, 19 December 2001, pp. B1, B4.

9. Ibid., p. 76.

13. Peters and Deshong, p. 42.
14. On the French debate on military participation in the Gulf War, see Lawrence Freedman

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26

19. For an argument for a limited Nato membership, see Richard L. Russell, “American Security Policy and NATO’s Future,” European
Security, Spring 1999, pp. 16–24.

44

War College: Winter 2003 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

45

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 26

Geoffrey Wawro is professor of strategic studies in the
Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
Specializing in military and naval history, especially
European, he earned a doctorate at Yale University in
1992. He has taught at Yale, Oakland University (in
Rochester, Michigan), and previously at the Naval War
College. Since 2000 he has appeared on cable television
as the anchor of the History Channel’s program Hardcover History. His most recent book is Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914 (Routledge, 2000); his
shorter publications include journal articles, op-ed
pieces, and entries in the Oxford Companion to Military History (2001).
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26

46

War College: Winter 2003 Full Issue

OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

LETTER FROM FRANCE

Geoffrey Wawro

The most popular television show in France
these days must be Les Guignols de l’Info—“the
evening news puppets”—who do a ten-minute
turn every night on the cable channel “Canal
Plus.” Their humor is excoriating, and they are
as hard on Princess Caroline of Monaco or
businessman Bernard Tapié as they are on
President Jacques Chirac—who is never referred to as “Chirac” or “the president” but as
supermenteur, “super liar.” Increasingly, however, America is the target of these pitiless puppets. There is a George W. Bush guignol, a perfect copy, who stumbles
rhetorically and shouts the gaseous platitudes that the French associate with
America: “We want to make the world a better place. . . . We are working for freedom and democracy in your land and ours.” Robespierre was the last Frenchman
to utter incautious statements like these, and he lived more than two hundred
years ago. Sometimes the guignols gather to sing, as the American ones did—in
extraordinarily bad taste—near the one-year anniversary of 11 September. The
song was “We Are the World,” except that the puppets’ refrain was “we fu—— ze
world,” and the rest was no less disturbing (considering that this satire was playing
to millions in French prime time): “we fu—— ze world / we fu—— ze children / we
fu—— ze forests and the sea.” Each time Bush stepped in to the mike to shout
the refrain in a Frenchified Texas accent, French subtitles drove the point home,
with prurient twists best left to French speakers: “On encule le monde . . . on
emmerde le monde.” Plainly, America is soiling and defiling the world in every
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imaginable way. Bush is but a marginal object of this French humor; Canal Plus
reserves its very best barbs for that true archetype of America, “Commandant
Sylvestre,” a beefy American in black beret and fatigues who looks just like
Sylvestre . . . Stallone.
To the sleek, urbane French, Sylvester Stallone—uneducated, unrefined, undiscriminating, inarticulate, muscle-bound—is the United States. Rambo, far
better than Bush, Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice, or even Donald Rumsfeld
(who occasionally “appears” on Canal Plus to do a convincing Joseph Goebbels
imitation), encapsulates every American stereotype. He is colossally ignorant,
which is regrettable, since he is the single-handed Police du Monde. Well, not
quite single-handed—in a tribute to American powers of science and engineering, Canal Plus recently cloned Commandant Sylvestre. There are now two of
them, and what a team they are (they conclude “we fu—— ze world,” crooning
into the mike together: “We make ze world a better place for me and . . . me”). In
an episode that aired in July 2002, the two Sylvestres flew in a C-130 Hercules to
the relief of starving Afghans. While one Sylvestre heaved out food packages, the
other dropped five-hundred-pound bombs. Food-bomb-food-bomb . . . bomb.
Panic! The one Sylvestre glances inquiringly at the other, who had been late
with his food package, then shrugs indifferently: “It doesn’t matter. . . .” Foodbomb-food-bomb. . . . On another night, they cruise in a bomber over Kandahar,
one flying the aircraft, the other with his eyes glued to a bombsight. “You
missed,” the Sylvestre in the pilot’s seat shrieks. The bombardier Sylvestre looks
up from his work, his eyes glazed and cross-hatched like the lens of a bombsight.
They are killing machines, these Americans.
In another episode, the two Sylvestres hunker in the desert sands around a
map of the Middle East. “We must execute a surgical strike against Afghanistan,”
one grunts to the other, who agrees, pokes a blunt finger through the map, and
rips out the entire country of Afghanistan. Dim Neanderthals that they are, the
two Sylvestres are just clever enough to play their part in the great conspiracy
that some French truly believe unites Osama Bin Laden and the United States. In
June, Figaro, the most respected conservative French daily, ran a story titled
“Why the Americans Let Bin Laden Escape.” A few days later, the anchor (also a
puppet) of Les Guignols picked up a phone in the studio and called Bin Laden’s
cell phone. The Bin Laden puppet answered (“’ello?”); the anchor prepared to
speak but was stopped by an explosion of angry whispering on Bin Laden’s end
of the line. It was the unmistakable voice of Commandante Sylvestre—South
Philly mingled with Créteil or Bobigny (scrofulous suburbs of Paris)—who
raged, “Osama, how many times do I have to tell you to turn off your cell phone
when we’re in a meeting!”
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Les Guignols—nightly at eight o’clock—are over the top, but not by much. A
September 2002 German Marshall Fund poll found that 63 percent of French
people believe that the United States should blame itself for the 11 September attacks, because of its blinkered support for Israel and its heavy-handed presence
in the Mideast. Ninety-one percent of the French believe that the European Union
must become an economic and military superpower to contest the global dominance of the United States. On both questions, France led the other EU member
states by a wide margin. One night in June, I sat after dinner with a group of Parisians near Pigalle and mentioned that I work for the U.S. government. “Aha,”
scoffed one young Frenchman (a well-educated businessman in heavy industry), “so you work for our nemesis.” “Really?” I replied, “what do you mean?”
“You Americans,” he began, “you see the world as black and white, when it is really a shade of gray. Everything is gray, nothing is black and white. The worst,” he
paused to sip his drink, “the very worst is . . . Woolfowees [Paul Wolfowitz]. We
despise him.” Why? Because “he is cooking up a war, just like you cooked up the
Gulf War.” How did we do that? “In France, we are convinced that the United
States fabricated both 11 September and the Gulf War. Your ambassador in
Baghdad was instructed by the State Department to take no position on the matter of Kuwait. That is to say, you lured Saddam into invading so that you could
smash him and increase your presence.” And 11 September? “It was all too easy,
box cutters and airplanes? America must have known in advance. You let that
happen.”
Perhaps the ravings of a young Americanophobe over drinks? The next
morning I walked to the legendary French grande école of international relations
and political science, the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (formerly the Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, or “Sciences-Po”) to meet Marie Mendras, a
distinguished research professor and defense analyst, over nothing stronger
than coffee. We sat in the lounge of the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches
Internationales (CERI), exchanged pleasantries, and then turned to the Middle
East. Pleasant at first, her tone changed the moment we left small talk for the war
on terror. “The average American understands nothing about Middle Eastern issues. What he does know is colored by propaganda, chiefly television news and
Bush’s rhetorical flourishes. It has been a year since September 11th, and it is
time for the U.S. to take a more diversified view, and use the advice and experience of others.” Will the United States craft a long-term political approach to the
Middle East or merely enshrine its furious short-term military reaction to the
terrorist strikes as permanent policy? As for the war on terror, she pronounced
what I would come to recognize as a European theme: “Terrorism is nothing
new, and in Europe we place it in a classical framework. There are rebels in any
society. And the terrorists of 9/11 are just another kind of rebel. Hence we
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deplore all of the sensationalist, exceptionalist rhetoric of America after 9/11. It
was not a banal event, but it was not unique either.” Far better than Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM, she said, would have been a serious effort to explain to the
American people why the 11 September attacks happened. “Why did they happen?” I interrupted. “Ah,” she motioned impatiently, “the West, Islam, capitalism, the clash of civilizations.” She returned to her original thought: “You are
silly, even childish, for trying to place so many complex problems—Palestine, Israel, fundamentalism, the military balance, corruption—into a single basket labeled international terrorism.” Such a course “restricts intelligent analysis and
makes it difficult to explore new ideas.”
I thought for a moment and then asked, “But why not at least try to smash international terrorism?” Is the game not worth the candle? “International terrorism,” she snorted. “That phrase is a perfect example of America’s politique
d’amalgam. You cannot fuse or amalgamate highly differentiated objects.
Al-Qa‘ida represents an altogether different problem than Palestine, Iraq, or
Chechnya; it therefore requires different methods and solutions.” I blanched at
her next words, which dripped with moral equivalence: “New York City has lost
its twin towers, but Grozny has lost everything.” That too is America’s fault, for
we have uncritically accepted President Vladimir Putin’s support in the war
against Islamist terror. For someone who had chided America for its simplicity,
Professor Mendras was proving rather simple herself—as if coalitions can be
made without compromises. Marie thought for a moment, and asked: “Why are
there no dissidents in U.S. policy making?” I offered the example of Colin
Powell. “He tries,” she replied, “but ultimately toes the line. His only effective resistance would be to resign, but he won’t.” She cited a lack of curiosity on the part
of U.S. strategists. They do not seem much interested in the complexity before
them. “Thus,” she concluded, “our European opposition to American methods
is actually quite healthy. It gives perspective. Our role is to decipher.” Marie finished with an observation that seemed to sum up the European perspective:
“September 11th was a massive trauma for you, and suddenly the world seems
different to you, but the world is not different. It’s just the same as it was before
September 11th, and the U.S. must not expect other countries to change their
long-term policies—France’s toward its ex-colonies, for example—at America’s
bidding. The soil here is different; we are countries with a memory.”
Emerging on the street, I returned home along the Quai d’Orsay, pausing to
admire the Foreign Ministry, a great sandstone hôtel in which France’s own efforts at world domination were pursued throughout the modern period. For a
nation that has consistently claimed to have a mission civilisatrice, a civilizing
mission—whether in the great leveling French Revolution, or the technocratic
First Empire, the nation-building Second Empire, or the expansionist Third and
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Fourth Republics—the French are evincing remarkable anguish at America’s
own attempts to spread a civilizing mission in its global struggle against terrorism. To be sure, they have strong points to make—our lack of initiative in Israel,
our demonization of Saddam (after years of supporting him), our politique
d’amalgam—but why the rage and vitriol? Why the head-in-the-sand refusal
even to consider American views? Mendras told me that when a professor from
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies came to speak at
Sciences-Po in March on the Terror War, the French faculty tried to bar him. “Arriving from the besieged fortress of Washington, with his mythical, naïve views
of Europe, he had nothing to offer us; he was not in touch with reality.” How can
we explain this gulf between Europe and America, this widening division? Perhaps, as Harvard scholar Michael Ignatieff observed in September 2002, the
doughty European left—only briefly silenced or co-opted after “9/11”—has
found its voice again.
Al-Qaeda’s attacks were indefensible, it was said, but they represented the Palestinians, the dispossessed of the Third World and the victims of U.S. imperialism everywhere. Faced with terrorism, the European left simply changed the subject. Instead of
hunting down Al-Qaeda, it said, we should be canceling Third World debt and tackling the manifold injustices of a global order built on free trade.

Wishing to change the subject myself, I stopped in at the Institut des Relations
Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS). Situated near the Bastille, a less chic and
prosperous corner of Paris than that inhabited by Sciences-Po, IRIS is surrounded by couscous joints and Arab markets. Searching for it, I recalled the fear
expressed by so many French analysts: “Here we have four million Muslims. How
can we join an American war against Islamists? What will that do to France?”
IRIS is located inside a faceless building. After banging furiously and impotently on the heavy iron door for five minutes, I tried the handle and let myself
in. Inside, and up two flights of stairs, I was introduced to two young analysts in
T-shirts—Bastien Nivet and Barthélemy Courmont, the former specializing, as
he put it, in “the emergence of the EU as a great power,” the latter in “nuclear issues and U.S. foreign policy.” Both were friendly and welcoming; it was a hot day,
and we sat around a conference room table, sweating copiously and sharing a
single small bottle of water. Whenever one of us would pour a thimbleful into
his cup, the other two would jealously measure the outpouring with their eyes.
“In America,” Bastien began, “you always envision competition in terms of
the EU versus the United States, or the EU versus Russia. But in my research I
prefer to look at the tensions and conflicts inside the EU. The key balance of
power is not between a united Europe and the other powers but within Europe
itself.” According to Nivet, France and Germany are far from agreement on the
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future of Europe. “The European visions of Paris and Berlin are quite different.
Berlin’s is much more ambitious and ‘unitarian’; France’s is nationalistic and emphasizes sovereignty over union. When it comes to defense, foreign policy, social
and economic issues, [Chancellor Gerhard] Schröder and [Foreign Minister
Joschka] Fischer are much more ‘communitarian’ than their French colleagues.”
This is no small difference, and it is one that has yet to be resolved more than
superficially. In general, the Germans are for a strengthening of European institutions and even a pan-European constitution to resolve the much-talked-about
“democratic deficit” in Europe—the absence of a direct electoral link between
the three hundred million EU citizens and their unelected “Eurocrats” in
Brussels who make all of the important decisions. Overweeningly confident in
their size and strength—eighty-five million citizens and a two-trillion-dollar
gross domestic product—the Germans want a rapid devolution of power from
the traditional national capitals—Madrid, Rome, Paris, Vienna—to new “European,” or regional, governments. The French, conscious of their own relative
weakness—fifty-nine million citizens and GDP of $1.4 trillion—just as resolutely defend l’Europe des patries—“the Europe of fatherlands,” or nations. True
union, Paris fears, would create a modern-day version of the Holy Roman Empire,
with a new Hohenstaufen dictating to the rest of Europe from Berlin or Brussels.
Before his unsuccessful run for the presidency earlier this year, Jean-Pierre
Chevenement said as much, sensationally charging that the Germans had not yet
recovered from the “derailment” of Nazism and were trying to make up lost
ground with their “federal proposals.” Chevenement later apologized, but President Chirac doggedly sticks to the view that there will be a United Europe of
States rather than the German preference, a United States of Europe.
Historians cannot miss the irony here. Since 1945, France has nourished the
“European idea” in order to contain Germany, to swaddle its latent might in European institutions. But now that Germany itself has embraced the “European
idea” and invited a host of Central European nations dependent on Germany
into the EU, the French are furiously backpedaling. In the early 1960s, President
Charles de Gaulle endorsed the withdrawal from Indochina, Algeria, and every
other overseas colony that resented French rule precisely so that he could
“re-found” French power on the European Community. The “French rider on
the German horse”—a politically vocal France atop an economically strong
Germany—carved out the famously independent, contrarian French niche in
the Cold War. But those days of borrowed glory are over; just as the Germans today dismiss American leadership—refusing to join “military adventures” in
Iraq—they have ditched the “French rider” and found their own political voice.
In his Delires et Defaites (“Frenzies and Defeats”), a book published two years
ago when France and Germany were battling over their respective European
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visions at the Nice summit, French diplomat Claude Fouquet accepted the new
reality. Others in Paris will follow; they will have no choice, as Germany’s assertiveness grows, globalization whittles at the French economy, EU citizens baulk
at undemocratic regulation from Brussels, and new member states crowd into
the union.
It is hard to abandon the historic dreams that continue to caress the French, because
we love this imagined France. But we must give it up, first because the truth requires
it, but especially because it blocks our understanding of the modern world, and
therefore our adjustment to it.

Besides the Franco-German tension—neatly described by American analyst
William Hay as “the quiet quake in Europe”—there are other debilitating conflicts inside the EU. According to Bastien Nivet, the conflict between big European states and small ones is at the top of the list. Countries like Spain and the
Netherlands, which have their own great-power pasts and traditions of expeditionary warfare (the Dutch deployed five entire divisions to suppress Indonesian
independence just fifty years ago), have bridled at the EU’s use of a “Contact
Group” for Yugoslav questions—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—that excludes them. When British prime minister Tony Blair invited his French and
German counterparts to Downing Street last year to discuss the European role
in Afghanistan, an indignant Silvio Berlusconi appeared uninvited to crash the
party and insist that Italy’s voice be heard. Spain and Holland followed suit.
The transatlantic link is another area in which there are differences. All of the
European states agree that there must be cooperation and amity between the
United States and the European Union, but there are widely differing degrees of
enthusiasm. Until Germany’s Schröder spoke out against “American adventures” in the heat of his fall 2002 electoral campaign, the biggest difference was
between France and Britain, between Britain’s “special relationship” with America and France’s call for an autonomous “Euro army” (and navy). Whereas the
British are convinced that the “special relationship” yields benefits—Nivet
called them “inflections”—that Britain would not enjoy as an independent or
even European power, the French insist that Britain (or the Europeans in general) cannot be a full-blown military power until they emerge from American
tutelage. Europe will never build armed forces on the scale of the United States
but will instead focus on closing the widening science-technology gap and
standing up a real and durable rapid-reaction force. “Britain is the key,” Nivet
said. “With its strong links to Washington and its expeditionary capabilities, it is
Europe’s most important player and must make up its mind.” In Nivet’s view,
Tony Blair must be under tremendous pressure; he is pro-European but inclined
to the “special relationship”—a glaring contradiction.
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I asked Barthélemy Courmont how the United States is perceived in France.
He gave an oddly specific answer, tracing the recent deterioration in relations to
the Kosovo air war. France and the United States very nearly took opposite sides
in the war; the French supported Serbia, allegedly tipping it off about pending
air strikes and vetoing 20 percent of the targets chosen by the Americans.
Courmont’s depiction of Chirac in that campaign reminded me of Lyndon
Johnson’s obsessive target selection in Vietnam. Every day Chirac reviewed the
target lists and struck out any that he considered too risky or escalatory. This did
not sit well with the Americans, who, according to Courmont, were irked that
they had been drawn there in the first place: “America’s arrival in Kosovo showed
the limits rather than the reach of U.S. authority; from that experience we Europeans learned that we too can manipulate Nato to get what we want, in this case
tranquility in the Balkans.”
September 11, Afghanistan, and the Terror War have deepened the divide. “At
first we thought that the United States had changed, that it would consult and
cooperate, but the war in Afghanistan revealed that it was just the same old
story: the United States would lead and everyone else would follow.” As we sat
perspiring in the late afternoon heat, Bastien Nivet picked up on the Terror
War—“The different approaches to terror reflect fundamental differences. Because we Europeans are poorly armed, we have always emphasized ‘critical engagement’ over blockades, embargos, or war. It’s not really a question of ‘moral
superiority,’ as some European pundits will suggest, it’s simply that we lack the
weapons to be bellicose. Hence our approach to a country like Iran is diametrically opposed to yours. We reject the term ‘axis of evil’ because there is no ‘axis’
or conspiracy binding states like Iran, Iraq, Libya, or North Korea. We consider
the whole concept of a ‘war on terrorism’ dubious, for there is no obvious enemy.
Fighting terrorism must be done at the roots, cutting problems, but also solving
them.” This is France’s principal worry about Israel; rather than negotiating the
Palestinian problem, the French believe, the Israelis are using the “war on terrorism” as an excuse to hammer the Palestinians and ignore their political
demands.
That evening I unwound in the company of my French nephew and his girlfriend at Esplanade, an ultra-chic restaurant facing the Hôtel des Invalides. (A
friend of mine had declined to attend on the grounds that it was trop
pretentieux.) We took a table on the sidewalk and sat facing what must be one of
the most impressive sights in Paris. Built by Louis XIV in the last decades of the
seventeenth century—France’s grand siècle—to house six thousand wounded or
destitute veterans, the Invalides, its tree-lined esplanade reaching to the Seine,
radiates the classical beauty and symmetry that so impress the French. Looking
around the restaurant as we awaited our impossibly small and expensive entrées
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and plats, I observed the same beauty and symmetry in the French. Everyone was
expensively dressed and coiffed, and people talking on cell phones did so almost
inaudibly, while simultaneously carrying on what appeared to be profound and
passionate conversations at their tables. There is a supreme confidence and
self-assurance about the French that is not to be denied.
Later I joined my unpretentious friend—a graduate of the domineering Ecole
Nationale d’Administration—for drinks with his other unpretentious friends to
celebrate the wrap-up of French legislative elections. Although slack voter turnout—fifteen million voters (40 percent of the electorate) did not bother to
vote—gave cause for concern, there was even more cause for astonishment. The
left had been decimated; there was no other word for it. Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin had been routed in his bid for the presidency, driven from office along
with other tribunes of the left, including Robert Hue (general secretary of the
French Communist Party) and Socialist Pierre Moscovici (who was promptly
consoled in best French fashion with a high EU job). Overall, the right took 399
of 577 seats in the National Assembly and crystalized around a new Chiracian
grouping called “the Movement for a Presidential Majority.” Weary of sterile
“cohabitation” by the Gaullists and Socialists, the French had voted a list of conservative candidates pledged to work with President Chirac to pass legislation
and invigorate the French economy.
I found Jean Guellec, a wild Breton conservative who was delighted with the
Socialist defeat—he had been the token conservative for years in an office of
Mitterand appointees—at a gritty bar in the Latin Quarter. A senior official in the
Jean Monnet–era Commissariat Général au Plan, Jean was joined by an electionday celebrity: the youngest deputy in the new National Assembly. A conservative
from France’s rust belt—the sooty northern towns around Arras and Valenciennes—this young thirty-something was a personality straight from the pages of
Emile Zola. By the restless way he looked around the bar, it was clear that he was
enjoying Paris no less than Zola’s slightly debauched députés. I asked him what it
meant to be a part of Chirac’s new movement for a presidential majority, and he
replied that it was time for the assembly to solve problems and pass legislation;
strong leadership was needed. When I countered that this was an age-old struggle in French history—between “national” presidents and provincial deputies
fighting for local or ideological interests, whose conflict was not generally resolved by an unchecked president (think of the “presidential regimes” of the
Bonapartes, or Marshals MacMahon and Pétain)—he replied that forceful measures were needed to “break the impasse.” When I showed him Le Parisien’s
headline of the day—“TROP?”—too much?, as in “too much presidential
power?”—he shrugged indifferently.
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In fact he is probably right. It is hard to imagine anything changing abruptly
in France, even with a presidential majority. France, like most European countries, is wedded to socialism, regardless of the party in power. The French like
their agricultural subsidies, their free education and health care (and prescription drugs), their six weeks of paid vacation, and their absorbent bureaucracy,
which employs one in six Frenchmen. (Jean’s Commissariat au Plan has not had
an actual economic plan to wrestle with for decades yet employs dozens of
fonctionnaires, mere drops in a sea of six million white-collar bureaucrats.)
There is no more need for barricades in Paris, for there are no more misérables.
Feeling slightly the worse for wear the next day, I met Renaud Bellais (of the
Délegation Generale pour l’Armament) and Gilles Le Blanc (of the Ecole des
Mines) for lunch. I sipped a mineral water and nibbled a salad while they tucked
hungrily into plates of brains. Brains on a plate do not look nearly as gruesome
as one might expect—like a car-wash sponge, really—but I still had difficulty focusing on the job at hand. Renaud and Gilles were wrapping up a joint project
for the French military on transformation: “how to transition from legacy to
emerging to future systems.” Both men were downcast by their findings. The
price of transformation is staggering, made worse by the anti-terror war, “which
has added new, expensive capabilities to the transformation package.” Game
theory, which used to guide French defense thinking, is no help at all against suicidal terrorists. “When you deal with asymmetric threats, there is no predictable
solution, so the problem for all Western powers has become how to impress a
political solution upon players with irreconcilable views.” Raising defense budgets, à la America, is not the most likely path to success, and it is a path that only
the United States itself can take. Since the 1950s, Western Europe has never spent
more than 60 percent of what the United States spends on defense, and it is now
slipping back to half of the American rate. Alluding to the forty-billion-dollar
increase in U.S. defense spending this year, Renaud commented that “only
America can spend on this scale.” Europe, compelled to “coordinate economic
policies”—another phrase for socialism?—most definitely cannot.
I asked them about one of the prime examples of European socialism, the
Rafale fighter, which has burned through seven billion dollars in development
costs and yielded just fifteen fighters at a preposterous $450 million unit cost
that is not destined to plummet any time soon, because of projected French buys
of just one or two aircraft per year. “Oh,” they both groaned, “the Rafale.” Because of its suffocatingly high cost the plane cannot compete in export markets,
and it has sluiced away precious euros that would have been better spent on
rapid-reaction training and platforms. “Look,” Renaud said, “we aren’t like you
Americans; you can have everything. We had to build a fourth-generation aircraft to replace three planes and fighter types: our Jaguars and Mirage F-1s and
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2000s. We also needed a navalized version for our carriers. All of these capabilities and compromises simply cost too much. It’s a typically French program, and
it’s yielded an obsolete little plane designed for the Cold War.” They chatted with
each other for a moment and then one turned to me and said: “None of the European states—France included—is a great power, so we don’t really need a military, we need a police force. That, at least, is the view of the Quai d’Orsay and the
politicians, who all say that since France is a medium power, it must content itself with medium capabilities.”
Later I met with Arnaud Voisin, chargé d’études, or head researcher, at the
Ministry of National Defense. “Most of our defense programs are too costly,” he
said. “Once the contract is given in France, there is no auditing. Contractors can
fudge and steal; the French state has no oversight whatsoever once an order is
placed.” However, he continued, inefficiency and even fraud are more palatable
than the alternative—submission to the United States. “Naturally there are
trade-offs, colossal trade-offs, but France must control its political, technological,
and economic destiny. And there are bright spots; look at the Airbus 400M military transport aircraft, which will compete with your Boeing C-17. Expensive?
Redundant? Yes on both counts, but it has yielded the A-380 [Europe’s 555-seat
challenge to the Boeing 747]. Weapons today are a fusion of civilian and military
technologies, and France will always be the integrator, not the hapless consumer.” Voisin stopped to sip his water. “Would you have us buy ‘off the shelf ’
from Boeing or Lockheed Martin?” He snorted impatiently: “We’d end up like
Saudi Arabia.”
Arnaud was critical of the British and Italians for joining the Joint Strike
Fighter program and impatient with every European air force that has purchased the F-16. “For a European, the F-16 will never be more than a capabilité
partielle; the same goes for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The source codes, armament, software, all are ‘made in the USA,’ and, quite frankly, you Americans will
never give us the upgrades that we need.” Arnaud even doubts the sincerity of
America’s plea for greater European military effectiveness. “Take the example of
Belgium: they have a mixed bag of a hundred Mirages and fifty F-16s. They
wanted to standardize and integrate the two forces as much as possible, but the
Americans withheld the critical information. Or Italy: they signed up for the
British Harrier with one type of missile, a Marine Corps package, but then the
Marines switched to another missile, and the poor Italians were just left in the
cold—Harriers without any missile at all.”
Why would the Italians—fathers of aviation—allow themselves to be so misused? “Because they have lost their aerospace industry; only France and Britain
have retained theirs and, after a thirty-year effort, the Germans have come back.
Eurofighter is more German than British; it is a German plane.” Arnaud
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pondered a moment and then added, “Italy will never be more than a subcontractor; hence they choose the F-35 because Lockheed will build three thousand
units, Eurofighter no more than a few hundred. These production numbers are
America’s real wedge inside Europe. The prize is too tempting even for ‘good Europeans’ to resist.” Like Marie Mendras, Arnaud was indignant on the subject of
the United States and in as little doubt as to our perfidy. Later, I checked his facts
and discovered that the Italian Harriers are in fact provided with Mavericks and
that the Belgians have ninety F-16s (not fifty) and just five Mirages (not a hundred), all five of them in mothballs. He had been so definite, like Mendras assuring me categorically (but wrongly) that no al-Qa‘ida fighters, agents, or
subsidiaries had ever been in Chechnya. “It is an invention of Putin and the
American media.”
Arnaud asked me about President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. “Here in
France we were flabbergasted. It reminded us of the poisonous pre-1914 rhetoric about révanche and the boches. Or of the anti-Asian ‘yellow peril’ rhetoric of
the turn of the century. The French people reject such nationalist hoaxes and
have reason to. Four million of our sixty million citizens are Muslim Arabs. You
have third-generation Algerians working in this ministry. The moment we say
‘France is at war with an “axis of evil,”’ we lose these people. They become spies
and terrorists. When we French talk about ‘nationalist hoaxes’ and say ‘never
again,’ it’s not because we fear the Germans marching through the Arc de
Triomphe a third time; it’s because a ‘clash of civilizations’ would rip apart
French society.” France prefers police measures and aid. Arnaud gave the example of the EU’s Mediterranean Development Agency (MEDA), which has recently committed itself to disburse four billion dollars over two years to twelve
Arab countries along the rim of Europe. The money will be used to foster development and human rights, create a free trade area, and promote security cooperation between police and military forces. “B-52s bombing Afghanistan, that’s
not fighting terrorism,” said Arnaud. “This is.”
Unless, of course, the French are building the bombers. The next day I entered
the vast hall of Eurosatory 2002, the biennial ground and air defense equivalent
of the Paris Air Show. “Quand la defense avance, la paix progresse”—“When defense advances, peace progresses”—was the rather Tartuffian exhortation above
the main entrance. Here all concerns about aid, suasion, and civilizational prejudices were drowned out by shrieking simulators and thundering tanks.
What most impresses at a twenty-first-century arms show is the thoroughgoing way in which warfare is changing. There has been a restless search for
high-tech “force multipliers” since at least the 1970s, but until recently the general shape and appearance of armed forces had hardly changed since World War
II: mechanized divisions of tanks and infantry, airborne troops, carrier battle
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groups, Marine divisions, and manned air forces of fighters and bombers. Today
all of this is changing, as quickly as pinched Western defense budgets will
permit.
Everyone wants to be in on the ground floor, whether as an innovator or a
broker of emerging technologies or their knockoffs. Singapore Technologies is
ubiquitous at the arms expos, whether here or at IDEX in the Middle East, and
its pavilion might serve as a summary of the new message: “small logistics footprint, signature management, extreme mobility.” Mobility, transportability,
sustainability, and survivability are the mantras. Everything Singapore Technologies produces is geared to these expeditionary goals. New stealth tanks—still
on the drawing board—look like dining-room tables draped with bedsheets to
cloak every angle and surface. To maximize fuel efficiency (and thereby cut reliance on piped or trucked gasoline), production vehicles are stripped down to
the bare bones and protected—if at all—with light ceramic-appliqué armor. To
reduce bulky inventories of spare parts, all tanks, self-propelled guns, fighting
vehicles, and personnel carriers are built with common parts on identical chassis. To cut the cumbersome ordnance train, there is “precision ammunition
technology”—rounds that don’t miss.
A good example of this is Singapore Technologies’ 40 mm grenade launcher.
What used to be a relatively primitive weapon has gone high tech. Built like a
machine gun, Singapore’s “super lightweight automatic grenade launcher” fires
belts of time-fused grenades. But these are time fuses with a difference: a laser
beam acquires the target, and the launcher determines its range and calculates
time to impact. You pull the trigger, and as the grenade whistles out of the muzzle the laser finds a sensor in the base of the projectile, programs the computed
time to target into the fuse, counts down the pre-acquired range to zero, and explodes the grenade over the target. The whole process is depicted on video, in
which no one is safe from this “smart” technology: the grenade bursts above a
truck full of troops, killing them all; another explodes above a foxhole, maiming
the occupants; a third finds a resting squad of infantry behind a stone wall and
bursts in their midst. “Defilade,” the eternal sanctuary of the infantryman, is just
another target to a relatively cheap and accessible “air bursting munition system” like this one.
The World War II–era tank and armored division are the most obvious
victims of this focus on mobility, weight, and precise fire. In the first place, a
seventy-ton main battle tank (MBT) is too heavy and thirsty to move efficiently.
Since its fuel efficiency is measured in gallons per mile rather than miles per gallon and it cannot roll on and off a C-130 (which can use the short, rough runways of the third world), it is not a handy asset. Given the advances in
ammunition of the sort described above, it is a rather imprudent investment at
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four million dollars a copy. Bofors of Sweden was giving away key chains and
office-badge lanyards to anyone who would watch a video demonstration of its
155 Bonus “armor destruction” round. Already in mass production for the
French and Swedish armies, Bonus is a fairly typical modern-day antitank
round. The 155 mm “carrier shell” carries two sensor-fused “submunitions” out
to a range of twenty-five kilometers. Separating from the shell above their (preprogrammed) target, the submunitions descend on wings at a speed of forty-five
meters per second to strike the tank or fighting vehicle at its most vulnerable and
unarmored point—the roof. Guided by infrared sensors, the shaped, explosive
penetrators gouge their way inside at two thousand meters per second, lacerating the crew with deadly spalling—from the implosion of the tank’s own armor—and clouds of fragments.
“One fifty-five Bonus,” the video crowed triumphantly, “ready for the future
artillery battle.” Artillery battle—Bofors has already consigned the tank to the
dustbin of history. Outside I climbed to the roof of a German Leopard 2 and
found it as heavily armored as the rest of the tank. I asked the demonstrator
about that, and he replied that every army in the world was adding roof armor to
its tanks because of Bonus, Javelin, Spike, and all of the other “armor destruction” rounds on the international market. “Armored and anti-armored warfare
has always been like this,” the German said. “Whenever they expose a vulnerability, we cover it. And then the search continues for a new vulnerability.”
The Russian pavilion is the same at every arms fair. Gruff, inhospitable, and
monolingual, the Russians sprawl in folding chairs, kibitz around card tables,
smoke in defiance of “no smoking” signs, and studiously ignore customers who
stray past their booths. This is all the more remarkable in view of the glossy agitprop on their shelves: “Rosoboronexport: A Global Operator with Fifty Years of
Arms Trading Experience.” Much of the Russian literature is incomprehensible.
Whereas Bofors Defense or Rockwell Collins shrouds its business of murder in
discreet circumlocutions in brochures that a sixth-grader could make sense of,
the Russians are shockingly blunt (“main armament is able to kill the enemy at
2,000 meters”) and rhetorically challenged—“This attempt to merge the developers of air defense assets have been aplenty recently.” Russian briefings—I attended one on T-72 upgrades—reek of the Soviet Union. The chief engineer was
well into his slides when a short, stocky apparatchik bowled in from a side door.
A Rosoboronexport flunkey leaped to his feet, interrupting the engineer and a
question from the floor to shout, “Mr. Nasdrov, the head of the Russian delegation, has arrived!” The Russians in the room all clambered to their feet and
stared at their shoes like submissive muzhiks, while the rest of us looked around
at each other in bafflement.
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One of Russia’s most sought-after exports is the Igla shoulder-launched antiaircraft missile—the Russian Stinger, selling for about half the price of a Stinger.
Determined to try one on for size, I hung around the Igla simulator—a big, partially enclosed dome—watching the Russian employee who was supposed to be
selling the missile stolidly ignore the customers around him while firing round
after round into space. Finally I was approached by a Dane who was working for
the Russians. He reminded me of the efficient Scandinavians, Balts, and Germans whom the Russian tsars used to hire in droves to manage their unruly
army, navy, and civil service. I now saw why. Taking me under his wing, he timidly approached the big Russian, who held the only Igla, tapped him on the
shoulder, and asked if I might have a shot. The Russian resentfully complied,
dumped the bazooka-sized weapon into my arms, and stalked off. Though
forced to work the simulator and instruct me at the same time, the Dane had me
up to speed in just a few minutes. The simulator is like a well-lit planetarium.
Targets zip across the sky or flutter along the horizon; you must hoist the Igla
onto your shoulder, crack a flask of some chemical over the heat sensor to cool it
(so that the cold missile can easily find the hot engine of the target), put the aircraft in your sights, and squeeze the trigger. In the time it would take you to
drink a large cup of coffee, I had learned the basics and shot down two helicopters and a jet. It was simple: point, fire, and forget. “How much does this thing
cost?” I asked incredulously. “We never discuss that; it always depends on the
package.” “But, I mean, more or less?” I insisted. “Well, about sixty thousand dollars each,” he said. “For the launcher and the missile.”
Every arms-producing nation fits a stereotype. The Italians on this day had
abandoned utterly the activity of selling weapons and their accessories and instead were crowded inside the Finmecanica pavilion to watch the “Azzurri”—Italy’s national soccer team—play a must-win World Cup match against South
Korea. The Italians stared fixedly at the set, absently downing the panini and Asti
that had been intended for prospective buyers. Picture eighty salespeople
wedged like a rugby scrum around a twelve-inch portable television with rabbit
ears. The exhibition hall literally shook with savage cries when Italy scored an
early goal. Thinking there had been a terrorist attack, I had raced to investigate,
only to find eighty happy Italians shucking the wrappers off new panini and topping up their plastic flutes with spumante. For their part, the Austrians retain
legendary brands like Mannlicher and Steyr despite their contraction since the
good old days of Kaiser Franz Joseph and the k.u.k. empire. They dress in that
curious Central European style—black loafers, white socks, mustard pants and
shirt, olive jacket—and stalk you warily, like Viennese shop girls: “Bitte schön?”
The British are, well, British. Fluent and self-assured, they make you feel truant
even for considering a competing nation’s product, yet they are scrupulously
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obliging. As the GIs used to say in World War II: “The British are a people who, at
any hour, will lovingly carry a cup of tea up six flights of stairs.” The Swedes and
Norwegians are all business; should you hazard a shortcut through their zone,
you will emerge like a pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey, bristling with brochures and
souvenirs. The Turks are the Target or Wal-Mart of the trade, selling cheap, serviceable vehicles and heavy weapons as well as knockoffs of the latest Western
computers, telephones, radars, and missiles. Their primary markets, besides
Turkey’s own vast armed forces, are Pakistan, Bosnia, and Turkic-speaking
countries like Azerbaijan. They make no bones about this but react with legendary Turkish pride should you question the quality of their everyday-low-priced
products.
At the EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) exhibit, I
chatted with Wolfram Lautner, vice president of communications for this most
ambitious trinational corporation, which merges the operations of Germany’s
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, France’s Aerospatiale Matra, and Spain’s CASA,
manufacturing products with familiar names like Airbus, Eurofighter,
Euromissile, and the Eurocopter. Lautner bitterly regretted Germany’s refusal to
modernize its armed forces. “We are spending at the level of Luxembourg! Less
than 1 percent of GDP, about 0.8 percent, to be precise. East Germany is our
main problem; we are investing there not only to rebuild but to preempt social
problems. We cannot afford not to make those payments.” He also rued the meddling of the liberal German Vaterstaat—“father state”—by which weapons exports are severely curtailed. “If we want to export German military technologies,
we must get the approval of the Federal Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is much more complicated than in
other countries. Our only hope is ‘harmonization’—that is, if we can adopt European export regulations to replace our German ones.”
There was none of this hand-wringing in the American booths, which exuded
“hyperpower” and much unhelpful smugness. Surely most armaments customers are not engineers, but the Americans believe that they should be. This prejudice trickles all the way down to the bottom feeders, like the two plump
southerners selling the kind of gunsights that project red dots onto chests or
foreheads of intended victims. They chuckled knowingly at my every question,
clearly placing me in the same class as the frightened housewife who would purchase one of their sights to deter burglars. “She’ll put that raaaaayed dot ’tween
that feller’s eyes and he won’t be stickin’ aroun’ fer long.” They could not wait to
be rid of me, nor I of them, and I sidled upmarket to Northrop Grumman. Here I
was welcomed as befitted a flesh-and-blood representative of Northrop’s very
best customer, the U.S. government. Still, I had a difficult time grasping all of the
attributes of the Global Hawk, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) entering serial
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production next year, because of the very technical way in which it was explained to me by earnest men in suits (with pocket protectors). No matter—
when one ponders the ingenious ways in which warfare is changing in our lifetime, UAVs are among the sensational innovations. These sparrow-thin planes
are cheap and abundant, and they give political and military decision makers
real or near-real-time “information superiority.” Gliding quietly over enemy
forces or installations, they solve the central problem of war, defined by the duke
of Wellington two hundred years ago as “knowing what is on the other side of
the hill.”
More surprises were in store at the U.S. Army pavilion, some forward looking,
others quite retrograde. If Donald Rumsfeld and Congress have truly decided
against the Crusader self-propelled 155 mm howitzer, it is news to United Defense and the state of Oklahoma, which continue to advertise their prodigy at
arms fairs and on the Internet as if it were still on the cusp of procurement. Like
many platforms, the eleven-billion-dollar Crusader program, designed to demolish Soviet armored and infantry spearheads, was canceled because the rapid
pace of change in warfare since 1990 had left it behind. In the 1980s, when the
Army began upgrading its indirect-fire capability, Crusader’s elephantine
weight—fifty tons—and gaggle of tracked and wheeled resupply vehicles
scarcely attracted debate. Based in Germany, where the Soviet attacks would fall,
the gun would not have needed to be “air deployed.” It would roll into action on
the Autobahn—inside a C-17, in a pinch—and decimate the Red Army with an
astonishing ten 155 mm rounds a minute at ranges of up to forty kilometers! In
their wildest dreams, the gunners of Sedan, Passchendaele, and Falaise could
never have dared imagine such a storm of steel. But today the heavy, conspicuous, gas-guzzling Crusader is in its death throes, the victim of the new expeditionary emphasis on mobility, stealth, and sustainability.
Even as I looked at the Crusader displays in Paris, Oklahoma’s congressional
delegation was in Washington wringing a final $475 million out of the American
taxpayer to study ways in which to transfer some of the doomed program’s innovations to the Army’s revolutionary new “Future Combat System” (FCS). That
too was on display at Eurosatory, heralded by a U.S. “Objective Force” warrior,
who alternately thrilled and startled conventioneers by whooshing past them at
high speed on a scooter. Rendered obsolete by the Soviet Union’s collapse, the
U.S. Army is scrambling to redefine itself. The FCS is that new definition; and it
is light, mobile, “scalable,” and sustainable. Gone are the armored divisions, the
columns of infantry, the squadrons of helicopter gunships, and the vast trains of
logistical support. The new Army—still a generation away—will be unlike any
army ever fielded in history. It will look like something from science fiction, with
small numbers of soldiers in “risk-reduction suits” remotely controlling UAVs
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(“eagles”) and wheeled vehicles. The latter—“mules,” or “dogs,” in FCS parlance—are small and light, the size of a two-drawer file cabinet, and they can
mount quick-firing mortars and tiny UAVs of their own. Needless to say, FCS
has captured the attention of every military in the world. It augurs the “empty
battlefield” of the future, when proficient militaries will focus their initial attacks on “soft” information targets—data links and computer networks—before wheeling in with futuristic contrivances like these to decimate the enemy’s
deaf, sightless, “hard” targets. As I knelt to examine a mule, two Slovenes grasped
me by the shoulders and pulled me aside so that their colleague could close in
and snap pictures of the prototype. In this business, like any other, no one wants
to miss the transforming moment.
Army spokespersons might find fault with my thumbnail sketch of the FCS,
but frankly, I was confused. Had you asked a nineteenth-century Prussian soldier how his army planned to fight the next war, he would have answered simply.
The cavalry—deployed in front of the army and on its flanks—would find the
enemy and fix him in place. Masses of infantry and guns would then advance on
a broad front to encircle the enemy and destroy him with fire. Ask a
twenty-first-century American soldier the same question, and you receive an entirely different answer, with much lamentation of the continued absence of a
“lead technology integrator” and far too much hair-splitting about the technical
differences between the “legacy,” “interim,” and “objective” forces. Depending
on whom I asked, I received two or three different answers as to the parameters
of the Scorpion program—the “risk reduction” equipment of future infantrymen. No one quite seemed to know if the Scorpion-suited soldier was part of the
future or just of the interim. A major there to brief the Comanche helicopter—
possibly slated for production in 2006—spent more time espousing the Comanche as a technological shortcut to the Objective Force than talking about the aircraft’s justification and capabilities (which must be stellar, at fifty-five million
dollars a copy). The Army, in short, seems more interested in technology, terminology, and funding schedules than it is in the art of war. At least, that is the impression that it gives.
Like the French, who ring their exhibits with Chanel-soaked women in short
skirts and daringly unbuttoned blouses, the Israelis have discovered that sex
sells. When I stopped inside Rafael’s pavilion to look at the Spike antitank missile—the U.S. Javelin’s fiercest competitor—I felt a movement at my side, followed by a blast of perfume. “Would you like to try it?” she asked in a husky
voice. “Y-y-yes,” I stammered, and she slid an arm around my hips and lowered
me onto the simulator. After firing the Spike a couple of times, I understood precisely why the tank is doomed. Crouching on a seat, I looked through a scope
and saw my target, a partially concealed main battle tank. Using my fifth, ring,
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and middle fingers, I toggled the digital crosshairs onto the tank and then fired
the missile with my index finger. “Always correct,” my Rafael trainer whispered
into my ear as the missile meandered two kilometers downrange, and she was
right. At two thousand meters, you might fire low or off to the side and just wing
the tank. As my Spikes wended their way toward the target—these are not supersonic projectiles—I “corrected” their flight with my thumb, pushing them right
into the turret or even through a hatch. Both times I was rewarded with fiery explosions, and the second time with a certificate: “This is to certify that Mr.
Wawro has successfully completed Spike family training.” I was a hero, albeit a
simulated one, and I only regretted the insufficiency of my fingers. Generation
theorists have already remarked that future warfare belongs to the young Play
Station generation, and my time with Rafael convinced me of that. A dexterous
American teenager would have dispatched the entire armored corps of a
third-world country in the time that it took me to claim my two victims.
Outside, a Magic Kingdom–type shuttle ran visitors out to the démonstrations dynamiques of largely French hardware. Sitting on the shuttle, I was
greeted by a Swedish steel salesman, who squinted at my name tag and nationality and burst out laughing. “You know,” he said, jabbing at his own badge, “my
company actually makes more money because of your President Bush’s steel tariffs.” How could that be? “Because you now have steel shortages, so we can
charge whatever we like for our products. We export one-third of what we used
to, and net more!” He and his companions settled back in their seats, guffawing
like Vikings of the global economy. At the proving ground, we stepped off our
longship and parted ways, my high-net-worth Swedish friends passing through
a cordon to shaded bleachers, I joining the journalists on the unshaded pavement to watch a rather boring parade of Tatra and Scania trucks and Panhard
scout vehicles. Europe being in the midst of as hot and dry a summer as America’s, we were soon engulfed by choking clouds of dust. Looking around me, I
saw nothing but dirt-covered figures with tear-rimmed eyes scribbling in notebooks, like a Wehrmacht staff on the Russian steppe. Everyone awaited the main
event, which was Giat’s fifty-six-ton Leclerc main battle tank and Caesar 155
mm self-propelled howitzer. Finally they appeared, the Leclerc gunning through
the sandstorm kicked up by the Tatra 8x8s, the Caesar stopping to deploy and
fire blank rounds.
Watching the Leclerc bump and grind through various obstacles, I knew that
I was watching the end of a military epoch begun on the battlefield at Cambrai
in 1917, when 324 British tanks launched the world’s first armored attack
against the German-held Hindenburg Line. To be sure, the tank has come a long
way since those early days, when it was little more than a steel-plated machinegun carrier. Today’s Leclerc—a typical “third generation” MBT—can heave itself
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across a ten-foot-wide trench, climb four-foot vertical steps, and fire eight 120
mm rounds four thousand yards with pinpoint accuracy while driving at forty
miles per hour. Thanks to a recent big purchase by the United Arab Emirates,
there are six hundred Leclercs in service worldwide, but like all the obtrusive,
unstealthy MBTs, they are on their last legs. There will assuredly not be a fourth
generation.
Giat’s Caesar is today’s more viable (and affordable) alternative to the American Crusader. Mounted on a light all-terrain vehicle, it is one-half to one-third
the weight of a conventional self-propelled gun and can fairly fly along, at
sixty-five miles per hour. We watched it race into position, unlimber, fire six
rounds (had they been real, they would have screamed from our battery position
in Paris Nord–Villepinte over the rooftops of Paris to explode in the gardens of
Versailles, forty-two kilometers away), pack up, and move to a new position, all
in under two minutes. “Caesar,” the announcer boasted over the public-address
system, “would have been moved and firing from a new position before the last
round of the first salvo had even hit the ground.” Prodigious is the only word for
it; still, having just been briefed on the Future Combat System with its neoteric
dogs, mules, and eagles, the Caesar’s gun crew looked to me like Civil War
reenactors. They were simply too human—big, sweaty Frenchmen struggling
with wrenches and shells in the summer heat. How long would they last against
an inquisitive eagle launched from a nosy mule? What would obliterate them
first, the Hellfire missile from the drone or the mortar rounds from the wheeled
robot? To the Objective Force, a perspiring Frenchman would just be another
“heat signature,” ripe for demolition.
To test my earlier assumption that a nineteenth-century Prussian would have
explained his craft in plain terms, I stopped in the German booths on the way
back from the test ground. Along a boardwalk leading to EADS, the Bundeswehr
had its own “future infantryman” on display—Der Infanterist der Zukunft.
Though not a nineteenth-century Prussian, he was a twenty-first-century Bavarian, and I asked him to explain himself. “A main difference between the future infantryman and the past is this”: he showed me IFF (identification, friend
or foe) sensors on his shoulders and in his helmet. In fog, darkness, or defilade,
other Germans will recognize this man as their own and not shoot at him. Like
everything else in our efficient age, the future infantryman is “modular.” He can
be swiftly reconfigured for any mission or climate. Magazine pouches can be
added or removed, as can body armor and Camelbak 1.6-liter drink bags.
Ten-man squads are easily coordinated via voice-activated microphones and
Global Positioning System receivers. Maps and orders are carried and transmitted on a palm pilot in a “ruggedized” shell. “Where am I? Where am I going?
Where are my comrades? It is all here,” the German noncom said, tapping his
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personal digital assistant. “The only problem is the cables.” He reached backward and clutched a knot of them, not unlike the mess behind my television set
at home. “How do we transmit the power supply from the lithium batteries to all
of these gadgets? It’s impossible to do that wirelessly. Someone really needs to
work on that.”
The German future infantryman’s armament is the G-36 assault rifle, with a
red-dot sight and an attachable 40 mm grenade launcher. Pistols have been superseded by PDWs—“personal defense weapons”—like the MP-7, which can
fire automatic or semi-automatic bursts of small-caliber 4.6 mm rounds able to
penetrate the Russian-made Crisat body armor used by most of the world’s villains. The German’s “ballistic protection” comes in three removable layers: titanium steel to blunt knife attacks, Kevlar to stop a nine-millimeter round, and a
“trauma pad.” I had never heard of trauma pads, but they are a staple of
postmodern, casualty-averse armies. Your Kevlar vest will deflect a 7.62 mm rifle
round, but you will feel the impact, as the bullet slams into your armor, inflicts a
bruise or trauma twenty to forty millimeters deep, and then rebounds away. “A
forty-millimeter trauma can smash your organs, bruise your heart, or damage
your arteries,” the German said gravely. “You Americans wear forty-millimeterrated pads; we consider that unsafe and use twenty-millimeter ones.” Like its
pampered Pensionisten, Germany’s Infanteristen are shielded against every
eventuality.
After lunch I returned to Paris for a meeting. Waiting in the reception area of
the French Secrétaire Général de la Defense Nationale, I was taken by a
wall-sized painting of the battle of Fontenoy. In that famous clash in Flanders in
1745, aristocratic officers from both the British and French armies strolled between the lines of musketeers, chivalrously inviting the other side to fire first.
Even on this idealized canvas you could see the terror in the French ranks, as infantrymen pondered imminent death or mutilation by a .50-caliber musket ball.
Corporals and sergeants pushed in behind the quaking troops, steadying them
with their halberds. Having spent two days at Eurosatory, I was shocked by the
primitiveness of methods that had seemed quite advanced in their time. Today’s
infantryman locates himself with GPS and voice-activated microphones, wears
twenty-five pounds of modular body armor, and fires with deadly accuracy from
five hundred meters, not thirty. This is warfare of which the musketeers of 1745
could not have conceived.
In the midst of this reverie, I was ushered in to see Tristan Lecoq, a senior bureaucrat in the secretariat, a body created in the 1950s to enforce cooperation
between France’s bumptious ministries of defense, foreign affairs, the interior,
and finance. Tristan’s office was once de Gaulle’s—when he was a rebellious
thirty-year-old lieutenant colonel—so I stroked the door handle of the armoire
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and set my briefcase on the art deco coffee table, trying to imbibe as much of the
general’s spirit as I could. We discussed the semisecret fourteen billion dollars
that will probably be spent on French weapons procurement over the next five
years, and European defense in general. “The days of national independence in
Europe are over,” Tristan said. “European defense is making tremendous progress, thanks to us, the Germans, and the British. Italy, Spain, and Sweden are on a
subordinate rung, and as for the rest—Belgium, Norway—forget it, they hardly
register.”
Tristan listed Europe’s principal objective as “strategic autonomy”—the ability to take decisions and act without deferring to the United States. This will be
achieved with more nimble, deployable forces, transport aircraft like the
A-400M, new strike aircraft with beyond-visual-range missiles, and enhanced
communications and reconnaissance capabilities—the standard transformation “bridge” package. But the French are suffering as acutely as Rumsfeld. Conceived as a means of saving money—by laying off conscripts and scrapping
“legacy” systems—transformation is actually ruinously expensive; small numbers of paid professional troops are more costly than droves of free, scarcely
trained draftees, and legacies look cheap by comparison with the emerging technologies. “Our all professional military is much more expensive than forecast,
yet our defense budget has fallen from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1997 to 1.7 percent
today. So what have we done? We’ve stopped buying new equipment and continuously lengthened the service life of our old stuff.” I looked out Tristan’s window
at the gilded roof of Louis XIV’s Dôme church and smiled. In another age I could
have been listening to Voltaire’s critiques of rotten, threadbare Bourbon France.
“Although we’re lengthening service life, we’re also slashing maintenance budgets, so these days the French military has planes that cannot fly, ships that cannot sail, and tanks that cannot drive. Thirty to 40 percent of air force planes are
grounded on any given day with maintenance problems. We are au pied du
mur—backs against the wall. The few things we do buy, we buy slowly. The
Charles de Gaulle [aircraft carrier] is a perfect example: the first studies were
done in 1982; the ship was begun in 1992 and delivered (defective) in 2001.”
That afternoon I crossed from Lecoq’s office in the Invalides to the vast Second Empire campus of the Ecole Militaire to meet with Jean-Jacques Roche of
the Defense Ministry’s Institut Supérieur des Affaires de Defense (ISAD). I asked
him about the glaring contradiction between Tristan Lecoq’s call for European
“strategic autonomy” and the dearth of European spending on defense. Roche,
who moonlights as a professor of international relations in Paris and Grenoble,
chuckled at my question. “The problem of European defense is a double problem. First, we lack hard power. With European countries spending 1 or 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, you can combine the defense budgets of all fifteen EU
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members and they don’t even approach U.S. spending. Second, we lack soft
power, the ability to join persuasively in international debates, what I call
‘visibilité exterieure’—‘international visibility.’ This is, of course, a function of
the hard-power deficit—threats must be backed by force—but also of divergent
voices in the many European nations.”
We had moved from Roche’s office to a nearby café, and while we sat drinking
coffee I asked him why he thought America spent so much on defense and Europe so little. “Part of your superiority in this respect is your federal system,
which can push through higher defense budgets. Our European equivalent—
Javier Solana’s EU directorate—has no budget, and the individual states that
do—France, Germany, Britain—don’t want to spend. Of course we would like to
spend more; that’s why we decided at St. Malo, Cologne, and Nice to create a
‘Euro army’ to erase memories of Yugoslavia and Kosovo, where we depended on
the Americans. But that was then; this is now, and the emotion has passed. Once
again, the Europeans are refusing to pay.” I pressed Jean-Jacques to explain the
disparity, and he did: “We Europeans find it difficult even to accept military
expenditures. For civil society, yes; for the military, no. Fifty-five percent of
French revenues are consumed by public expenditures: transportation, health
care, education, welfare, and farm subsidies. The situation is about the same in
Germany. Now compare this to the U.S., where you spend just 15 percent of revenues on such purposes, no more than 35 percent if the education spending of
individual states is included. In the U.S. you have a profound aversion to socialism; here we are imbued with it. A friend of mine is the minister of health, and he
tells me that there are at least two great demonstrations in front of his ministry
every month. And that’s now, as is. If we were to cut medical benefits to spend
more on defense, there would be a revolution.” Back at the Ecole Militaire, Roche
left me with this thought: “We Europeans don’t spend much on defense, but we
console ourselves with the argument that the problem of Europe is one of security, not defense. By that I mean unchecked immigration, crime, and other social
problems. I recently heard an interview with the Italian army chief of staff in
which he said that Italy’s gravest security threat was not foreign war but
immigration.”
I looked down on Italy early that evening, as I flew from Paris to Rome. The
Alps were a jagged, brown wilderness, streaked with ice and snow. After the
minuscule farms and villages at which I had been gazing down, these fifteenthousand-foot peaks seemed an arm’s length away. Before long the north Italian
plain unfolded to the east—the whole history of modern Italy was there.
Splashes of light to either side of the broad, silvery Po marked Turin, Milan,
Piacenza, Brescia, Parma, Modena, Verona, Bologna, Ferrara, and Padua. This
was the heart of the Renaissance, the fabled “land of a hundred cities.” In the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

69

66

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 26

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, fast-flowing rivers like the Po, Adige, Brenta,
and Piave, fed by the snow alps I had just crossed, coursed across this plain and
powered the silk and textile industries that enriched the Italian city-states. Long
before the rest of Europe, Italy was urbanized and industrialized, which goes far
to explain the Italian’s innate sense of style and clear preference for the city. Until
the discovery of America and of the Atlantic world after 1492, Italian ports—
Genoa, Pisa, Livorno, Naples, and Venice—were the hubs of world trade in cloth
and spices. Looking down from twenty thousand feet, you can feel the blessedness of the place: the easy climate, the plentiful water, the alluvial plains beneath
the Alps and on the flanks of the Apennines.
My eyes roved west to east while I thought about European union. Europe’s
bad old days of great-power rivalry originated here in 1494, in a grinding
thirty-six-year campaign by the Spanish to bring the riches of the Italian Peninsula under their control. French, Spanish, and Austrian armies battled across the
plain, burning and plundering. Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513 in part to
explain Italy’s defeat and loss of autonomy—Italians lacked virtù, the power to
dispose their own affairs. Then, as now, Italy was buffeted by global economic
currents; its maritime trade was stolen away by Barbary pirates and by the more
efficient Atlantic ports of Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain. More than three
hundred years were to pass under Spanish and Austrian domination before the
“national awakening” of 1848 and three sharp wars drove out the last of the foreign occupiers—the Austrians in 1859 and 1866, the French in 1870.
My plane turned inland over Civitavecchia—a veritable French colony until
1870—and made for Rome. I thought how strange and wondrous it is that the
Europeans have forgotten this violent past, not only two world wars but a whole
millennium of brutal, lacerating conflicts. “That’s the old way; we don’t do that
any more,” Europeans will tell you, and they mean it. France, of course, is a leading power of Europe, Italy a second-tier player, vulnerable to the policy gyrations of Paris and Berlin. I wondered how Italians would analyze the changes in
Europe and also how Italy had changed in the ten years since I had last been
there, snooping around those northern Italian hills for my dissertation. As we
bumped down on the runway at Fiumicino, I watched the French passengers
look irritably at their watches and the Italians gleefully unpack their fonini (cell
phones)—“Pronto? Ciao!” Shoving my things into my briefcase, I ran for the
exit. Like Goethe, I was thrilled to be “back in the land where the lemon trees
bloom.”
To be continued
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“ALONGSIDE THE BEST”?
The Future of the Canadian Forces
Andrew C. Richter
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t the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Canadian Forces face a range
of challenges. Reduced defense spending, uncertainty regarding missions
and tasks, and the lingering effects of recent scandal have resulted in a significantly diminished military. In the midst of a rapidly emerging “revolution in
military affairs” (RMA), the Canadian Forces (CF) are poorly positioned to in1
troduce next-generation weapon systems. At the same time, Canada’s allies, in
particular the United States, have undertaken dramatic defense modernization
programs. It is this divergence—Canada’s reduced military capability at a time
of swiftly advancing technology—that will be the focus of this article. Specifically, the article will examine the degree to which the Canadian Forces are
currently interoperable with its allies, and the steps that need to be taken if they
are to remain a viable fighting force in the future. It will suggest that rather than
maintaining the current (largely fictitious) goal of “multi-purpose, combat
capable” forces—as called for in Canada’s 1994 defense white paper—the CF
needs to prioritize among the services to ensure that
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at least one maintains a wide range of interoperability
Political Science at the University of Windsor, in Wind2
capabilities.
sor, Ontario. His most recent book is Avoiding ArmaThe service that can make the best case for first
geddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear
Weapons, 1950–63 (2002). He has published articles in
priority is the navy, as a result of its modern fleet,
numerous journals, including National Security
widespread political support, and broad range of misStudies Quarterly, International Journal, and Cana3
dian Defence Quarterly.
sions tihat it can undertake. While this will not be an
easy decision for the Department of National Defence
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(DND), a failure to make it will have enormous
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consequences, as a “rusted out” military will be incapable of carrying out Canadian defense and foreign policy goals. In addition, given the importance that
Canada places on participating in multilateral operations, it is critical that Can4
ada maintain at least some meaningful capacity to do so.
As a preliminary, “prioritization” should be defined. In the context of this article, it refers to a process whereby one service receives the majority of the department budget and, in particular, the preponderance of the capital equipment
budget. The prioritized service is able to field more modern equipment over a
shorter time frame than would otherwise be the case. Prioritization does not
mean that the other two services would disappear or that they would not receive
funding for their own reequipment programs. On the contrary, they would remain vital in the contemporary strategic environment, and both would retain
valuable capabilities. However, given Canada’s limited security spending (to be
examined below) and the enormous cost of modern defense equipment, it will
simply not be possible to modernize all three services adequately. Prioritization
will produce one service capable of undertaking a broad range of missions and
tasks; the other two will focus, if they are to remain viable, on one or two primary missions—missions that do not require disproportionate funding.
Over the last decade, military technology has been transformed, a development
with which all countries have had to deal. At one end of the spectrum is the
United States, which because of its economic power, global responsibilities, and
5
enormous defense establishment has eagerly embraced military change. Indeed, the U.S. military has long emphasized advanced technology in pursuit of
its strategic and military objectives, and thus the current RMA is entirely consis6
tent with traditional American thinking. While recognizing that pursuing the
RMA will be an expensive undertaking, the United States has demonstrated that
it is committed to maintaining the world’s most advanced defense force. The
2002 U.S. defense budget is $340 billion, roughly equivalent to the combined to7
tal spent by all other countries.
The response of U.S. allies, however, to these changes has been less certain. To
begin with, there has been considerable frustration that the long-hoped-for
(and much anticipated) “peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War proved so
fleeting. While defense spending in Europe and Canada had never reached the
level that it did in the United States during the four-decade dispute with the Soviet Union, the allies had nonetheless relentlessly emphasized military preparations and forces, and they consequently expected that once the conflict ended,
substantial military reductions could finally be achieved. Even the realization
that the post–Cold War environment would remain unstable and prone to periodic violence did not appreciably alter this belief. Thus by the mid-1990s, when
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26

72

War College: Winter 2003 Full Issue

RICHTER

69

advanced technology promised to transform military forces (and threatened to
render existing forces obsolete), there was a palpable sense of frustration that
large-scale defense expenditures would now be required.
Yet as even a cursory glance at European and Canadian defense preparedness
and spending reveals, this military investment has not taken place in those nations. The modest allied reaction to the RMA can be linked to two critical factors—the general weakness of many Western countries in the technologies that
are fuelling the RMA, and an unwillingness to spend the money required to field
advanced defense forces. With regard to the first point, it is widely acknowledged
that U.S. companies are at the forefront of the information revolution; as such, it
is they that most often develop advanced technologies that have military appli8
cations. In general, U.S. technology and defense companies are stronger and
more competitive than their European and Canadian counterparts. American
companies are usually the first to innovate and to bring important new technologies to market, which in turn feeds the major defense contractors a continuing
9
stream of new designs and systems.
As for the second point, none of the major European allies or Canada seems
prepared to spend the resources necessary to field state-of-the-art defense
forces. While the United States consistently devotes between 3 and 4 percent of
its gross national product to defense, most European allies spend between 2 and
10
3 percent, while for Canada the figure is an embarrassing 1.2 percent. Further,
in contrast to the United States, the allies have not demonstrated a willingness to
increase defense spending substantially post–11 September 2001, a failure that
will result in an even larger spending divergence in the future (indeed, prior to
the terrorist attacks, concern was mounting over the continued defense spend11
ing cuts in several European countries). Lastly, the issue is not just how much—
or, more accurately, how little—Europeans spend on defense but what they
spend their money on. Thus, while the European allies collectively spend
approximately 60 percent of what the United States does (i.e., about $180 bil12
lion), they do not have 60 percent of U.S. capabilities. As Ethan Kapstein has recently noted, “Europe seems to get ‘less bang for the buck’ than the United
13
States.”
The result is a growing “capabilities gap” between the United States and its allies, one that shows no sign of diminishing. This gap was first noted at the time
of the Gulf War, but it was the 1999 Kosovo conflict that clearly revealed a significant difference in the capabilities of U.S. and European defense forces (not to
mention the virtual chasm that existed between U.S. and Canadian forces).14 In
spite of widespread European and Canadian recognition and discussion of the
problem since that time, the gap has not closed; defense cuts continue to down15
grade military forces.
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On both sides of the Atlantic there is considerable concern over this gap and
growing unease over its implications. Such concern led the American Defense
Science Board, a senior advisory panel, to undertake a study in 1999 that examined how U.S. allies were coping with rapid technological change and whether
16
there were any steps that the United States could take to ease the transition.
Contrary to the popular view that a rampaging unilateralism has overtaken
Washington, there is a widespread American acceptance of the importance of
working with coalition partners in international security issues. The United
States has realized—perhaps somewhat reluctantly—that it is compelled for
17
diplomatic as well as practical reasons to ally itself with other actors. This circumstance has applied not only to operations under the authority of the United
Nations or Nato but also in the context of ad hoc coalitions, like the present cam18
paign in Afghanistan. However, in spite of this recognition, allied military
weakness may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of such operations. Indeed, there is
growing concern in the United States that such weakness may ultimately increase the risks to American troops, a prospect that could make future strategic
cooperation difficult.
Similarly, Nato officials, after a lengthy period of apparent indifference, now
seem to appreciate the dimensions of the problem. In the most recent reflection
of this newfound awareness, Nato’s secretary general, Lord George Robertson,
warned in February 2002 that if the capabilities gap “[is] allowed to increase, it
will mean there won’t be coalitions in the future because the Americans will not
19
be able to operate [with the allies].” In essence, Robertson’s warning was a restatement of one he had made during the Kosovo war, when he had spoken of a
“two speed” alliance, in which Europe would be unable to participate in mis20
sions that the United States led.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of these warnings or, even more importantly, their sources. There is now recognition within Nato that the inability
of allies to work together on the battlefield will undermine—and perhaps ultimately doom—the alliance. The United States might restrict its role in alliance
missions to providing the advanced logistics, lift, and airpower that it alone
can supply. Tension could arise if European and Canadian armies, accordingly,
find themselves disproportionately responsible for the dangerous manpower21
intensive tasks that can lead to significant casualties. Further, the United States
might feel that it is entitled to have a say in alliance decision making commensurate with the fact that it provides the bulk of military assets.22
It is against this backdrop that the debate over Canada’s defense preparedness
and interoperability with the United States is taking place. To many observers,
Canadian defense weakness means that Canada will become a U.S. ally in
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political terms only, unable to make meaningful military contributions to multilateral coalitions; some critics would suggest that this day has already arrived.
However, Canada’s difficulties in cooperating with the U.S. military and in dealing with advanced defense technology are similar to those of many other American allies and, given the extensive history of defense cooperation between the
two countries, constitute a troubling development. Indeed, since 11 September
2001, the issues related to interoperability have taken on a new urgency in the
North American context, as the various Canadian agencies dealing with border
issues, law enforcement, and intelligence have begun to integrate themselves formally around joint tasks with their American counterparts.23 Perhaps most importantly, a new regional military structure, U.S. Northern Command,
responsible for American homeland defense, became operational on 1 October
2002. NorthCom’s area of operations will include not only the United States and
Canada but Mexico and parts of the Caribbean as well. It is apparent that this
new command will create additional pressure upon the two countries’ militaries
24
to cooperate.
Viewed from a broader perspective, then, the Canadian experience with advanced military technology and interoperability is an interesting case study in
how U.S. allies are adapting to the emerging military and strategic environment.
In this regard, while virtually all Western militaries now acknowledge that some
form of RMA is taking place (and most are trying to identify strategies for dealing with it), their forces are evolving in very gradual, measured ways. Thus, examining how one key U.S. ally is adapting will tell us much about the challenges
that other actors may face. Most crucially, it will offer lessons useful to Washington in how to approach allies who wish to participate in multilateral operations,
and it will offer guidelines as to the types of capabilities that allies can be expected to provide.
The first section of this article examines interoperability itself—what it is and
why it is important. It also briefly looks at recent developments that have made
interoperability such a major concern for the militaries of many countries. The
next part will focus on Canadian defense capabilities in each of the three services
and upon the modernization programs that are presently under way, by way of
determining which service is best positioned to take advantage of the RMA and
what steps need to be taken. The last section offers concluding observations and
findings, as well as suggestions on strategic development in light of the events of
11 September 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led war on terrorism.
INTEROPERABILITY IN THE CANADA-U.S. CONTEXT
While the concept of interoperability may appear to be relatively straightforward, in practice interoperability is almost always controversial and difficult to
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25

realize. It is therefore important to have a clear definition of what interoperability is and of why its achievement can be so problematic.
According to a recent RAND Corporation study, interoperability “is a measure of the degree to which various organizations or individuals are able to operate
26
together to achieve a common goal.” Thus interoperability is not necessarily
a military concept but has applications across the business, political, and strategic worlds. For the purposes of this article, though, interoperability will be examined in its military sense, and hence a more precise definition is required. The
U.S. military defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and
27
to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”
This notion of seamless cooperation and efficiency is the hallmark of an
interoperable fighting force. This definition includes issues related to standard28
ization, integration, cooperation, strategy, and defense production.
Military interoperability can be further defined at the operational and tech29
nical levels. Operational interoperability addresses support to military operations, focusing on people and procedures. Implementation of operational
interoperability involves testing, certification, training, and force configuration.
30
This definition encompasses the entire spectrum of military operations. Technical interoperability is essential to achieving operational interoperability.
Rather than focusing on people, however, technical interoperability stresses
communications and electronics equipment, ensuring that information can be
31
relayed quickly and efficiently. On the modern battlefield, rapid communications are a necessity for effective operations—information related to weapon
systems, software and associated operating systems, and intelligence at the command level. In a worst-case scenario—two militaries with identical weapons as
well as common training and procedures but incompatible communications
and data networks—cooperation will be difficult and the result could be errors,
mistakes, and missed opportunities.
In a general sense, the ultimate goal of interoperability is not to ensure that all
contributors to a coalition will necessarily deploy similar military forces or
weapon systems but rather to achieve a practicable level of cooperation between
32
their contingents. As Danford Middlemiss and Dennis Stairs have recently argued in a study on interoperability in the Canadian context, “from the military
point of view, the overarching objective is thus to make a militarily relevant and
effective contribution to multinational security efforts at the maximum possible
33
level of efficiency.”
But definitions and descriptions alone cannot convey the critical role that
interoperability plays in the contemporary military environment. Recent operations in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as evidence from experiments and
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exercises, point to the dramatic improvement in operational effectiveness that
can be achieved by using advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems and sharing information in a timely manner. A
“common operating picture,” along with the associated decision-support capabil34
ities, can have enormous effects on the pace and nature of military engagements.
This is not to suggest that achieving interoperable defense forces is a simple
task. On the contrary, the challenges posed by differing force structures, weapon
systems, and training techniques highlight the problems of realizing interoperability in practice. A recent U.S. study that examined forty coalition operations identified a long list of difficulties, including divergences between U.S. and
allied forces, differences in decision-making procedures, and communications
discrepancies.35
In addition to such apparent obstacles, a wide range of “soft factors” can
make effective cooperation virtually impossible. Such factors can include disagreement over or misunderstanding of goals, priorities, and rules of engagement; commitment of national forces to incompatible tactical, organizational,
36
or other professional doctrines; and outright policy disputes. Such sources of
divergence can create havoc in the field, particularly when the individual contingents involved are not large enough to be self-sufficient.
However, no discussion of the challenges to interoperability should mask the
real benefits that it offers, particularly to smaller countries. Most significantly,
interoperability enables a country with only modest military capabilities to con37
tribute in a meaningful way to multinational operations. Such contributions
tangibly demonstrate a commitment to resolving the conflict at hand. Perhaps
most critically, interoperable military forces offer visibility to other countries,
and they can generate political “IOUs” from coalition partners and allies alike,
chips that can be cashed in at some future point.
At the same time, though, interoperability has political costs, arising especially from the perception of reduced sovereignty and a general impression of
weakness resulting from acknowledgment that one’s military is no longer able to
act independently. Thus, for example, multilateral missions may involve a significant loss of decision-making power for the smaller coalition powers and create
38
an impression that a country has little say in how its forces are used. Furthermore, a history of successful military interoperability may create pressure to
participate in future missions, even those that do not have strong domestic political support, as defense ties are created and military alliances forged.
As far as Canada and the CF are concerned, interoperability has long been a
major goal. Since 1945, Canadian governments have accepted that the country’s
military forces are incapable of defending the country on their own and that as a
result cooperation with the United States and other allies is necessary. Canada
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was therefore a major supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and signed
an air defense agreement with the United States in 1958. Both treaties required
Canada to train and field military forces that could cooperate effectively with allies, although throughout the Cold War (but particularly after 1970) there were
persistent warnings that Canada’s defense forces were inadequate and lacked the
39
equipment and personnel necessary for sustained military operations.
The 1994 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the need for Canada to maintain
diverse and capable military forces. The white paper rejected the argument that
Canada required only a defense force largely focused around “constabulary”
40
tasks; instead it held that Canada “needs armed forces that are able to operate
with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations
against a capable opponent—that is, able to fight ‘alongside the best, against the
41
best.’” The white paper left no doubt that Canada needed a modern defense establishment, one that could cooperate with a U.S. military that was the world
42
leader in introducing and deploying sophisticated military technology.
Since that time, in spite of significant defense spending cuts, the goal of an
43
interoperable CF has been reiterated on several occasions. In 1999, DND released a major planning document intended to mould defense strategy for the
first two decades of the new century. Titled Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020, the study established both short and long-range goals
for the Canadian military. Among those goals was to “strengthen [Canada’s]
military relationship with the U.S. military to ensure Canadian and U.S. forces
44
are interoperable and capable of combined operations in key selected areas.” In
addition, it identified three targets for the next five years: to manage interoperability with allies so as to permit “seamless operational integration at short
notice”; to develop a program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible
with Canada’s “principal allies”; and to expand the joint and combined exercise
45
program to include “all environments and exchanges with the U.S.” While
interoperability was explicitly discussed in only one of the eight core objectives
identified for the CF, “it is hard to resist the conclusion,” as one observer recently
noted, “that [interoperability with the United States] is the [objective] that mat46
ters most.”
The goal of interoperability was reaffirmed in Strategic Capability Planning,
released in June 2000 by the vice chief of the Defence Staff. It noted that by
“achieving the goal of interoperability with U.S. forces in particular, who are
currently and for the foreseeable future setting the standard for advanced military equipment, [the Canadian Forces] will almost certainly be capable of operating effectively with the rest of [Canada’s] major allies, providing significant
47
flexibility in [Canada’s] approach to foreign affairs.”
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Lastly, in At a Crossroads in 2002, the chief of the Defense Staff again gave priority to interoperability. This report noted that “maintaining interoperability
remains key to the future relevance of the CF” and highlighted common training
practices, the establishment of joint doctrine, and participation in the Multinational Interoperability Council (which aims to enhance interoperability
48
through “improved data exchange and operational information”).
49
In sum, interoperability is a primary goal of the Canadian Forces. However,
at a time when the pace of military innovation is dramatically increasing,
achieving interoperability in practice poses serious challenges.
FORCE STRUCTURE AND SERVICE MODERNIZATION PLANS
The Canadian Forces today suffer the consequences of decades of neglect, inadequate funding, and questionable decisions regarding force structure. As a result,
they are in a relatively poor position—at least in comparison to many other Western nations—to field interoperable defense forces and to take advantage of the
RMA. At best, they can pursue what some observers have called a “niche” RMA
50
strategy, while fielding specialized forces that offer interoperability capabilities.
The Department of National Defence was slow to recognize the military
51
changes brought about by the revolution in technology. Inertia seemed to be
the primary DND response until around 1998, when a belated effort to study the
52
revolution in military affairs began. This response was slow not only in comparison to most of Canada’s allies but came more than a decade after the Pentagon first began to recognize and study the RMA.
The combination of the slow departmental response with limited defense
budgets has, in turn, meant that all three services have been sluggish in developing RMA plans. However, one area that has witnessed significant change in
the CF is command and control. Over the past few years, numerous new bodies have been established, including a Joint Imagery Centre, an Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Fusion Centre, and a Joint Operations
53
Group. As can be seen from these examples, the notion of “jointness,” which
many believe to be a key component of the RMA, has been eagerly adopted by
DND. An additional step has been the amalgamation of the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters with the Joint Force Headquarters, to create the Canadian
54
Joint Force Headquarters. While limited in terms of capabilities, each of these
new structures demonstrates some recognition that a transformation in command and control is required in the RMA environment.
DND has also signified its intention to create a new, highly mobile ground
force. In 2000, the minister of national defense announced the CF’s plan to establish “a combat-ready strike force to respond swiftly to global crises to prevent
the loss of innocent life and strengthen Canada’s influence with its allies.”55 This
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force similarly seems to be an attempt at creating a more RMA-relevant force, as
rapid response has been shown to be crucial in the post–Cold War strategic
environment.
In spite of these changes and plans, however, the services themselves have
very limited abilities to restructure themselves to take advantage of changes in
military technology. Each of the services—but in particular the air force and the
army—has dated or even antiquated equipment and is unlikely to acquire advanced weapons platforms in the near future. The implications of this develop56
ment have so far gone largely unrecognized in DND; this, however, cannot
continue much longer, at least not if the department intends to formulate a coherent defense strategy. To put it simply, a moment of truth is coming for the Canadian military, which would be wise to consider the options and make its
choices well before decisions are effectively made for it.
The Army
Of the three services of the CF, the army is in the worst shape militarily, presently
the least able to carry out its stated missions, let alone accept new ones. It also
suffers from dated equipment and political indifference. The result is a force uncertain of its present and future, and an unlikely candidate to receive priority.
The army today numbers about twenty-three thousand personnel, or about
57
40 percent of the total CF. This numerical strength should not come as a surprise, given the wide range of tasks the army (theoretically, if not in practice)
performs, ranging from conventional warfare at one end of the conflict spectrum, to peacekeeping and other low-intensity conflict (LIC) missions, and
58
more recently, to domestic tasks like fighting floods.
However, it is peacekeeping that has become most important for the army
over the last several decades. Successive Canadian governments have emphasized peacekeeping, and there is a widespread international perception that the
army has been geared specifically toward the task.59 In addition, the declaratory
Canadian emphasis—at least during the five-year tenure (1996–2000) of Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy—on “soft power” and “human security”
has given peacekeeping and other LIC tasks priority over more traditional army
60
missions. The result is an army with a combat capability that has been systematically reduced for decades.
The prominence of peacekeeping (and related peace-support operations) can
be seen most dramatically by examining the number of such missions that the
Canadian Forces have accepted in the recent past. Canada participated in nineteen United Nations and non-UN peacekeeping assignments between 1947 and
61
1986; that number ballooned to over twenty-five between 1988 and 2000. The
acceptance of so many missions has created considerable strain for the army,
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which has frequently found it difficult to provide the forces pledged by the
62
government.
Peacekeeping, however, is essentially irrelevant to the RMA, a fact having major implications if the army is to remain interoperable with the land forces of
Canada’s allies. This is not to suggest that RMA weapons can play no role in
peacekeeping or other LIC missions; nonetheless, the technological requirements of advanced military platforms, combined with the emphasis on sensing
equipment, simply do not translate well at the low end of the spectrum and may
63
even be counterproductive in some cases.
Peacekeeping aside, the army is largely incapable of carrying out its present
commitments and would require a complete overhaul to become more RMA
relevant. The army’s standing field forces consist of three mechanized brigade
groups. Each group is composed of three infantry battalions, an armored regiment, an artillery regiment, and an engineer regiment, along with combat sup64
port and combat service support. While each brigade should number about six
thousand personnel, their current strength is actually about 4,500 (a figure that
is reached only with the inclusion of hundreds of reservists). Further, while each
should be capable of operating without assistance, the reality is that were a Canadian brigade group deployed, it would be heavily dependent on additional resources provided by allies, especially for fire support, engineers, and electronic
warfare.
The term “mechanized brigade group” is a peculiarly Canadian one and thus
deserves additional comment. A brigade is a basic army formation; a brigade
group is more comprehensive. A mechanized brigade group is based predominantly on infantry but is equipped with a variety of fighting vehicles. These vehicles normally include tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as
long-range howitzers and other artillery. This combination of firepower and
65
mobility allows the group, ideally, to undertake a broad range of operations.
For overseas engagements, the army is supposed to be able to field a single
“Sabre” brigade group, which consists of mechanized infantry battalions, an armor regiment, armored reconnaissance, an engineer regiment, and a service
battalion. Such a brigade has a complement of six thousand personnel and
would be augmented by air defense and tactical aviation. Units drawn from the
three field brigades would form the Sabre brigade, which, it is envisaged, would
operate as part of a larger multinational or binational force and would necessarily be able to integrate its combat functions with those of the larger formation.66
However, the Sabre brigade is not designed to take part in high-intensity combat, only low-to-middle-level engagements. Thus, if it were ever deployed—
which it has never been—particular care would have to be taken to ensure that it
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was not placed in a sophisticated warfare environment, a restriction that obvi67
ously reduces its utility.
As to what would constitute an appropriate conflict for the brigade, there are
grounds for concern. According to the army, “low-level operations” involve terrorism or some form of insurgency (with the application of the minimum necessary force), while a “midlevel operation” is another term for limited war, like
the Gulf War or the 1999 Kosovo campaign, where the use of force is localized
and noncontinuous. Lastly, “high-intensity conflict” refers to total war. However, in the twenty-first century, it is not at all clear that such terms have much
meaning or that they delineate operationally distinct missions. Put simply, as 11
September has demonstrated, terrorism can inflict enormous devastation (indeed, should terrorist groups get hold of weapons of mass destruction, the results could be indistinguishable from those of total war), and the fight against
terrorism requires an array of capabilities and strategies. Further, the proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons in the 1980s and ’90s means that
even substate actors and terrorist groups may now possess significant military
capabilities; consequently, considerable caution must be employed when engaging them. Thus the operational distinctions that Canada seems to assume may
no longer exist. The net result is that the constraints limiting the Sabre brigade
must be interpreted so broadly as to all but preclude its participation in operations against any country or actor with modern defensive capabilities.
The question of whether the Canadian Forces are even capable of deploying
the Sabre brigade is an open one. While officially DND maintains that it can fulfil all its commitments, the army has acknowledged that deploying the brigade
would require its “entire focus” and could require the withdrawal of Canadian
68
peacekeepers overseas. In addition, should the unit suffer significant casualties, finding replacements would pose an enormous challenge, one that would
quickly overwhelm the manpower reserves (such as they are) of the army. Further, the army lacks strategic lift; the CC-130 Hercules transports (to be exam69
ined below) would be hard pressed to carry much of the brigade’s equipment.
Lastly, regular training in the Canadian army has been funded at the subunit
70
level only; adequate training at the battle group and brigade levels is lacking.
Doubts regarding the Sabre brigade were raised anew in August 2002, when it
was reported that DND had considered deploying it to Afghanistan as part of
71
Canada’s commitment to the U.S.-led war on terrorism. However (as noted below), concern over the CF’s ability to maintain and operate the brigade, acknowledged inability to provide adequate medical supplies, and insufficient
logistical support led to a decision to send a much smaller contingent. The controversy has led to renewed speculation regarding the future of the brigade and
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the desirability of maintaining a “capability” that the Canadian Forces, in reality,
cannot exercise.
With regard to equipment, the army—perhaps not surprisingly, given its inability to engage in high-intensity combat—must make do with a long list of
outdated weapon systems. Indeed, the army itself has provided the most damning critique of its capabilities. In a 1998 report, the Land Forces Command
noted that “the Army’s ‘core’ combat capability remains constrained by obsolescent and obsolete 1960s and 1970s equipment that impose limitations on the
tasks that can be undertaken with acceptable risks and is becoming increasingly
72
expensive to operate and maintain.”
The army’s primary combat weapon system remains the Leopard I main battle tank, acquired in the mid-1970s. While a sophisticated tank at the time it was
introduced, the Canadian Leopard has not been regularly upgraded; it is essentially unchanged from the original model. With a (relatively) small 105 mm main
gun and no reactive armor, the Leopards are a marginal weapon at best on the
modern battlefield. Given the dramatic changes that have occurred in tank technology over the last twenty-five years, the Leopards would prove easy targets in
virtually any combat environment. They are presently, at last, getting badly
needed renovations, but few defense observers believe that they will be apprecia73
bly strengthened as a result.
An additional army deficiency is the lack of tactical aviation. Unlike the
United States (with its AH-64 Apache), Canada has never owned a dedicated
attack helicopter. Instead, it assumes that allies will provide such capabilities.
Canadian army helicopters primarily perform reconnaissance and transport
74
missions. To accomplish such tasks, the army acquired in the mid-1990s a hundred Griffon helicopters, a platform based on a commercial civilian
design (by Bell Helicopter). The program has been plagued by controversy, uncertainty, and deficiencies that have been well docu75
mented. Indeed, in the summer of 2002, a quarter of the Griffon
fleet was temporarily grounded after a fatal accident in which a
76
tail-rotor blade disintegrated.
There are too many additional army equipment deficiencies to list here. However, among the most glaring are the lack of an IFF (identification, friend or foe)
system to reduce the possibility of “friendly fire” accidents, limited minedetection and clearing capabilities, few intelligence assets, and an inadequate
capacity to decontaminate personnel in the event of exposure to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
Ironically, the incapability of Canadian land forces to wage high-intensity
warfare and their marginal utility in midlevel operations effectively reduce the
importance of army interoperability. A force has little need to ensure that its
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equipment and training allows seamless integration into a larger formation if it
cannot take part in most of that formation’s operations. As Joel Sokolsky has recently noted, there are different levels of interoperability, of which the highest
(which he calls “a seamless fusion of military forces”) is required in “high intensity combat operations.” For various LIC missions, Sokolsky argues, “a lower
77
level of interoperability [is] necessary.”
This is not to suggest, however, that maintaining an interoperable land force is
not a professed goal of the Canadian army, for it clearly is. The value of comparable
training procedures and doctrines has been highlighted by the Canadian participation in the war in Afghanistan and the deployment there of 850 soldiers of Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. Prior to their arrival, the commander of the U.S.
forces in southern Afghanistan said that the integration of the two countries’
forces would be “seamless”;78 this characterization, defense analysts explained,
79
would result from common training practices. The Canadian troops left Afghanistan in July 2002, after only six months, but there is widespread acceptance that they
performed a valuable mission—primarily, assisting U.S. forces in capturing remaining al-Qa‘ida and Taliban fighters and securing the Kandahar airport—and made a
80
major contribution to the larger war effort. The interoperability achieved in Afghanistan was the result of years of careful planning and reflected a strategic decision to
bring Canadian army operational procedures in line with those of the United States
81
(at least to the extent possible, given Canadian military weakness).
As for modernization plans, a few army initiatives can be noted. The army is
taking some initial steps to develop a capacity to function on the emerging “digi82
tized” battlefield. The Iris Tactical Command, Control, and Communications
System consists of handheld and vehicle-mounted radios that will provide a secure communications capability. Further, the Situational Awareness subsystem
will show unit commanders where all friendly and enemy vehicles are, with pin83
point accuracy. The army is also in the process of modernizing its armored
84
fighting vehicles, an important step in the creation of a more mobile force.
With regard to plans to reshape the army, a study prepared in 2000, Army of
85
Tomorrow, outlined a blueprint for a transformed Canadian land force. The
document calls for a more technology-dependent army, utilizing advanced sensors and precision weapons, and capable of participating in joint and combined
operations. Perhaps most critically, it calls for a much smaller force, with only
two brigades and a significantly reduced artillery corps.
An even more important army blueprint was released in May 2002 by the
service’s commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jeffrey. In a document titled
Advancing with Purpose, Jeffrey called for a radically reformulated Canadian
army, one that would be based around units of one hundred soldiers instead of
86
the present seven-hundred-man battalions. Jeffrey’s plan would create a
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much more flexible structure and would place considerable emphasis on the
87
readiness of light infantry and on command and communications functions.
While the plan certainly represents a bold rethinking of the size and purpose of
the army, it is difficult to overstate the financial impetus behind it; as Jeffrey
has noted, “I don’t see a better way unless of course someone has got a lot more
88
money to build me a lot bigger army.”
These initiatives aside, inadequate equipment, uncertain strategic goals, and
near-constant manpower reductions have produced a service in crisis, as many
89
have observed. For example, in 1999 the Conference of Defence Associations, a
pro-DND lobby group, stated that “the Canadian Forces, especially the army, are
90
on the verge of collapse.” As noted, the army itself has been surprisingly can91
did, accepting that it is in a “fragile” state, with erosion beginning to set in. In
short, the prognosis for the army is bleak. The emphasis on peacekeeping has resulted in a force that can take part in only low-level combat, quite a contrast to
92
the role the Canadian army played in the last century’s two global conflicts.
The Air Force
Like the army, the Canadian air force is battling equipment obsolescence and declining capabilities. Recent engagements, particularly Operation ALLIED FORCE
over Kosovo in 1999 (the Canadian portion of which was called Operation
ECHO), demonstrated serious interoperability concerns, concerns that placed allied aircraft and their crews in potential danger. Given the prohibitive cost of replacements for the ageing CF-18s, the limited roles that the present aircraft can
perform, and questionable political support, the air force also is a poor candi93
date for prioritization over the other services.
The decline of the air force has been particularly dramatic since 1994. That
year’s white paper outlined a series of steps necessitated by the reduction in defense spending. Most critically, expenditures on fighter forces and their support
were to be reduced by 25 percent. To achieve those savings, the air force was required to retire its CF-5 fleet, cut its fighter-related overhead, reduce annual authorized flying hours, and scale back the number of operational CF-18s, the sole
remaining combat aircraft in its inventory.94 As a result, measured by the number of personnel (thirteen thousand), the air force today is the smallest it has
95
been since 1948.
Canada’s 138 CF-18s were purchased in the early 1980s and are the original
A/B models produced by the American manufacturer McDonnell Douglas. A
second version of the plane, the C/D model, was produced in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and included a large number of improvements over the original. In
1998, the Boeing Corporation—having purchased McDonnell Douglas several
years earlier—began manufacturing the third variant of the aircraft, the E/F
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96

CF-18s

(nicknamed “Super Hornet”), a model that became operational in 2002. All
F-18s in the active inventory of the United States are already at the C/D standard and will be upgraded to E/F by mid-decade. In contrast, most CF-18s
have never been upgraded (although a current modernization program will
be examined below), with the result that many of their systems are approaching obsolescence and are facing serious challenges in supportability and the
97
availability of spare parts.
Canada’s CF-18s have taken part in two major conflicts in the last decade. In
the Gulf War, twenty-four CF-18s were deployed to perform defensive combat
air patrols; in the war’s later stages the aircraft also performed sweep and escort
missions—the first time since the Korean War that Canadian aircraft had been
98
involved in offensive air operations. In 1999, eighteen CF-18s were deployed to
Aviano, Italy, where they took part in ALLIED FORCE. Canadian aircraft played an active part in the bombing campaign, one of only five Nato countries to do so (the others
99
being the United States, Britain, France, and Germany).
With regard to Operation DESERT STORM, there were
numerous interoperability problems associated with the
CF-18. For example, Canadian aircraft were deficient in
tactical air communications equipment. Specifically, the
CF-18s lacked the Link-4 ship-to-aircraft datalink system,
necessary for secure transmissions with the Aegis antiaircraft cruisers that guarded the coalition surface fleet. Until the problem was resolved by an upgrade arrangement negotiated with the United States, it
100
delayed Canadian engagements against hostile Iraqi aircraft.
The Canadian sweep-and-escort missions in the Gulf raised two different sets
of problems. The first stemmed from a lack of secure voice radio communications, which forced a change in coalition bombing missions to higher altitudes
101
for greater protection against enemy missiles and artillery. The second problem was inadequate refuelling capability. At the onset of the operation Canada
deployed a refuelling aircraft, a converted Boeing 707 nicknamed “Husky One,”
to support the CF-18s. But after sixteen consecutive days of operation, the aircraft was grounded due to hydraulic problems. This became a serious matter for
the CF-18s, as most of the coalition tankers in the region had nozzles that were
102
incompatible with CF-18 refuelling probes.
Additional problems were experienced with the Canadian bombing effort.
Most critical was a lack of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Canadian
CF-18s had not been reconfigured to carry the new, more accurate ordnance and
as a result were limited to dropping “dumb” bombs against Iraqi artillery and ve103
hicle convoys. A further difficulty involved doctrinal differences and tactical-
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level training. For example, Canadian pilots had not been trained to perform
high-altitude bombing, a problem that was rectified only through extensive
training and exercises.
The air force spent the years following DESERT STORM addressing some of the
problems that had been identified, but there were some notable failures, with the
result that many of the same issues resurfaced during ALLIED FORCE in 1999. For
example, Canada (still) did not have a strategic air-to-air refuelling capability; it
104
was wholly dependent on the United States in this respect. Further, Canada
had acquired only a limited number of laser-guided PGMs prior to the campaign;105 Canada did not acquire any satellite-guided munitions.106 In addition,
Canadian aircraft lacked night-vision devices and helmet-mounted bombsight
“cueing” systems, the absence of which degraded the safety of their maneuvering
and the effectiveness of their bombing. Most critically, Canada still had no secure
voice communications—it was the only Nato country that did not—a failing that
forced the entire allied air effort to use single-frequency (and thus jammable)
107
equipment. An air force assessment of the campaign concluded that “we could
not repeat the same level of activity, and in most scenarios we would not be permitted to participate to the same extent, due to our increasingly outdated equip108
ment.”
In 1999, with the CF-18s approaching the ends of their expected service lives
in five to ten years, the air force introduced a plan designed to keep the aircraft
flying until approximately 2020. The Incremental Modernization Program
(IMP) has a budget of eight hundred million dollars (U.S.) and is now well under way. The project consists of ten independent ventures, including enhanced
computer capabilities, new electronic warfare systems, and an improved radar
109
suite. However, even after all the upgrades are completed (in 2008), the CF-18s
will have been brought up only to the operational standard the U.S. F-18s attained almost twenty years ago. Even more worrisome, with the introduction of
the F-22 Raptor in the United States in 2005 and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in
2008 (and the expected gradual retirement of the F-18s), U.S. aircraft standards
will by then have been entirely transformed, well beyond the capability of the
110
CF-18s. In addition, the air forces of many of Canada’s allies will receive new
aircraft over the next decade, making effective cooperation increasingly un111
likely. Lastly, with price tags of ninety million dollars (U.S.) per aircraft for the
F-22 and about fifty million for the JSF, both aircraft will be far too expensive
for the CF to purchase (barring an unexpected and massive defense spending
112
increase).
For transport, the air force has thirty-two turboprop CC-130 Hercules aircraft. Their most important function is to carry cargo, but they can also be used
to carry passengers, and they have a marginal capability for aerial refuelling. The
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Hercules is also the principal fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft of the Cana113
dian Forces.
In service since the 1960s (although some were purchased in the early 1970s),
the Hercules, like many other Canadian weapons platforms, are nearing the ends
of their operational lives. Indeed, DND recently acknowledged that only a third
of the fleet is available for daily operations; the majority require nearly continu114
ous repairs. The retirement of the Hercules will pose a particularly daunting
challenge, as these highly versatile aircraft have been depended upon for virtually all deployments of CF personnel abroad.
While a comprehensive modernization program could extend the life of the
Hercules force for perhaps ten years, a replacement aircraft will have to be purchased in the next few years if DND is to maintain a transport capability past
2010. The obvious candidate is the C-130J Hercules, a modernized version of the
venerable aircraft. However, it costs about seventy million dollars (U.S.) per
plane and has cargo limitations; the government has to date not approved any
115
such purchase. A second possibility is a limited acquisition of more expensive
Boeing C-17 Globemasters, an aircraft that is now widely used by the U.S. Air
116
Force. Despite the cost of either option, purchasing a replacement aircraft for
the Hercules has become a top priority of DND; the 2001–2002 Report on Plans
and Priorities declares that “develop[ing] options to enhance [Canadian forces’]
deployability, including strategic lift” is a primary objective of force structure
117
modernization.
Finally, despite attempts to emphasize the air force’s nonmilitary capabilities,
airpower runs inherently counter to the “soft power” view of the world that prevails within the Liberal government, particularly the Department of Foreign Af118
fairs. As a result, the air force is unlikely to attract significant political support
any time soon.
The air force, then, is facing a difficult period. Its sole combat plane is verging
on obsolescence, it has no strategic lift capability to speak of, and its transport
aircraft are ageing and increasingly error prone. All this will seriously impede
the efforts of the Canadian air force to become functionally interoperable with
the U.S. Air Force. There is little question that in the opening stages of future
conflicts (as in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) the United States will
look to utilize its airpower, a capability that no prospective enemy can match. Indeed, it has been recently observed that “across the spectrum of conflict, air supremacy is now the sine qua non of U.S. military activity, the arm of choice and
the enabler and protector of all other arms.”119 Thus Canada’s air weakness may
effectively negate its ability to participate in U.S.-led military operations.
Certainly, if it were up to DND, Canada would retain a sophisticated air combat capability and would remain a potential air coalition partner of the United
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States. One could argue that the Incremental Modernization Program is designed with precisely this in mind. However, if this is indeed the air force’s intent,
the IMP is not sufficient, nor is it apparent that any country of Canada’s size and
resources could do much better. Combat aircraft are presently undergoing a revolution in terms of performance and capabilities, a transformation not experienced since the late 1940s and early 1950s, when jet engines and air-to-air
missiles were first introduced. Only countries with large and sophisticated militaries (the United States, Britain, France, Israel, and perhaps one or two others)
will now be able to field first-rate air forces.
Other nations are left with the options of either operating second-tier air
arms or concentrating on noncombat air missions (for example, command and
control or aerial surveillance). Given U.S. air superiority over both friends and
foes alike, the question needs to be asked: do allies of the United States need to
operate advanced combat aircraft? It is highly unlikely that any Western country
would feel obliged to go it alone against a prospective foe; fielding and maintaining advanced combat aircraft in order to do so are now very demanding and expensive tasks. In any case, the choice will be difficult for Canada, a country with a
120
long and proud record of aerial service.
Canadian CF-18s have played no part in the bombing campaign over Afghanistan. Their inability to operate from U.S. aircraft carriers was the official reason
121
given. An additional explanation, however, may have been that the United
States desired the assistance of only forces that would add appreciably to the
campaign.
The Navy
The navy is in the best shape of Canada’s three services, and it is the obvious candidate for prioritization. It enjoys relatively modern equipment, strong political
support, and a strategic mission that is broadly consistent with Canadian foreign policy goals. In addition, it has an excellent working relationship with the
U.S. Navy, perhaps the closest of any American ally. A decision to prioritize the
navy will not only allow it to purchase badly needed equipment but will ensure a
strong Canadian naval presence well into the future.
The navy’s major warships are twelve Halifax-class frigates, four Iroquoisclass destroyers, two fleet support vessels, and four submarines. In addition, it
operates a maritime aviation force of thirty Sea King helicopters and twenty-one
122
long-range patrol aircraft. Lastly, the navy has recently acquired twelve maritime coastal defense vessels.
The frigates are the pride of the fleet. Delivered between 1992 and 1998, they
can perform a variety of roles, depending on the circumstances, against undersurface, surface, or air threats. A Halifax-class frigate can search some thirty-two
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thousand square kilometers (about 12,400 square miles) of ocean in about ten
123
days, before it requires refuelling. To detect and track submarines, and to extend the range of territory that the frigate is able to scout, each frigate carries one
Sea King helicopter (examined below). The frigates are quite heavily armed with an
array of missiles, guns, and defensive systems.
The destroyers, while hardly new (they were purchased in the early 1970s),
have been extensively modernized and refitted over the years and
are still effective warships. They have been outfitted with an
area-air-defense system by which they can extend protection to
other vessels—radars, an inventory of twenty-nine long-range
surface-to-air missiles, and chaff launchers. The destroyers have
also been fitted with command and control facilities that allow
124
them to serve as flagships for Canadian or allied task groups.
This combination of modern air defense and command and control capabilities merited redesignation of these ships as guided
missile destroyers (DDGs). It should be noted, though, that the
destroyers are scheduled to be withdrawn from service at the end
125
of the decade.
The navy’s Victoria-class submarines are in the process of being introduced. Purchased (slightly used) from Britain in the mid-1990s, they offer an
enormous improvement over the now-withdrawn Oberon-class submarines,
126
which had been in service since 1963 and were effectively obsolete. While the
Russian navy does not pose the threat that the Soviet navy did during the Cold
War, it retains a substantial submarine force, which still patrols off the North
American coasts. The new submarines will provide valuable surveillance as well
127
as antisubmarine capabilities.
Combined, these three warship classes offer Canada fairly robust presence
and significant combat capabilities. Furthermore, and critically, they offer a
high degree of interoperability with allied navies, and in particular the U.S.
Navy. Perhaps the best example of this is the ability of Canadian frigates and
destroyers to operate in U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Since the Gulf War,
128
Canadian warships have frequently been integrated into such groups. This
has occurred most recently with Operation APOLLO (the Canadian designation for its contribution to the U.S. war on terrorism), where six Canadian
warships—four frigates, one destroyer, and one supply ship—joined the
129
U.S.-led fleet. Extensive combined training allowed Canadian vessels to do so
quite easily, a degree of interoperability that is highly unusual in the naval
130
world.
Among their naval allies, the Americans consider the Canadian navy “high
131
end.” With an emphasis on command and control along with intelligence and
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surveillance, it has a demonstrated ability to undertake a broad array of missions. The navy’s blueprint for the next several decades—a document entitled
Leadmark—notes that during the Gulf War the Canadian task group commander was the only non-American warfare commander, a development that
was possible because of the compatibility and interoperability of Canadian ships
132
with those of the United States. Similarly, the upgraded destroyers and frigates
133
have frequently played leading roles in multilateral operations.
In the area of maritime aviation, however, the navy is badly in need of modernization; these needs point to the advantages that naval prioritization would
offer. The navy’s maritime helicopter, the Sea King, is completely obsolete; it
poses a danger to both its crew and nearby ships virtually every time it flies
(which, given its enormous maintenance requirements, is thankfully not of134
ten). In service since 1963, Canada’s fleet of Sea Kings was initially slated for
replacement in the early 1990s. However, upon election in 1993, one of Prime
Minister Jean Chretien’s first official acts was to cancel the helicopter project
(and pay the hefty three-hundred-million-dollar U.S. cancellation fee). The
135
government announced its intention to replace the fleet in 2000; the timetable, however, remains unclear, and the Sea Kings
136
will likely be flying until at least 2008. This is an
embarrassment not only to the crews who are forced
to keep these antiques in the air but more broadly to
all Canadians, who are apparently content to ask CF
naval aviators to fly aircraft that are poorly equipped,
occasionally unstable, and incapable of operating in
137
most combat environments.
The other major naval aircraft is the CP-140 Aurora (an adaptation of the U.S. P-3 Orion), which is
also nearing the end of its operational life. In service since 1980, the Auroras perform an array of surveillance and reconnaissance missions, in addition to antisubmarine warfare tasks. As a result, however, they have been operated hard.
Having exceeded the deadline set in the United States for their refurbishment,
the Auroras have problems with corrosion and structural fatigue. In addition,
the now-familiar Canadian practice of not upgrading aircraft has resulted in
138
service and maintenance difficulties.
The problems associated with naval aviation notwithstanding, the Canadian
139
navy is in surprisingly good shape. Certainly, there is an element of luck involved;
it was the navy’s good fortune that it was the last service to undergo a major modernization program before the defense budget was effectively gutted in 1993. However, luck alone cannot explain the navy’s balanced force—for that, credit must be
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given to the navy’s senior officers, who designed a fleet approach that combines several types of capabilities.
Another factor in the navy’s favor is the broad range of operations that naval
forces can perform. Leadmark divides naval functions into three basic roles—
140
military, diplomatic, and constabulary. Under military missions it lists command of the sea, sea control, sea denial, battlespace dominance, fleet-in-being, maritime power projection, and maritime maneuver. Among diplomatic roles, it
identifies ten distinct missions, including preventive diplomacy, coercion, maritime interdiction, peace-support operations, civil military cooperation, and
humanitarian assistance. Lastly, constabulary tasks comprise another six functions, among which are sovereignty patrols, aid to the civil power, search and
rescue, and disaster relief.
This lengthy list of functions makes the navy ideally suited to carry out Canadian
foreign policy. As noted earlier, contributing to international peace and security
through multilateral operations remains a primary foreign policy goal of Canada,
and among the three services the navy clearly offers the broadest array of capabilities to carry out this mission. As evidence, the Canadian navy has frequently deployed when regional or ethnic conflict is seen as
requiring Western intervention. Thus, in the recent past, the navy has sailed to Southeast Asia to
support operations in East Timor and participated
in the embargo against Haiti; it is currently engaged
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as part of the
141
campaign in Afghanistan.
Any decision to prioritize the navy would
have an immediately beneficial impact, as badly
needed modernization programs could then be
undertaken quickly. In addition, because the
navy’s primary warships are all relatively modern, replacement should not be an
142
issue for at least another ten years. Even then, a decision could be made simply
to retire (rather than replace) the destroyers. Lastly, given its impressive degree
of interoperability with the U.S. Navy, the Canadian navy is well positioned to
participate in a wide range of missions, from peace-support/humanitarian aid
to sophisticated conventional warfare.
ALONGSIDE THE BEST, AGAINST THE BEST?
The decline of Canadian military capabilities has occurred with the apparent
approval of much of the Canadian public. Defense commentators and what remains of the Progressive Conservative and Alliance parties have strongly criticized the Liberal government for its defense cuts.143 Nevertheless, the reality is
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that, as Canadians have repeatedly demonstrated, when it comes to proposed
government spending increases, defense simply does not fare very well in com144
parison to programs like health care or education.
Nor does this seem likely to change in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. While the Canadian government has pledged to pay more attention to security issues, there is no indication
145
that DND will be getting any significant infusion of cash as a result. Indeed,
since the attacks, not only has the government announced only minor increases
in defense spending (of the additional five billion [U.S.] allocated for security in
the 10 December 2001 federal budget, only eight hundred million spread over
five years was earmarked for defense), but it has also declared that a defense policy review needs to be undertaken—a sign, many observers believe, that the government is finally prepared to
acknowledge that the fiscal basis of the 1994 Defence
146
White Paper can no longer be met.
If nothing else, though, 11 September has shifted public attention to the Canadian military in a way not seen in
decades. The Canadian Forces have come under scrutiny
not for their misadventures but for their capabilities, and
the tools they have—and perhaps more importantly, do
not have—to perform the tasks that are requested of them. While it is difficult to
predict what might come of this newfound attention, it is worth noting that this
debate is taking place against a backdrop of studies and reports that allege that
147
Canada is a “declining” international power. If it is to reclaim its status as a
“middle” power, these analysts argue, it needs to start paying the expenditures in
defense that are expected of an advanced, Western country that is a longtime
member of Nato and a partner with the United States in the defense of North
148
America.
DND must not only deal with antiquated equipment and inadequate funding
but battle a political establishment in Ottawa that appears to do everything possible to discredit it. In a recent example, Prime Minister Chretien stated in a
year-ending 2001 interview that people who call for increases in defense spending—who, it should be emphasized, include Canada’s auditor general as well as
members of his own party—are essentially pawns of the arms industry. As the
prime minister noted with his customary eloquence, “there is an industry that is
very important that produces armaments for government . . . that [says] you
149
should buy more of our stuff.” The prime minister went on to state that the
Canadian Forces are “well equipped” (a point he has made many times over the
last few years) and to suggest that DND’s troubles have more to do with outdated
150
strategies than with fiscal constraints.
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There is no question, however, that years of budget cuts have left the CF in a
precarious position. Despite the goals set in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada today cannot field military forces that can fight “alongside the best, against
the best.” Over the course of the past decade, the Canadian Forces have lost significant combat capability; once lost, such capability is difficult to restore. As has
been recently noted, “Neither flexible nor multipurpose anymore, the Canadian
Forces, by gradual but incessant reductions, have been ushered in the direction
of the glorified sovereignty protection and peacekeeping roles its fiercer critics
151
had for a decade and more demanded.” Even the defense minister, John
McCallum, has begun to acknowledge the severity of the situation, recently as152
serting that the CF have been stretched past the “breaking point.”
153
Nonetheless, Canadian foreign policy remains internationalist. While the
tenure of Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy has ended, his successors, John
Manley and, more recently, Bill Graham, have continued to stress the interna154
tional role that Canada can play. During much of the 1970s, the Liberal government’s emphasis on “human security” and “soft power” downplayed the
importance of military assets, thereby making them broadly consistent with
Canada’s declining capabilities. But those days seem to be (thankfully) over, as
Manley’s conception of foreign policy is far more dependent on traditional “hard power” resources and recognizes the linkages between political influence and
military power. Indeed, Manley has even gone so far as to
suggest that if Canada wants to be taken more “seriously”
in world affairs, it needs to increase its military, an opinion that would have verged on sacrilege in Ottawa just a
155
few years ago.
Further, Canada’s foreign policy internationalism is
strongly supported by the public, a finding clearly supported by polling data. Respondents to one such poll apparently surprised researchers with the depth of their understanding, leading pollsters to conclude
that “Canadians are passionate about world affairs, interventionist, and more
156
united than one might have predicted.” A majority of respondents indicated
they would consider a Canadian military response appropriate in the event of
another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or a Rwanda-type genocide in Africa.
The disconnect, then, between Canada’s foreign and defense policy is clear.
Simply stated, DND is incapable of fielding the forces required to match Canada’s foreign policy rhetoric, and it is unlikely to acquire those forces in the future. There are, however, steps that DND can take that will produce at least some
degree of combat capability. The army and air force suffer from advanced equipment obsolescence; their prognoses for future interoperability are poor. On the
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other hand, the navy has a reasonably modern fleet, can perform a wide array of
missions, enjoys widespread political support, and already offers significant
interoperability capabilities. A decision to give it priority, fiscal and otherwise,
over the other services would give the Canadian Forces a significant capacity to
participate in multinational coalition operations well into the twenty-first
century.
Let us be clear, though. There is no satisfaction to be found in recommending
that the needs of the navy be prioritized over those of the army or air force. As
many observers have noted, the future strategic environment is uncertain, and
the varied types of threats that Canada faces calls for broadly capable armed
157
forces (like those envisioned by the 1994 Defence White Paper). In an ideal
world, Canadians and their government would take military matters seriously
and ensure that the Department of National Defence was funded to carry out the
tasks demanded of it. But Canada is not living in an ideal world, nor is it likely to
158
enjoy one any time soon. Military spending in Canada is likely to remain low.
Accordingly, the government and DND must make some critical decisions.
There are indications that DND is beginning to appreciate the challenges and
is finally starting to ask the necessary difficult questions. In a sustainability review conducted in November 2001, DND acknowledged that it was in a period
of “relentless decline” and that “major trade-offs” might have to be made to en159
sure that some advanced capabilities are maintained. “The current situation
cannot endure. Either corrective action is taken now, or Defence will gradually
become unable to meet its white paper commitments and respond to emerging
challenges.” Most importantly, the report suggested that DND must begin making choices as to which capabilities it wishes to maintain—perhaps between
numbers of personnel and investment in high-technology weapons platforms;
between flexible, multipurpose forces and single-purpose “niche” forces; between preparation for domestic tasks and for international ones; and maintaining equal capabilities for the army, navy, and air force versus putting more
resources into one service at the expense of the others. While the report made no
recommendation, it noted that the time for making decisions is short and that
the consequences of making the wrong ones would be severe.
The concept of trade-offs was also raised in At a Crossroads, the report released by General R. R. Henault, the chief of the Defence Staff, in June 2002. He
concluded that “[DND] cannot invest in the new capabilities required to transform the CF and remain interoperable and well equipped without divesting ourselves of capabilities that have become less relevant to the twenty-first-century
160
battlespace. The transition will be difficult.” He offered no details as to which
capabilities had become “less relevant,” but he documented the difficulties and
challenges that both the army and air force face, while offering little but praise
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for the navy—“ton for ton, the Canadian Navy is currently as capable as any navy
161
in the world.”
A decision to prioritize Canada’s navy also makes sense on strategic grounds.
In this regard, the war on terrorism launched by the United States against the
Taliban and al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan in October 2001 has revealed interesting
changes in the way Western military operations are likely to be conducted in the
future. A new style of warfare employing small teams of special operations
forces on the ground supported by carrier-based and land-based aircraft may
162
well displace U.S. ground and tank forces on the battlefield. Four assets appear
to have been vital in the quick U.S. victory over the Taliban regime: special operations forces; long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers; “smart” weapons combined
163
with digital communications; and unmanned aerial vehicles, which now com164
bine reconnaissance capabilities with limited strike roles.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has revealed that the United States will carefully
screen multilateral participation in future coalitions. The Americans will likely welcome Canada’s participation in future naval task forces (provided its maritime
forces remain capable and fully interoperable) but are unlikely to request its air or
ground assets. At the very least, the campaign suggests that only countries that
maintain highly sophisticated air and ground units will be “allowed” to participate
165
in U.S.-led operations; Canada abandoned that standard some time ago.
In essence, Canada possesses armed forces with a marginal combat capability
in the current strategic environment and little hope of becoming more combat
capable in the future, while at the same time its government places a premium
on interoperable forces that can take full advantage of the revolution in military
affairs. Nor is the emphasis on interoperability likely to diminish; on the contrary, interoperable forces will remain critical to both the United States and its
166
allies, especially in a coalition context. As Lawrence Freedman recently predicted, “The most important allies of the United States will make an effort to
stay abreast of [advanced military] technologies and to adopt them where possible, if only for purposes of interoperability. . . . It will become the subscription to
167
be taken seriously as an ally.”
However, at least with regard to the United States, the need for interoperability in particular instances has more to do with American political concerns than strategic ones. Without doubt, the United States has the military
assets required to conduct unilateral operations any time it perceives its national
168
interests to be at stake (as it is essentially doing in Afghanistan). But when core
American interests are not directly threatened—as in Kosovo or the Gulf—
Washington prefers to have allies on board before undertaking military opera169
tions. Former secretary of defense William Perry has suggested, “The threat of
military force . . . will be maximally effective when political conditions permit
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26
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the military force to be a broadly based coalition.” But the primary criterion
for joining U.S.-led coalitions is fielding defense forces that are broadly interoperable with American forces; offers of forces that have failed to remain
interoperable will likely result in polite refusals—an understandable response,
given the risks. Simply put, the United States is not willing to allow its preference
for working with allies to weaken its own defense posture. If the allies—including Canada—wish to cooperate with the U.S. military, they must ensure that
171
their capabilities are up to the challenge.
The Canadian Forces have entered a critical period, one that will determine
their force structure for the next several decades. At a time of fiscal challenge
and dramatic technological change, continuing the present fiction of generalpurpose combat forces is no longer sustainable. The events of 11 September and
the resulting U.S.-led war on terrorism have highlighted the importance of a
modern and capable military. The Department of National Defence needs to
prioritize if it is to retain a viable fighting force. To be sure, such decisions will
not be easy; they could spark internecine struggle within the military. Failure to
make them, however, would largely ensure that the present disconnect between
Canadian foreign and defense policy will become a permanent fixture of Canadian statehood.

NOTES

1. While a topic of some controversy as recently
as the mid-1990s, it is now widely accepted
that an RMA is under way. Key studies include
Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996; Lawrence
Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,
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Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000);
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of War (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux,
2000).
2. In general, Canadian defense white papers are
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global conditions change in dramatic and unexpected ways. Over the last forty years, there
have been four such papers in Canada—1964,
1971, 1987, and 1994. The intent is to offer a
general guideline of defense policy for the Canadian government, a framework for strategy
and major procurement programs. Doug
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Bland has reprinted all post–World War II
defense white papers and released them in
one volume. See Doug Bland, ed., Canada’s
National Defence, vol. 1, Defence Policy
(Kingston, Ont.: School of Policy Studies,
Queen’s University, 1997).
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known as Land Forces Command (the army),
Maritime Command (the navy), and Air
Command (the air force), the result of a
departmental reorganization created during
the divisive service-unification debate of the
mid-1960s. (Land Forces Command is a
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use the old service designations, a practice
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4. The Canadian Defence Planning Document,
published by DND, identifies the fundamental missions of the CF. According to the 1997
report, contributing to international peace
and security, which includes participating in
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National Style (London: Hamilton Press,
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Univ. Press, 1996).
7. In February 2002, the U.S. Department of
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2003 fiscal year. The total amount requested,
$379 billion, represented a thirty-nine-billiondollar increase (11 percent) over the 2002
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those based in the United States. Major European and Canadian technology firms include
Nokia, Ericsson, Nortel, and Alcatel; major
defense firms include British Aerospace, the
European Aeronautic Defense and Space
Company (EADS), and Bombardier. Measured by either revenue or market capitalization, these firms are smaller than their
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One useful method of comparing defense investment and preparedness among countries
is to examine how much each country spends
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14. See Yost and “Lessons from Kosovo: Military
Operational Capabilities,” in The Military
Balance 1999–2000 (London: IISS, 1999). The
British and French governments have produced their own studies on the capabilities
gap; see, respectively, the Secretary of State
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in forging multilateral coalitions, see James P.
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27. As cited in ibid., p. xiii.
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three years to modernize equipment and contribute to international peace and security;
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a rare circumstance in Canada); see the DND
Website, “Equipment: Vehicles—Griffon”
(www.army.dnd.ca/LF/equip/veh/Griffon).
The Griffon’s weaknesses have also been discussed in several auditor general reports.
76. The accident occurred during a search and
rescue mission in Labrador; the helicopter
had not been designed to operate in harsh
weather; see “‘Antiquated’ Choppers Put Rescue Crews at Risk, Author Says,” Ottawa Citizen, 26 July 2002. Also see “Tail Blades
Defective,” Halifax Herald Limited, 15 August
2002.
77. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 9.
78. See “Canadians, Americans One Army, Officer Says,” Globe and Mail, 18 January 2002.
79. See “Canadians Will Mesh Smoothly with
American Troops in Afghanistan, Analysts,”
Canoe News (www.canoe.com), 14 January
2002.
80. The United States requested that the Canadian troops remain for an additional sixmonth term; the request was rejected because
it would have stretched the army too thin,
given its other commitments; see Sharon
Hobson, “Canada Will Not Replace Afghan
Battle Group,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 May
2002. American admiration of the role performed by the PPCLI was made clear by the
decision to recommend three Canadian snipers for a Bronze Star, for meritorious conduct
in a combat zone. See “Get Moving on
Snipers’ Medals, U.S. Officer Says,” National
Post, 3 May 2002. On the question of the role
the CF played in Afghanistan, in November
2002 reports surfaced that the Canadian mission had been plagued by poor planning and
inadequate equipment. See “Afghanistan
Mission Lacked ‘Timely Direction,’” Ottawa
Citizen, 9 November 2002.
81. See Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in
Advance.”
82. These Canadian programs have been necessitated by the U.S. plan known as “Army XXI”
for an advanced land force, elements of which
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could be deployed before the end of the decade. See General Dennis J. Reimer, “The
Army after Next: Revolutionary Transformation,” Strategic Review, Spring 1999; Michele
Zanini and Jennifer Morrison Taw, The Army
and Multilateral Force Compatibility (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000); and Walter
Perry, Bruce Pirnie, and John Gordon IV,
The Future of Warfare: Issues from the 1999
Army after Next Study Cycle (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 2001).
83. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, p.
128.
84. The army has recently acquired approximately two hundred Coyote reconnaissance
vehicles and is in the midst of purchasing 360
LAV III light armored vehicles. The Coyotes
in particular have attracted considerable positive comment, and there is speculation that
the United States may be considering them as
well. For a review of the Coyote program, see
R. F. Carruthers [Lt. Col.], “Coyote: Canadian Army Reconnaissance into the Next Century,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring
1998. The new vehicles are replacing Grizzly
and tracked M113A1 armored personnel carriers, both of which are being phased out of
service.
85. See “‘Army of Tomorrow’ Would Employ
Fewer Soldiers,” National Post, 6 April 2000.
86. Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy
(Ottawa: Land Force Command, 2002).
87. See “General Pushes Plan for Major Army
Overhaul,” Toronto Star, 10 May 2002. In a
speech outlining the proposal, Jeffrey said,
“We do not have and probably will not have
all of the resources required to address all of
our problems.” Also see Sharon Hobson,
“Canadian Infantry Comes Out on Top in
Restructure,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 May
2002.
88. “General Pushes Plan for Major Army
Overhaul.”
89. In 2002, a series of news stories alerted the
Canadian public to the extent of the manpower problem. See, for example, “Canada’s
Serious Troop Shortage,” Edmonton Journal,
24 May 2002, and “Army Stretched Past
Limit for Foreign Missions,” Edmonton Journal, 13 May 2002.
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90. See “Forces in Dire Straits, Claims Lobby
Group,” National Post, 19 November 1999.
91. These comments were made by Lieutenant
General Jeffery. See “Canada’s Troops Fight
Budget Battle,” Toronto Star, 26 January
2002.
92. See, for example, J. L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto:
Stoddart, 1993), and R. J. Steel, The Men Who
Marched Away: Canada’s Infantry in World
War I, 1914–1918 (St. Catherines, Ont.:
Vanwell, 1990).
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L. Bashow [Lt. Col.] et al., “Mission Ready:
Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,”
Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2000.
100. Middlemiss and Stairs, p. 21.
101. Walker, p. 261.
102. Ibid., p. 262.
103. Ibid.
104. Following its grounding in Operation DESERT
STORM, Husky One was retired from active
service. DND is planning, however, to modify
two of its Airbus cargo planes to provide an
air-to-air refueling capability by 2004. “Canada’s Troops Fight Budget Battle.”

93. Since it entered office in 1993, the Chretien
government has viewed airpower as perform- 105. Virtually the entire Canadian stockpile of
ing much the same role it did during the Cold
PGMs was used in the conflict, and in the
War, despite the political and strategic changes
middle of the campaign DND officials feared
in the post–Cold War environment. See Kim
that Canada might run out of them. “CanRichard Nossal, “Air Power and Canadian
ada’s Military Feared Running Out of Bombs
Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era,” in
in Kosovo,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 October 1999.
Air Power at the Turn of the Millennium, ed.
Indeed, a recent report alleges that Canadian
David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Andre Beauair force officials pleaded with their U.S.
regard (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Stracounterparts for an “emergency” resupply of
tegic Studies, 1999).
laser-guided munitions within weeks of the
beginning of Operation ALLIED FORCE. See
94. 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 48. The white
“Understocked Forces Begged U.S. for
paper recommended reducing the operaBombs,” National Post, 21 October 2002.
tional CF-18 force to between forty-eight and
sixty aircraft; the higher figure has been
adopted.
95. By way of comparison, the air force had
23,500 personnel as recently as 1989. David
Kinsman [Lt. Gen.], “The Future of the Canadian Air Force,” in Air Power at the Turn of
the Millennium, p. 8.

106. In ten of the first twenty-one days of Operation ALLIED FORCE, poor weather resulted in
cancellation of at least 50 percent of the strike
sorties. See Cordesman, p. 7.
107. Bashow et al., p. 60. This failure resulted in
an increased risk to all coalition pilots. Also
see David Kinsman, “Canada’s Air Operations in the Balkans,” National Network News,
Fall/Winter 1999.

96. For a discussion of the “Super Hornet,” see
John A. Tirpak, “The Three Fighters,” Air
Force Magazine, July 2001. Also see “All-in108. As cited in Hobson, “Canada Aims for DeOne Super Hornet Flies Off to Test Its Sea
fence Interoperability with United States.”
Legs,” San Diego Union Tribune, 24 July 2002.
109. The computer capabilities of the CF-18s have
97. Walker, p. 255.
become the object of derision. During ALLIED
FORCE, it was reported that the 1970s-era
98. For a general overview of Canada’s Gulf War
computers could malfunction if given comexperience, see Jean Morin and Richard
mands “at a critical weapon release point.”
Gimblett, Operation Friction, 1990–1991: The
See “Old Computers Inhibit CF-18s AccuCanadian Forces in the Persian Gulf (Toronto:
racy: Report,” Calgary Herald, 31 May 1999.
Dundurn Press, 1997).
110. For a look at the F-22, see John Tirpak, “The
99. Canadian CF-18s flew a total of 678 combat
Indispensable Fighter,” Air Force Magazine,
sorties during the Kosovo conflict. In addition,
March 2001. For a review of the JSF and the
Canadian aircraft flew in nearly 10 percent of
decision to award the contract to the Lockheed
the battlefield air-interdiction missions, among
Martin proposal, see James Fallows, “Uncle
the riskiest but most significant missions of the
war. For a review of Canada’s role, see David
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Sam Buys an Airplane,” Atlantic Monthly,
June 2002.
111. Most of Canada’s European Nato allies will
be deploying new fighters by 2005. The
Eurofighter Typhoon is a multinational project of the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain,
and Italy. The aircraft is currently undergoing
flight trials and is expected to become operational by mid-decade. In addition, France has
recently developed the Rafale, an advanced
fighter that is already in service.
112. In February 2002, Canada signed a memorandum of understanding with the United
States by which it committed itself to be an
“informed partner” in the second stage of the
Joint Strike Fighter development program, at
a cost of a hundred million dollars (U.S.). It
was reported that DND had estimated that it
would cost about seven billion to reequip the
air force with the new fighter (suggesting that
DND is considering an eventual purchase of
between sixty and eighty aircraft); see Sharon
Hobson, “Canada Joins JSF Programme,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 February 2002, and
“Canada to Spend $10.5B to Replace Aging
Warplanes,” Ottawa Citizen, 13 January 2002.
In spite of these developments, the Canadian
government is unlikely to allocate the financial resources required. Indeed, if this program were ultimately approved, there would
be little funding available for any other CF
procurement project for years. Further, if
past experience offers any guide, the final cost
of the JSF will be considerably higher than the
current estimate.
113. Jockel, p. 98.
114. “Most Hercules Planes Not Ready to Fly,”
Ottawa Citizen, 24 November 2001.
115. See Sharon Hobson, “Canada Includes
C-130J as Transport Option,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 13 June 2001.
116. At a cost of about $150 million (U.S.) per aircraft, the C-17 is easily the most expensive
transport plane ever built. One option that
DND is reportedly considering that would reduce the financial cost of a purchase is to
“share” C-17s with the United States. Under
the plan, Canada would buy or lease the
planes but make them available to the U.S.
military (or even private industry) when it
did not need them; see “Canada’s Troops
Fight Budget Battle.” In February 2002, it was
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reported that a split had developed within the
air force between supporters of the new Hercules and those who preferred a small purchase of C-17s; see “Forces Chiefs Differ on
Which Planes to Purchase,” National Post, 12
February 2002.
117. As noted in Sloan, The Revolution in Military
Affairs, p. 136.
118. The air force’s Website devotes considerable
attention to noncombat operations, including
peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, international cooperation, and space policy: “The air
force flies peacekeeping missions and conveys
relief workers, emergency food and medical
supplies to scenes of natural disasters or where
armed conflicts have left little behind—alleviating suffering and saving lives” (emphasis in
original, www.airforce.forces.ca/abroad).
119. Walker, p. 275.
120. For a history of Canada’s air force, see Sydney
Francis Wise, The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1980), and W. A. B. Douglas, The
Creation of a National Air Force (Toronto:
Univ. of Toronto Press and DND, 1986).
121. See “Canada Sends Third of Fleet,” Globe and
Mail, 9 October 2001.
122. Maritime aviation assets belong to the air
force, but they fall under the operational
command of the navy. A similar relationship
holds for army tactical aviation.
123. Jockel, p. 70.
124. Ibid., p. 71. Also see Sharon Hobson, “Slow
Progress for Canada’s Iroquois Destroyer,”
Jane’s Navy International, 1 July 2001.
125. They are former Royal Navy boats of the Upholder class. Relatedly, the navy has been examining possible replacements for the destroyers for the past several years. One project it
continues to study is the Command/Control
and Area Air Defence Replacement (CADRE).
Other options include transferring the command and control capabilities into several
Halifax-class frigates, building entirely new
hulls, or acquiring another type of ship. See
Hobson, “Canada Aims for Defence Interoperability with United States.”
126. See Sharon Hobson, “Upholder Class Submarines Resurface in Canada,” Jane’s Navy International, 1 November 2001.
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127. In the summer of 2002, a series of reports detailing structural and operational problems
with the submarines left the navy unsure of
the wisdom of the acquisition. First, the navy
discovered significant hull damage to one of
the boats; shortly after, hairline cracks were
discovered in the diesel hull-exhaust valves of
two others. The various problems and repairs
will result in a delay of at least two years before the submarines will be ready for active
duty, now estimated to be 2004 at the earliest.
See “New Submarine a Lemon, Navy Finds,”
Toronto Star, 23 April 2002, and “Cracks May
Hold Up New Subs,” Halifax Daily News, 12
May 2002.
128. As of 2001 (prior to Operation APOLLO), six
Canadian ships had been integrated into U.S.
naval forces in the Arabian Gulf alone. According to DND, “The Canadian Navy is the
only foreign navy to successfully operate as
part of U.S. carrier battle groups”; see “Canadian Navy Teams Up with U.S. Carrier Battle
Groups” (www.dnd.ca/menu/canada-us/
backgrounder). For a review of Canada-U.S.
naval cooperation, see Sokolsky, “Sailing in
Concert.”
129. It should be noted, though, that by August
2002 the Canadian naval commitment had
been reduced to three ships, a consequence of
the navy’s lack of enough personnel to maintain a significant overseas presence for more
than six months; see Granatstein, “A Friendly
Agreement in Advance,” p. 9. Also see “Frigate Returns Home from War on Terrorism,”
CBC Website (www.cbc.ca), 18 August 2002.
130. See “Our Warships to Be Treated as ‘American,’” National Post, 9 October 2001.
131. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 12.
132. Chief of the Maritime Staff, Leadmark: The
Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate
of Maritime Strategy, 2001), p. 129.
133. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 12.
134. Each Sea King requires twenty-five to thirty
hours of maintenance for every hour it is
flown. See Sharon Hobson, “Evergreen Sea
King,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring
1998, p. 32.
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expected to be issued in the fall of 2002 (some
two years after the project was first announced), were not issued at that time; in
fact, according to defense officials familiar
with the project, the entire program may be
in “limbo.” The delay stems in part from the
government’s decision to split the contract in
two—one for the airframe and the other for
the electronics package—in spite of considerable evidence that doing so will significantly
increase the total cost of the program. As a
result, there are widespread allegations of political interference and indifference—hardly
surprising, considering that the Chretien government is surely embarrassed by the entire
project. Indeed, one of the leading bidders,
EH Industries, has charged that the government has rigged the program to ensure that
its helicopter, a version of the EH-101 that
was canceled in 1993, is not selected. See
“Chopper Contract ‘Politically Driven,’” Ottawa Citizen, 1 December 2001; “Sea King
Plan Cost $13 Million, No End in Sight,” National Post, 31 January 2002; and “Program to
Replace Sea Kings in Limbo,” Ottawa Citizen,
25 August 2002.
136. According to a recent DND report, delays in
the MHP might require the Sea Kings to remain in service until 2010 or 2015, by which
time they would be more than fifty years old.
Until recently, the Canadian government had
insisted that the new helicopters would be in
service by 2005, in spite of unmistakable evidence that such a timetable was unrealistic.
See “DND Warns of More Chopper Delays,”
Ottawa Citizen, 25 November 2001; “Pilot
Shrugs Off Sea King Delay,” Halifax Daily
News, 7 June 2002; and Sharon Hobson,
“Canada’s MHP Falls Even Further Behind,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 April 2002. In November 2002, news reports emerged of further delays in the MHP, and for the first time
the government acknowledged that the existing timetable may be unachievable. See “Ottawa Warns of New Delay for Helicopters,”
National Post, 7 November 2002.

137. So much attention is focused on the Sea
King’s age and maintenance difficulties that
the helicopter’s design and equipment deficiencies tend to go largely unnoticed. In No135. The Maritime Helicopter Programme (MHP)
vember 2001, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported
has become mired in a seemingly endless prothat the Sea Kings that were to join Operation
cess of contract specifications and requireAPOLLO lacked the warning systems needed
ments. Formal tenders, which had been
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to defend themselves against missile attack, as
well as modern communications equipment.
See Sharon Hobson, “Canadian Helicopters
Deployed with Limited Self-Defence,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, 21 November 2001.
138. For a discussion, see Ernest Cable, “Canadian
Maritime Aviation: Requiem or Renaissance?” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Summer
1998.

favor of “substantially” increasing defense
spending, although they continue to view
peacekeeping as the military’s primary defense task. The poll also shows that the military is just one of many institutions the
public believes needs extra funding. See “In
Search of Our Role,” Maclean’s, 31 December
2001–1 January 2002.

145. The response of the Canadian government to
11 September was measured. With regard to
139. See an additional paper by this author: “Stramilitary action, Canada participated in the
tegic Ambitions and Fiscal Realities: Give the
U.S.-led war on terrorism (as noted). As for
Navy Priority,” Policy Options, April 2002.
domestic actions, the government introduced
140. See Chief of the Maritime Staff, chap. 3.
two anti-terrorism bills, both of which give
the state strong powers. The government also
141. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 13.
announced a comprehensive review of conti142. The obvious exceptions are the two oiler/
nental defense agreements with the United
replenishment ships (AORs), whose main
States. In addition, in December 2001 the Catasks include at-sea replenishment of other
nadian and U.S. governments reached a
naval vessels and helicopter maintenance.
broad agreement on border issues, including
The navy is currently considering a proposal
surveillance, common enforcement measures,
to acquire an Afloat Logistics and Sealift Caand increased cooperation on entry. For an
pability, represented by a ship that would
American perspective on these developments,
combine capabilities for fleet replenishment,
see “In Canada, a Sea Change Follows Wave
in-theater support to forces ashore, and straof Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, 28 January
tegic lift for the army. The navy is currently
2002, and “Canada Debates Its Global Role
trying to get the program “fast tracked.” For a
amid Dwindling Military,” Christian Science
discussion, see Bruce T. Irvie [Lt. Cdr.],
Monitor, 23 July 2002. It should be noted,
“Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability for the
though, that many of these steps appeared
Canadian Navy,” Canadian Defence Quardefensive, as the government has been batterly, Summer 1997.
tling a widespread perception that Canada is
143. Both the Progressive Conservative (PC) and
“weak” on terrorism. Indeed, American conCanadian Alliance (formerly Reform) parties
cern over Canada’s lax immigration stanhave been badly hurt by poor leadership and
dards and unwillingness to take strong
scandal over the past decade. A “unite the
measures against known terrorists in Canada
right” movement has for the past several
was a point of concern long before the atyears been attempting to consolidate these
tacks; see, for example, “Canadians Shun U.S.
two right-of-center political parties, but with
Efforts to Control Border,” Christian Science
little success. Indeed, such efforts appeared to
Monitor, 8 February 2000, and “Border with
come to an end in August 2002 amid mutual
Canada Must Be Tightened, U.S. Expert
accusations and recriminations; see “Alliance,
Says,” National Post, 24 February 2000. For a
Tories Agree Unity Dead,” National Post, 26
more recent American look at Canada’s conAugust 2002. Given the breakdown of voter
tinued reluctance to change its refugee polipreferences in Canada, it is difficult—if not
cies, see “Bordering on the Ridiculous,”
impossible—to imagine the Liberals’ losing a
Washington Times, 17 August 2002. For a
federal election as long as its two main rivals
critical overview of Canada’s approach to imcontinue to split the opposition vote, an obmigration, see Stephen Gallagher, “The Open
servation widely discussed by polling firms
Door beyond the Moat: Canadian Refugee
and political observers.
Policy from a Comparative Perspective,” in
Canada among Nations 2002: A Fading Power,
144. A recent Maclean’s poll indicates that the Caed. Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel
nadian public is finally beginning to appreciMolot (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford Univ. Press,
ate the severity of the defense crisis. The poll
2002).
reveals that 68 percent of Canadians are in
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146. “Eggleton Promises New Review of Defence,”
“Most Safely in the Middle,” International
National Post, 10 November 2001. While
Journal, Spring 1984.
(former) Defence Minister Art Eggleton was
149. “Armed Forces ‘Well-Equipped,’ Chretien
initially quite firm in his belief that a fullFires Back,” National Post, 21 December
scale review was needed (which would un2001. The prime minister’s allegations were
doubtedly lead to a new white paper), by the
reminiscent of the old “merchants of death”
spring of 2002 the department’s plans had bethesis, which for obvious financial reasons
come unclear, with some officials suggesting
has never found much support in Canada.
that a simpler program review would suffice.
150. The prime minister criticized Canada’s miliThe confusion ended in July 2002, when the
tary leaders for dated thinking, declaring that
new defense minister, John McCallum, con“we have to adjust to the new reality of 2001,
firmed that he was more interested in a probut some are still thinking of the same stratgram review; see “McCallum Plans to Use the
egy of 1939.” Chretien further argued that
Internet for Defence Policy Review,” Kingston
contemporary conflicts highlight airpower
Whig-Standard, 27 July 2002. As an aside,
(“It’s all airplanes, it’s all bombardment”)—
Eggleton was fired in May 2002 after reports
overlooking the fact that under his governsurfaced that he had awarded his girlfriend a
ment the air force has been decimated.
departmental contract.
147. The best example is the current edition of the 151. Oliver and Hampson, p. 135.
Canada among Nations series, an annual volume published by the Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs at Carleton
University that examines recent Canadian
foreign and security policy decisions and developments. The subtitle of the 2002 edition
(cited above) is A Fading Power; several of its
chapters deal with various aspects of Canadian decline.
148. The debate over Canada’s status within the
international community is a long and controversial one. One school, first popularized
in Canada by Lester Pearson and the diplomatscholar John Holmes, suggests that Canada’s
preference for multilateralism and skills
as a negotiator, its lack of the capabilities of a
great (or “principal”) power, and the fact that
it is too strong to be considered a minor (or
“satellite”) power make it an ideal “middle
power.” In the past few years, a new debate
has emerged over whether the end of the
Cold War has reduced the roles of middle
powers, as larger actors are now more willing
to undertake roles (like mediation and peacekeeping) they previously ignored. While the
field is far too extensive to review here, a controversial recent article examines the literature and concludes that Canada has skillfully
used its middle-power status to justify its role
in the international community: Adam
Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power
Myth,” International Journal, Spring 2000.
For a classic formulation, see John Holmes,
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152. See “McCallum Admits Forces ‘Stretched,’”
National Post, 27 July 2002.
153. For a critical look at Canada’s commitment
to internationalism, see Kim Richard Nossal,
“Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of
‘Good International Citizenship’ in Canadian
Foreign Policy?” International Journal, Winter 1998–99. Other observers have described
Canada’s foreign policy orientation as “selective internationalism”; see Jean-Francois
Rioux and Robin Hay, “Canadian Foreign
Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism” (paper published by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton
University, Discussion Paper 16, 1997).
154. In a cabinet shuffle announced on 15 January
2002, Manley became deputy prime minister
and finance minister, while Bill Graham, the
chairman of the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee for the past six years, was
named the new minister of foreign affairs. Interestingly, though, Manley retained responsibility for handling U.S. relations in the area
of border security, an obviously critical issue
post-“9/11.” While Graham is still in the early
days of his tenure, his preachy, moralistic
tone appears reminiscent of Axworthy. For a
profile, see “Flamboyant MP Takes His Post
and Prepares to Represent Canada before the
World,” Globe and Mail, 22 January 2002.
155. Manley attracted considerable attention in
the summer of 2001, when he argued that
Canada could not continue to sit in various
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international bodies and yet “go to the washroom” whenever bills come due. He also said
that Canada was “borderline in terms of [its]
ability to influence situations that are unexpected.” For a profile, see “Manley Transformed by Tumultuous Year,” National Post,
27 December 2001.

161. Ibid., p. 15.

162. See “High-Tech Weapons Change the Dynamics and the Scope of Battle,” International
Herald Tribune, 28 December 2001;
“Studying Lessons of Battle Success,” Los Angeles Times, 17 December 2001; “Special
Forces’ High Profile Could Yield a Budget In156. See William Peters [Col.], “Beyond Kosovo:
crease,” Washington Post, February 4, 2002;
Will Canada’s Army Fight for the Western
Andrew Koch, “United States Appraises LesAlliance?” in Transforming an Army: Land
sons Learned In Afghanistan,” Jane’s Defence
Warfare Capabilities for the Future Army, ed.
Weekly, 24 April 2002; and Michael O’Hanlon,
Shaye Friesen, DLSC Report 9904 (Ottawa:
“A Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs, May/
DND, Directorate of Land Strategic ConJune 2002. In August 2002, a debate over how
cepts, 1999), p. 83.
to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in
Iraq pitted those who called for a repeat of
157. Among recent studies, see Michael P. Noonin
the “Afghanistan model” against those who
and John Hillen, “The Promise of Decisive
maintained that any Iraqi operation would
Action,” Orbis, Spring 2002; William J. Perry,
require hundreds of thousands of American
“Preparing for the Next Attack,” Foreign Afground troops, much like Operation DESERT
fairs, November/December 2001; and John A.
STORM had eleven years earlier. For a review,
Nagl, “Hitting Us Where We Don’t Expect It:
see “Theater of War,” Time, 12 August 2002,
Asymmetric Threats to U.S. National Secuand “Afghanistan Lessons Don’t Apply to
rity,” National Security Studies Quarterly, AuIraq, General Says,” Washington Times, 22
tumn 2001.
August 2002. Interestingly, the primary sup158. In August 2002, the defense minister,
porters of the new model are civilians, led by
McCallum, noted in a letter sent to several
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
strategic-studies organizations that there was
Vice President Dick Cheney, while those ema need to “redirect resources” so that future
phasizing the need for a massive ground asdefense capabilities could be pursued. The
sault are military professionals (or former
comment was widely interpreted as indicatones), led by Secretary of State Colin Powell
ing that the CF will not get any significant inand the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
fusion of new funding in the near future; see
Richard Myers. The issue was apparently re“Minister Hints Forces Won’t Get New
solved in November 2002, when it was reMoney,” National Post, 2 August 2002. In adported that the U.S. military had finalized its
dition, Prime Minister Chretien’s surprise aninvasion plan of Iraq, which would involve a
nouncement in August 2002 that he will
total force of two hundred thousand personresign in February 2004 will likely result in
nel. See “War Plan for Iraq Ready, Say Obeven more spending pressure, as defense is
servers,” Washington Post, 10 November 2002
clearly not high on his list of priorities for soand “Bush Approves Iraq War Plan, Large
lidifying his political legacy. See “PM’s
Force Seen,” Reuters News Service, 9 NovemAgenda Ignores Forces: Critics,” Ottawa Citiber 2002.
zen, 28 August 2002. While McCallum has
163. The newer Link-16 tactical data system has
subsequently begun calling for increased dedramatically decreased the time required for
fense spending, by late 2002 there were no inthe air force to locate and strike targets. See
dications that these efforts would yield results
Phillip S. Meilinger, “Force Divider: How
anytime soon. See “McCallum Seeks Huge
Military Technology Makes the United States
Hike in Military Budget,” National Post, 25
Even More Unilateral,” Foreign Policy,
October 2002.
January/February, 2002.
159. See “Military in Relentless Decline,” National
164. The emerging capabilities of UAVs were
Post, 30 May 2002. The report is titled “Dehighlighted in February 2002 when a U.S.
fence Policy Update: Sustainability.”
Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile at an
160. Henault, p. 33 [emphasis added].
Afghani convoy that may have included senior al-Qa‘ida officials. The Predator’s live
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video feed, combined with the ability to fire
166. A recent British study examined the role the
its missile by remote control, gives the United
United Kingdom can play in coalition operaStates at least a limited capability to strike tartions and the interoperability challenges that
gets within seconds of their detection. See
must be met for it to do so. See Coalitions and
“CIA May Have Hit al-Qaeda Leader,” Nathe Future of UK Security Policy (London:
tional Post, 8 February 2002. This capability
Royal United Services Institute for Defence
was further highlighted in November 2002,
Studies, 2000).
when a car carrying several al-Qa‘ida officials 167. Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,
in Yemen was similarly hit by a missile fired
p. 48.
from a Predator. See “Sky Wars: Remote
168. See U.S. Dept. of Defense, Concept for Future
Targetting Changes the Nature of Warfare,”
Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010
Times Online, 6 November 2002 (www
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chief of Staff,
.timesonline.com).
1997).
165. Art Eggleton, then defense minister, was
169. Jockel, p. 121.
widely derided in November 2001 for saying
that Canada would not send troops “into a
170. William Perry, “Military Action: When to Use
condition in which they are unwelcome.” The
It and How to Ensure Its Effectiveness,” in
comment, made at a time when it was unclear
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security
whether the government would commit
in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.:
ground forces to Afghanistan, drew (largely
Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 236.
negative) attention to the fighting capabilities
171. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has warned
of Canada’s army; see “Troops Won’t Go If
about the dangers of coalitions and the threat
They’re ‘Unwelcome,’” Globe and Mail, 20
they may pose to effective military operaNovember 2001. The 850 Canadian troops
tions: “The mission must determine the coalideployed to Afghanistan between February
tion; the coalition must not determine the
and July 2002 provided airport security, permission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed
formed land-mine removal, assisted in trackdown to the lowest common denominator,
ing and capturing remaining Taliban and
and we can’t afford that.” Cited in G. John
al-Qa‘ida fighters, and helped protect aid opIkenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,”
erations. Their deployment did not indicate a
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002,
major ground combat capability; they were
p. 54.
neither equipped nor trained to fight in a
high-intensity combat environment.
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CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY
It’s Not What We Thought
Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army

O

ver the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand the
center of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find
practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped
as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual
perspectives to Clausewitz’s expression and redefined it in its respective image.
Thus, the U.S. Marine Corps, a relatively small force designed more for winning battles than fighting campaigns or wars, prefers to strike at enemy weaknesses. Accordingly, it initially equated enemy centers of gravity (CoGs) with
key vulnerabilities. Recently, however, Marine Corps doctrine has distinguished
between CoGs and critical vulnerabilities, considering them different but complementary concepts; CoGs, for the Marines, are now
1
Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria is the director of na“any important sources of strength.”
tional security affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute
By comparison, the U.S. Air Force, which takes a
at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks,
“targeting” approach to warfare, sees centers of gravPennsylvania. He graduated from the U.S. Military
Academy in 1981 and was commissioned as an armor
ity as multiple strategic and operational critical points
officer. He has since served as assistant professor of Euthat it can attack with its bombing assets. Airpower
ropean history at West Point; as squadron operations
officer of 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, at the
theorists like John Warden, with his notion of “conU.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; at
centric rings,” have in fact identified so many CoGs as
the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe,
2
to reduce the concept to absurdity.
Virginia; and as a speechwriter for the chief of staff of
the Army. He earned master’s and doctoral degrees in
In contrast, the U.S. Army, which has the role
history at Princeton University and is a graduate of the
of fighting campaigns and winning wars, sees the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and
3
enemy’s center of gravity as his “source of strength.”
the U.S. Army War College. He is the author of After
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Accordingly, the Army tends to look for a single center
Great War (2001), as well as of numerous articles.
of gravity, normally in the principal capability that
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mission. In short, the Army considers a “friendly” CoG as that element—a characteristic, capability, or locality—that enables one’s own or allied forces to accomplish their objectives. Conversely, an opponent’s CoG is that element that
prevents friendly forces from accomplishing their objectives.
Likewise, the U.S. Navy, as America’s force for winning maritime wars, has a
center-of-gravity concept that resembles that of the Army and the Marines. Like
the Army, the Navy’s doctrine states that a “center of gravity is something the enemy must have to continue military operations—a source of his strength, but
not necessarily strong or a strength in itself. There can only be one center of
4
gravity.” Like the Marine Corps, the service it supports most, the Navy has made
5
the linkage between CoGs and vulnerabilities more explicit.
Recently the Joint Staff ’s Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0)
attempted—with only limited success—to pull these various perspectives together into a single definition. Joint doctrine currently asserts that the essence of
the operational art—a term that Clausewitz would not have used—rests in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power, or centers of grav6
ity, to gain a decisive advantage. The Joint Staff now defines centers of gravity as
those “characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force de7
rives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” At the strategic
level, they can include a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself. At the
operational level, they are generally the principal sources of combat power—such
as combat forces that are modern, mobile, or armored—that can ensure, or prevent, accomplishment of the mission. At its core, this definition is capabilities
based, despite the presence of terms such as “national will” and “public support.”
On this view, all elements—whether leadership, national will, or public opinion—tend to flow from an opponent’s capability to resist.
However, this capabilities-based definition differs substantially from
Clausewitz’s own concept, which is effects based. To be sure, the U.S. military is
under no obligation to accept a concept developed nearly two centuries ago by a
military theorist who was influenced by a long-disappeared cultural environment and used conceptual tools quite different from those available today. Yet
each of the services believes that its definition of the center of gravity derives
from Clausewitz’s. Presumably the original concept had some special value that
attracted each of the services in the first place. That fascination is not misplaced;
the concept does have value. Unfortunately, the U.S. military’s misinterpretations of Clausewitz’s original idea have obscured it.
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CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY
The quintessential “cerebral savage,” Clausewitz borrowed a number of intellectual constructs, theories, and concepts from the leading philosophers, scientists,
and other thinkers of his day in order to understand and describe what he ob8
served as the various aspects of war. Several of his concepts—friction, polarity,
and center of gravity—are analogies or metaphors drawn from the “mechanical
sciences” (today’s physics). In particular, the original German text of Vom Kriege
(On War) reveals that Clausewitz used the center-of-gravity metaphor—
expressed primarily as Schwerpunkt (center of gravity, or main point)—more
9
than fifty times. He appears to have derived his military concept of a center of
gravity after hearing a series of lectures by the German physicist Paul Erman, a
professor at the University of Berlin and the Prussian Allgemeine Kriegsschule
(war college). Clausewitz served as director of the war college from 1818 to 1830;
10
he and Erman knew each other cordially.
Clausewitz’s use of the center of gravity in On War remains essentially consistent with the concept’s representation in the mechanical sciences. Most Englishlanguage sources that cite his definition of a center of gravity draw primarily
from one of two passages—pages 485–86 in Book VI (“Defense”), or pages
595–96 in Book VIII (“War Plans”), from the translation of On War by Sir
Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Unfortunately, that translation, while perhaps
the best available, is somewhat misleading. For one thing, it strips away the physics metaphors that Clausewitz used to describe his military concept, metaphors
essential to understanding his basic idea. Furthermore, it creates the false impression that centers of gravity derive from “sources” of strength, or that they are
themselves “strengths.” Clausewitz never used the word “source” (Quelle) in this
connection, and he never directly equated the center of gravity to a strength or
source of strength. Finally, the Howard-Paret translation makes Clausewitz’s
concept appear static, bereft of the intrinsic dynamism he appears to have
envisioned.
This article will offer alternative translations of select passages that come
closer to Clausewitz’s original sense:
It is against that part of the enemy’s forces where they are most concentrated that, if a
blow were to occur, the effect would emanate the furthest; furthermore, the greater
the mass our own forces possess when they deliver the blow, the more certain we can
be of the blow’s success. This simple logic brings us to an analogy that enables us to
grasp the idea more clearly, namely, the nature and effect of a center of gravity in the
mechanical sciences.11

Since in this passage Clausewitz introduces the analogy in a theoretical sense,
it is appropriate to review how a center of gravity functions in elementary
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physics. In general, a center of gravity represents the point where the forces of
gravity can be said to converge within an object, the spot at which the object’s
weight is balanced in all directions. Striking at or otherwise upsetting the center
of gravity can cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall to the
ground. A physical object can be
FIGURE 1
CROSS SECTION OF A ROCK, SHOWING
thought of in two ways: as a composite
HOW FORCES OF GRAVITY OPERATE
of many smaller particles, each of which
is acted upon by gravity; or as a single
object, acted upon by gravity only at a
12
single point (see figure 1). Understandably, physicists prefer the latter,
since it makes other calculations concerning the interaction of force and
matter much easier. However, physicists
also acknowledge that a center of gravity amounts to little more than a mathematical approximation, since gravity
Adapted from Jones, Jones, and Marchington,
acts simultaneously upon all the points
Cambridge Coordinated Science: Physics
in an object.
Calculating the center of gravity for a simple, symmetrical object—a yardstick, a marble, or a boomerang—is not difficult. The center of gravity of a
yardstick is at its middle; the CoG of a sphere lies at its geometric center.
Interestingly, the center of gravity of a boomerang, as can be readily calculated, lies not on the object itself but in
FIGURE 2
the V-shaped space between the arms
CoG OF A BOOMERANG
13
(see figure 2). Calculating the center
of gravity of more complex objects—
such as human beings, with many moving parts—is more difficult. Such objects must be artificially frozen in time
and space; if their distribution of
weight or position changes, or external
weight is added, the CoG moves. For example, a soldier standing at port arms
will normally have a CoG in the middle
of the pelvis, roughly behind the navel
Adapted from Jones, Jones, and Marchington,
(see figure 3). If the soldier raises his
Cambridge Coordinated Science: Physics
arms, his center of gravity rises to a
point somewhere behind and above the navel. If the soldier dons a rucksack, the
CoG will shift again. If he begins to move about rapidly, the center of gravity will
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
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change just as rapidly (see figure 4). If he becomes locked in hand-to-hand combat, the gravitational forces acting on both bodies will affect the CoG of each. A
physicist could treat both masses as one and calculate a
FIGURE 3
common center of gravity of the total mass; however, if
A STATIONARY SOLDIER’S CoG
the struggle proceeds at a rapid pace, the CoG will
change constantly.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the soldier’s center of
gravity is not a source of strength. Rather, it represents
the point of confluence where gravitational forces come
together. A soldier’s strength (or power) might derive
from muscles, brains, weapons, or any combination of
these—all of which relate to the center of gravity only so
far as the soldier needs balance to use them. Nor, strictly
speaking, is a center of gravity a weakness. A soldier
might lack physical strength, be “intellectually challenged,” or not have the proper weapons; these conditions would constitute weaknesses, but they have little to do with the soldier’s
CoG, per se. Nonetheless, although neither a weakness nor a vulnerability, a center of gravity can lie open to attack and, therefore, be vulnerable.
Clausewitz pursues the analogy:
Just as [in physics] the center of gravity is always found where the mass is most concentrated, and just as every blow directed against the body’s center of gravity yields
the greatest effect, and—moreover—the strongest blow is the one achieved by the
center of gravity, the same is true in war. The armed forces of
FIGURE 4
every combatant, whether an individual state or an alliance of
A MOVING SOLDIER’S CoG
states, have a certain unity and thus a certain interdependence
or connectivity [Zusammenhang]; and just where such interdependence exists, one can apply the center of gravity concept. Accordingly, there exist within these armed forces
certain centers of gravity that, by their movement and direction, exert a decisive influence over all other points; and these
centers of gravity exist where the forces are most concentrated. However, just as in the world of inanimate bodies
where the effect on a center of gravity has its proportions and
limits determined by the interdependence of the parts, the
same is true in war.14

The previous two passages, as Clausewitz mentioned, serve only to introduce the basic theoretical
concept. Hence, we should take the description of the center of gravity in a metaphorical rather than a literal sense. Unfortunately, U.S. military analysts and
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doctrine writers have failed to do that, preferring instead to interpret
Clausewitz’s center of gravity literally, as a concentration of force.
These passages reveal two important points. First, the CoG concept only applies where a certain “unity” (Einheit) and “connectivity” or “interdependence”
(Zusammenhang) exist between the enemy’s forces and the space they occupy.
The type and number of centers of gravity the enemy possesses will thus depend
15
upon the degree of connectivity, or overall unity, that his forces possess. Second, Clausewitz’s statement that the center of gravity lies “where the forces are
most concentrated” refers less to the forces than to the thing that causes them to
be concentrated. As in the mechanical sciences, Clausewitz’s military CoG is a
focal point. Hence, combat forces tend to concentrate there and, at times, to emanate from there.
In Book II, chapter 5 (“Critical Analysis”), Clausewitz uses an example
that clarifies this point. In the course of illustrating the importance of critical
analysis, he argues that the then-common opinion about Napoleon’s “Bril16
liant February” campaign of 1814 was wrong. Napoleon, confronted by
advancing Prussian and Austrian forces, first defeated Field Marshal Gebhard
von Blücher’s Prussian army, then turned on Field Marshal Karl Philip
Schwarzenberg’s Austrians and drove them back. However, Napoleon failed to
achieve a decisive victory in either case; his enemies were able to recover and defeat him a month later, eventually forcing him into exile. Clausewitz maintains
that instead of pursuing two (incomplete) victories, Napoleon should have continued hammering Blücher until the Prussian force was decisively defeated.
“Blücher,” he maintains, “although weaker [numerically] than Schwarzenberg,
was nonetheless the more important [adversary] due to his enterprising spirit;
hence, the center of gravity lay more with him [Blücher] and it pulled the others
17
in his direction.” In Clausewitz’s view, decisively defeating Blücher—the alliance’s center of gravity—would have induced the Austrians to withdraw as well.
This example shows that the CoG concept refers less to the concentrated
forces than to the thing—in this case, Blücher—that causes them to concentrate
18
and gives them purpose and direction. Clausewitz also states that centers of
gravity have a “sphere of effectiveness” and that their “advance or retreat” can
19
have an effect “upon the rest” of the forces involved. As they advance or withdraw across the battlefield, centers of gravity can “pull” friendly forces with
them, as Blücher would have. In other words, to return to the physics analogy,
military centers of gravity possess a certain centripetal (as opposed to centrifugal) force. Accordingly, they represent in Clausewitz’s mind much more than a
mere concentration of forces. Indeed, his concept in general reflects an intrinsic
dynamism—not easy to capture on paper but conveyed by the analogy in chap20
ter 1, Book I, of a pendulum actively oscillating among three magnets.
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In Book VIII (“War Plans”), Clausewitz discusses the relevance of centers of
gravity to war planning. Contrary to some of his critics, Clausewitz does not
overextend the analogy by suggesting that several CoGs could exist beyond the
21
enemy army. In fact, the opposite is true. Book VI adheres almost too closely to
the physics analogy, at the expense of clarity as to military relevance. Book VIII
addresses that relevance and reveals the inherent flexibility of the concept:
What theory can admit to thus far is the following: Everything depends upon keeping
the dominant conditions of both states in mind. From these emerge a certain center
of gravity, a focal point of force and movement, upon which the larger whole depends; and, it is against the enemy’s center of gravity that the collective blow of all
power must be directed. . . .
Small things always depend on large ones, the unimportant on the important, the incidental on the essential. This relationship must guide our thoughts. . . .
Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII of Sweden, and Frederick
the Great each had their centers of gravity in their respective armies. Had their armies been destroyed, these men would have been remembered as failures. In states
with many factions vying for power, the center of gravity lies mainly in the capital; in
small states supported by a more powerful one, it lies in the army of the stronger
state; in alliances, it lies in the unity formed by common interests; in popular uprisings, it lies in the persons of the principal leaders and in public opinion. The blow
must be directed against these things. If the enemy loses his balance because of such a
blow, he must not be given time to regain it; blow after blow must follow in the same
manner. In other words, the victor must always direct all of his blows in such a way
that they will strike at the whole of the enemy, not just a part of him.22

This lengthy passage shows that the identity and location of a center of gravity can be perceived only by considering the enemy holistically—that is, by
drawing connections between or among an adversary’s (or adversaries’) various
parts and then determining what “thing” holds them all together. For example,
the armies of Alexander, Gustavus, Charles XII, and Frederick were significant
not because they were “sources” of power but because they enabled their leaders
to hold their power systems together. In different circumstances, the personalities of key leaders, a state’s capital, or the community of interests of a network of
allies perform this centripetal or centralizing function. The salient issue once
again is Zusammenhang—interdependence, or connectivity.
Clausewitz reinforced this point in chapter 9 of Book VIII, when he explains
that reducing the enemy’s force to one center of gravity depends “first, upon the
[enemy’s] political connectivity or unity itself ” and “second, upon the situation in
23
the theater of war itself, and which of the various enemy armies appear there.”
The criterion once again is the extent to which the enemy’s (or enemies’) forces
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can operate as a single entity. In World War I, Germany, fighting on two fronts,
had to look for two centers of gravity, one Anglo-French and one Russian.
Hence, the unity (or lack thereof) formed (or not) by military forces and the
24
geographical spaces in which they have to fight can create more than one CoG.
Clausewitz, of course, advocates tracing these back to a single one, whenever
possible, but he allows for the possibility that no one, specific CoG might exist.
The key question, then, is whether the enemy is so “connected” that actions
25
against him in one area will have a decisive effect in other areas as well.
AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH
Clausewitz’s center of gravity, then, is a “focal point,” neither a strength (or even
a source of one) nor a weakness, per se. Second, CoGs are found only where sufficient connectivity exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an overarching system (or structure) that acts with a substantial degree of unity, like a
physical body. Third, a center of gravity exerts a certain centripetal force that
tends to hold an entire system or structure together; thus a blow at the center of
gravity would throw an enemy off balance or even cause the entire system (or
structure) to collapse. Fourth, using the concept necessitates viewing the enemy
holistically.
The U.S. military’s various definitions lack entirely Clausewitz’s sense of
“unity” or “connectivity.” By overlooking this essential prerequisite, the U.S.
military assumes centers of gravity exist where none might—the enemy may not
have sufficient connectivity between its parts to have a CoG. In that case the
analysis does little more than focus on the most critical of the enemy’s
capabilities.
As previously mentioned, Clausewitz’s CoG concept focuses on achieving a
specific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is an effects-based approach
rather than a capabilities-based one. In this sense, it resembles the emerging
concept of “effects-based operations” (EBO) more than the U.S. military’s
capabilities-based concept of CoG, with the exception that it seeks only one
26
particular effect—total collapse of the enemy. EBO has the benefit, as General
Anthony Zinni (U.S. Marine Corps, retired) has remarked, of forcing political
and military planners to focus on the specific effects that they want military
27
(and nonmilitary) action to achieve. Effects-based operations have been characterized as dissolving “the glue” that holds a table together, rather than striking
28
at its individual legs. By implication, then, if Clausewitz’s CoG assumes the enemy constitutes a system, EBO goes a step farther and posits that the enemy is a
mappable system.
Like effects-based operations, Clausewitz’s center of gravity concept requires
the ability to predict, with reasonable accuracy, how at least first and secondPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

119

116

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 26

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

order effects, and possibly more, can be achieved. That said, it is important to
point out that Clausewitz considered the calculation of a CoG a matter of “stra29
tegic judgment” (strategische Urteil), to be addressed at the highest levels. It is
doubtful that he would have approved of current efforts to develop prescriptive
formulae.
Furthermore, Clausewitz’s CoGs were “operative” (wirksame) only in cam30
paigns or wars designed to defeat the enemy completely. In such wars, military
and political objectives are essentially complementary. In limited wars, on the
other hand, CoGs (because they by definition relate to the total collapse of the
enemy) tend to compete with political objectives. Notwithstanding, U.S. joint
31
doctrine asserts or implies that CoGs exist for all kinds and at all levels of war.
Presumably, there are tactical centers of gravity, the defeat of which facilitates
the accomplishment of tactical objectives, which in turn contribute to the defeat
of operational CoGs, the destruction of which assists in the accomplishment of
operational objectives, and so on, until national security objectives are achieved.
Yet to insert a center of gravity into the strategic planning process is contrived and unnecessary. In the Gulf War (1990–91), for example—a limited
conflict in which, according to Clausewitz, the CoG concept should not have
been applied—the regional commander’s notion of the enemy’s center of
gravity did not accord with those of the joint force air component commander.
The former saw three distinct CoGs: Saddam Hussein, the Republican Guard,
and the Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear infrastructure. The air commander identified twelve “target sets” ranging from national leadership and
command and control to railroads, airfields, and ports, each of them constituting a center of gravity. As Lieutenant Colonel Joe Purvis, who headed a team
of U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies graduates who assisted in
ground-component planning during the war, later admitted, “The
CENTCOM [Central Command, the regional command] staff became more
32
focused on what [the CoG] was as opposed to what do we do with it.” However, even simply translating the war’s strategic objectives—expulsion of Iraqi
forces from Kuwait and reduction of Iraqi offensive capability—into operational and tactical objectives would still have identified the capabilities that
33
coalition forces had to defeat in order to be successful.
Clausewitz was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, and his emphasis on concentrating forces and energy for a knockout blow derived from his observations
that such concentrations often brought about success. He had obvious concerns
about the temptation to fritter away resources on ventures that would not bring
about a decisive end. These concerns were well placed. For one thing, the army
officers of his day were not the school-trained professionals of today; competence varied considerably. In addition, the operational art was not well
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developed; there were, for example, no standardized principles of war, such as
mass and objective, to encourage commanders to focus their efforts.
Today, military commanders concern themselves less with massing forces
than with massing effects. Nonetheless, joint doctrine still maintains that the
purpose of identifying a center of gravity is to assist commanders in focusing
their efforts and resources, just as in Clausewitz’s day. As Brigadier General Wass
de Czege (U.S. Army, retired) has explained, “Trying to approach the problem
from the perspective of a center of gravity leads you to see very quickly that some
vulnerabilities are interesting but a waste of resources because they do not lead
34
anywhere useful in the end.” At the same time, joint doctrine acknowledges
that CoGs may not always be readily discernible and that they can change at any
moment during an operation. If this is true, then why, as civilian analysts like
35
Eliot Cohen have asked, should the U.S. military bother with them? Joint doctrine’s answer is to insist that both enemy and friendly centers of gravity be analyzed continuously throughout an operation. However, this solution works only
if planning processes can keep pace with change and if political and military
leaders have the flexibility to redirect their efforts in midstream.
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
As this article has argued, the U.S. military has long misunderstood Clausewitz’s
concept of center of gravity, believing that its own capabilities-based definitions
are closely linked to his effects-based one. Ultimately, capabilities-based definitions merely reflect back what each of the services wants to believe about its own
strengths and weaknesses and about those of its potential adversaries. Perhaps
that is why no single, reliable method for determining a center of gravity has
emerged after two decades of effort.36
Confusion has fallen equally upon those wishing to pursue the concept and
37
those who would abandon it. The question arises, in fact, of whether attempting to understand Clausewitz is worth the effort. Do his ideas in general, and
those related to the center of gravity in particular, offer anything of enduring
value to the strategist or the warfighter today?
As others have pointed out, many of Clausewitz’s ideas possess a transcen38
dent quality that makes them relevant not only to his era but always. These enduring insights include friction in war, the culmination of the attack, and the
roles of chance and uncertainty. The center of gravity is another. The idea offers
something worthwhile for twenty-first-century strategists and warfighters.
However, its application must be judicious. The center of gravity needs to be
redefined as a “focal point,” not as a strength (or a weakness) or a source of
strength. A CoG is more than a critical capability; it is the point where a certain
centripetal force seems to exist, something that holds everything else together.
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For example, al-Qa‘ida cells might operate globally, but they are united by their
39
hatred of apostasy. This hatred, not Osama bin Laden, is their CoG. They apparently perceive the United States and its Western values as the enemy CoG
(though they do not use the term) in their war against “apostate” Muslim leaders. Decisively defeating al-Qa‘ida will involve neutralizing its CoG, but this will
require the use of diplomatic and informational initiatives more than military
action.
Commanders and their staffs need to identify where the connections—and
the gaps—exist in the enemy’s system as a whole before deciding whether a center of gravity exists. The CoG concept does not apply if enemy elements are not
connected sufficiently. In other words, successful antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan may not cause al-Qa‘ida cells in Europe or Singapore to collapse. Indeed, given the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-explosive weapons that is expected to occur over the next decade or so, it is
dangerous to assume that all the segments of the enemy can be defeated by a single knockout blow. Indeed, the continued proliferation of such weapons could
very well make the CoG concept academic.
Nor should the notion of a center of gravity be applied to every kind of war or
operation; if it is, the term may become overused and meaningless or be conflated with political-military objectives. The war against terrorism—and
al-Qa‘ida in particular—is a war to the death; hence, it is the kind of war in
which the CoG approach serves a constructive purpose. The Gulf War of
1990–91 was not.
The industrial-age paradigm of warfare, in which the distinction between the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels is inviolate, needs to be replaced with
one that regards all activities of war as interdependent. Clausewitz did not distinguish between tactical, operational, or strategic centers of gravity; he defined
the center of gravity holistically—that is, by the entire system (or structure) of
the enemy—not in terms of level of war.
The American military—with the help of a somewhat misleading translation—has obscured the true sense of Clausewitz’s center of gravity, but it can
still adjust its doctrine to correct those errors. If it does not, the concept will create more confusion and cost more than it is worth. The U.S. military would do
better to abandon the center of gravity concept altogether than to apply it in circumstances and ways not appropriate to it. The risks of misapplying it, especially in an environment in which opponents can operate in a wholly
decentralized manner but with potentially devastating power, are too great.
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NOTES

1. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Warfighting, Marine
Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington,
D.C.: Dept. of the Navy, 20 June 1997),
pp. 45–7.

4. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Naval Warfare, Naval
Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.:
March 1994), p. 35.

2. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine
Document 1 (Washington, D.C.: September
1997), p. 79, now uses the joint definition of
CoGs cited elsewhere in this article. But see
John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign:
Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 9–10,
and “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal, Spring 1995, pp. 40–55. Another prominent air power theorist writes, “In essence,
Air Power is targeting”; Phillip Meilinger, 10
Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums
Program, 1995), chap. 4.

6. U.S. Dept. of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication [hereafter JP] 3-0
(Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995),
p. GL-4. In Book I, chapter 2, of On War,
Clausewitz concludes that warfare is neither a
science nor an art. Its outcomes are too unpredictable to consider it a science; and it involves forces that react when acted upon, so it
cannot be an art, like painting. Carl von
Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1989) [hereafter On
War].

3. U.S. Dept. of the Army, Operations, Field
Manual [hereafter FM] 100-5 (Washington,
D.C.: 1993), pp. 6–13; cf. the more recent Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: 14 June
2001), pp. 5–7, which now uses the joint definition. The CoG appealed to maneuver theorists, who saw it as something at which to aim
the maneuver in the hope of a quick decision,
à la the blitzkrieg. Unfortunately, although
the Army’s 1986 version of FM 100-5 placed
great emphasis on the center of gravity, identifying it as the “key to all operational design,” it also caused a great deal of confusion
by equating CoGs to key geographic features,
boundaries between army groups, and lines
of communication—in other words, to “decisive points” in the Jominian sense; James
Schneider and Lawrence Izzo, “Clausewitz’s
Elusive Center of Gravity,” Parameters, September 1987, pp. 52, 56. William Lind, “The
Operational Art,” p. 45, Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988, points out that “FM 100-5
arrives at a meaning of center of gravity that
can be applied to anything worthy of being
attacked” (p. 45). Henri de Jomini defined a
decisive point as anything “whose attack or
capture would imperil or seriously weaken
the enemy”; John Shy, “Jomini,” in The
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli
to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 152–4.
The 1993 version of FM 100-5 partially corrected this error but retained the idea that
CoGs could be lines of communications.
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5. Ibid.

7. Joint Publication 3-0, p. GL-4.
8. For example, Clausewitz borrowed from Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schiller,
and Wilhelm Goethe. Peter Paret, Clausewitz
and the State (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1976).
9. Schwerpunkt is the term used most frequently; it appears some fifty-three times.
Clausewitz also used Centra gravitatis, Kern
(core), and Zentrum (center).
10. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 310–1.
11. My translations are followed first by the
original German, then by the Howard and
Paret translation, for comparison. For this
passage: “Gegen den Teil, wo die meisten
feindlichen Streitkräfte beisammen sind,
wird derjenige Stoß geschehen können,
dessen glückliche Wirkungen am weitesten
reichen; und wir werden dieses Erfolges am
meisten gewiß sein, je größer die Masse der
eigenen Streitkräfte ist, die wir zu diesem
Stoß verwenden. Diese natürliche Vorstellungsreihe führt uns auf ein Bild, in welchem
wir sie klarer feststellen können, es ist die
Natur und Wirkung des Schwerpunktes in
der Mechanik” (Carl von Clausewitz, Vom
Kriege, 19th ed., [Regensburg: Pustet, 1991],
p. 810 [hereafter, Vom Kriege]), compare:
“The blow from which the broadest and most
favorable repercussions can be expected will
be aimed against that area where the greatest
concentration of enemy troops can be found;
the larger the force with which the blow is
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struck, the surer its effect will be. This rather
obvious sequence leads us to an analogy that
will illustrate it more clearly—that is, the nature and effect of a center of gravity” (On War,
p. 485).
12. Geoff Jones, Mary Jones, and Phillip
Marchington, Cambridge Coordinated Science:
Physics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1993), pp. 52–5. In an environment
where gravity does not exist, a center of gravity is replaced by a “center of mass,” where an
object’s mass is most heavily concentrated.
13. Jones et al., p. 53.
14. “So wie sich der Schwerpunkt immer da
findet, wo die meiste Masse beisammen ist,
und wie jeder Stoß gegen den Schwerpunkt
der Last am wirksamsten ist, wie ferner der
stärkste Stoß mit dem Schwerpunkt der Kraft
erhalten wird, so ist es auch im Kriege. Die
Streitkräfte jedes Kriegführenden, sei es ein
einzelner Staat oder ein Bündnis von Staaten,
haben eine gewisse Einheit und durch diese
Zusammenhang; wo aber Zusammenhang ist,
da treten die Analogien des Schwerpunktes
ein. Es gibt also in diesen Streitkräften
gewisse Schwerpunkte, deren Bewegung und
Richtung über die anderen Punkte
entscheidet, und diese Schwerpunkte finden
sich da, wo die meisten Streitkräfte
beisammen sind. So wie aber in der toten
Körperwelt die Wirkung gegen den
Schwerpunkt in dem Zusammenhang der
Teile ihr Maß und ihre Grenze hat, so ist es
auch im Kriege” (Vom Kriege, pp. 810–1).
Compare: “A center of gravity is always
found where the mass is concentrated most
densely. It presents the most effective target
for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is
that struck by the center of gravity. The same
holds true in war. The fighting forces of each
belligerent—whether a single state or an alliance of states—have a certain unity and
therefore some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the center of gravity
can be applied. Thus, these forces will possess
certain centers of gravity, which, by their
movement and direction, govern the rest; and
those centers of gravity will be found wherever the forces are most concentrated. But in
war as in the world of inanimate matter the
effect produced on a center of gravity is determined and limited by the cohesion of the
parts” (On War, pp. 485–6 [emphasis
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added]). Clausewitz is, of course, wrong in
his understanding of physics; as we have seen
with the boomerang, a center of gravity can
be located where no mass exists, a point he
perhaps realized by Book VIII, where he lists
a number of examples that do not pertain to
mass (see note 22 below).
15. Reinforcing this point, Clausewitz elsewhere
says, “Weil das Wesen des Krieges Kampf,
und die Hauptschlacht der Kampf der
Hauptmacht ist, diese immer als den
eigentlichen Schwerpunkt des Krieges
betrachten” (Vom Kriege, p. 453). Compare:
“But since the essence of war is fighting, and
since the battle is the fight of the main force,
the battle must always be considered as the
true center of gravity of the war” (On War,
p. 248). For more on Clausewitz’s notion of
“interdependency,” see Antulio J. Echevarria
II, “Clausewitz: Toward A Theory of Applied
Strategy,” Defense Analysis, vol. 11, no. 3
(1995), pp. 229–40, available on the World
Wide Web at www.clausewitz.com (accessed
4 April 2002).
16. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of
Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966),
pp. 960–76.
17. “Weil Blücher, obgleich schwächer als
Schwarzenberg, doch wegen seines
Unternehmungsgeistes der Bedeutendere
war, daß in ihm also mehr der Schwerpunkt
lag, der das Übrige in seiner Richtung mit
fortreißt” (Vom Kriege, p. 324 [emphasis
added]). Compare: “Even though Blücher
was weaker than Schwarzenberg, his enterprising spirit made him more important. The
center of gravity lay with him, and he pulled
the other forces in his direction” (On War,
p. 163).
18. One could also make a case that Blücher’s
personal desire to defeat the French was the
ultimate force. But this goes beyond what is
necessary to prove the point that Clausewitz’s
CoG is more than just a concentration of
force.
19. “Diese Centra gravitatis in der feindlichen
Kriegsmacht zu unterscheiden, ihre
Wirkungskreise zu erkennen, ist also ein
Hauptakt des strategischen Urteils. Man wird
sich nämlich jedesmal fragen müssen, welche
Wirkungen das Vorgehen und Zurückgehen
des einen Teiles der gegenseitigen Streitkräfte
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auf die übrigen hervorbringen wird” (Vom
Kriege, pp. 810–1). Compare: “It is therefore
a major act of strategic judgment to distinguish these centers of gravity in the enemy’s
forces and to identify their spheres of effectiveness. One will constantly be called upon
to estimate the effect that an advance or a retreat by part of the forces on either side will
have upon the rest” (On War, p. 486).
20. Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity
and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, Winter 1992, pp. 59–90.
21. Schneider and Izzo maintain (p. 49) that
Clausewitz carried the analogy “too far” in
Book VIII. Unfortunately, their views merely
reflect their own predilections about what a
CoG ought to be.
22. “Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl XII.,
Friedrich der Große hatten ihren
Schwerpunkt in ihrem Heer, wäre dies
zertrümmert worden, so würden sie ihre
Rolle schlecht ausgespielt haben; bei Staaten,
die durch innere Parteiungen zerrissen sind,
liegt er meistens in der Hauptstadt; bei
kleinen Staaten, die sich an mächtige stützen,
liegt er im Heer dieser Bundesgenossen; bei
Bündnissen liegt er in der Einheit des
Interesses; bei Volksbewaffnung in der Person der Hauptführer und in der öffentlichen
Meinung. Gegen diese Dinge muß der Stoß
gerichtet sein. Hat der Gegner dadurch das
Gleichgewicht verloren, so muß ihm keine
Zeit gelassen werden, es wieder zu gewinnen;
der Stoß muß immer in dieser Richtung
fortgesetzt werden, oder mit anderen
Worten, der Sieger muß ihn immer ganz und
das Ganze nicht gegen einen Teil des Gegners
richten” (Vom Kriege, pp. 976–7). Compare:
“For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles
XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of
gravity was their army. If the army had been
destroyed, they would all have gone down in
history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally
the capital. In small countries that rely on
large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is
the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies
should be directed. If the enemy is thrown off
balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be aimed in the
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same direction: the victor, in other words,
must strike with all his strength and not just
against a fraction of the enemy’s” (On War,
pp. 595–6).
23. “Das Reduzieren der feindlichen Macht auf
einen Schwerpunkt hängt ab: Erstens von
dem politischen Zusammenhang derselben.
. . . Zweitens von der Lage des Kriegstheaters,
auf welchem die verschiedenen feindlichen
Heere erschienen” (Vom Kriege, pp. 1009–10).
Compare: “The task of reducing the sources
of enemy strength to a single center of gravity
will depend on: 1. The distribution of the enemy’s political power. . . . 2. The situation in
the theater of war where the various armies
are operating” (On War, p. 617). Note that
“source” (Quelle) does not appear in the
original.
24. Clausewitz also lays out two war-planning
principles, the first of which involves the
CoG. In my translation, “The first principle
is: To trace the full weight [Gewicht] of the
enemy’s power [Macht] to as few centers of
gravity as possible, when feasible, to one; and,
at the same time, to reduce the blow against
these centers of gravity to as few major actions as possible, when feasible, to one. And,
finally, to keep all subordinate actions as
subordinate as possible. In a word, the first
principle is: To act with the utmost concentration. The second principle is: To act as
rapidly as possible, permitting no delay or
detour without substantial justification.”
Compare: “Der erste ist: das Gewicht der
feindlichen Macht auf so wenig Schwerpunkte als möglich zurückzuführen, wenn es
sein kann, auf einen; wiederum den Stoß
gegen diese Schwerpunkte auf so wenig
Haupthandlungen als möglich zurückzuführen, wenn es sein kann, auf eine;
endlich alle untergeordnete Handlungen so
untergeordnet als möglich zu halten. Mit
einem Wort, der erste Grundsatz ist: so
konzentriert als möglich zu handeln. Der
zweite Grundsatz: so schnell als möglich zu
handeln, also keinen Aufenthalt und keinen
Umweg ohne hinreichenden Grund” (Vom
Kriege, p. 1009). Further compare: “The first
principle is that the ultimate substance of enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one alone.
The attack on these sources must be compressed into the fewest possible actions—

125

122

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 26

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

again, ideally, into one. Finally, all minor actions must be subordinated as much as possible. In short the first principle is: act with the
utmost concentration. The second principle
is: act with the utmost speed. No halt or detour must be permitted without good cause”
(On War, p. 617). Note again that contrary to
the Howard and Paret translation, the word
“source” does not appear in the original.
25. Clausewitz’s center of gravity has been called
a linear concept (see Beyerchen, p. 87), because his description employs a relationship—CoG against CoG—seemingly based
on directly proportional effects. Yet in some
respects it implies nonlinearity as well, because the center of gravity is not always a
physical mass. Destruction of something intangible—such as an alliance’s community of
interests—or of something relatively small—
such as a political or military leader—can
bring down the enemy’s entire edifice.
26. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Rapid Decisive
Operations White Paper, draft dated 16 February 2001 (Norfolk, Va.: J9 Joint Futures Lab,
2001) [hereafter RDO]. It defines effectsbased operation as “a process for obtaining a
desired strategic outcome or ‘effect’ on the
enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative,
and cumulative application of the full range
of military and other national capabilities at
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”
An effect is defined as the “physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or
consequence that results from specific military and non-military actions” (p. 20).
27. Christian Lowe, “In Exercise, U.S. Military
Practices Unconventional Warfare,” Defense
Week, 21 May 2001, p. 2. For a more detailed
critique of RDO see Antulio J. Echevarria II,
Rapid Decisive Operations: An AssumptionsBased Critique (Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2001).
28. Lowe, p. 2.
29. Vom Kriege, p. 324. Cf. On War, p. 163.
30. “Denn nur durch diese Entscheidung werden
die Schwerpunkte der gegenseitigen Macht
und die von ihnen ausgehenden Kriegstheater
wirksame Dinge” (Vom Kriege, p. 813). Compare: “It is the decision that changes the
centers of gravity on each side, and the operational theaters they create, into active agents”
(On War, p. 488).
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31. JP 3-0, pp. III-20 through III-21.
32. Cited in Seow Hiang Lee, “Center of Gravity
or Center of Confusion: Understanding the
Mystique,” Wright Flyer Paper 10 (Maxwell
Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff
College, 1999), pp. 18–9.
33. To condense the strategic objectives. The objectives for the Gulf War as outlined by President George H. W. Bush were: withdrawal of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of legitimate government in Kuwait; assuring security and stability of the Persian Gulf region;
and protecting American lives. Eliot Cohen et
al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1,
Planning and Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 83–4.
34. Huba Wass de Czege [Brig. Gen., USA,
(Ret.)], “Clausewitz: Historical Theories Remain Sound Compass References: The Catch
Is Staying on Course,” Army, September
1988, p. 42.
35. Eliot A. Cohen, “Strategy: Causes, Conduct,
and Termination of War,” in Security Studies
for the 21st Century, ed. Richard H. Shultz,
Jr., Roy Godson, George H. Quester (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1997), pp. 364–6.
36. One of the better-known and detailed attempts was Dr. Joseph Strange’s “CG-CCCR-CV” concept, by which a “CG” (center of
gravity) must have “critical capabilities”
(CCs) to be a true, military CoG. Those CCs,
in turn, have “critical requirements” (CRs)—
such as lines of communication—that enable
the CCs to keep functioning. Leaving a CR—
such as, in Korea in 1950, the Inchon-Seoul
transportation hub—inadequately protected
creates a “critical vulnerability” (CV) that
friendly forces can exploit to defeat the enemy’s CG. Dr. Strange thus effectively linked
centers of gravity—which were in reality critical capabilities—to critical vulnerabilities.
Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical
Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian
Foundation So That We Can All Speak the
Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting
Series 4 (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1996). Strange correctly maintained
that service definitions of CoG (with the exception of the Army’s) were flawed and imprecise. They tended to equate CoGs with
vulnerabilities rather than with strengths, and
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they paid too little attention to psychological
centers of power.

fact exists, somewhere inside the “helix” or
“onion.”

Other methods of identifying centers of gravity are too numerous to list here in their entirety, but they include the “strategic helix”
method, which involves attacking all potential centers of gravity until the real one is hit
and reveals itself by the effects that ensue.
This method, which is in effect “recon by destruction” and assumes unlimited resources,
is discussed in detail by Lee (pp. 27–8), who
credits Phillip Meilinger for developing it.
Another approach, the “onion method,”
amounts to little more than eating one’s way
through the multiple layers of the enemy’s
national power to get at the CoG; Colin Agee,
Peeling the Onion: The Iraqi’s [sic] Center of
Gravity (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of
Advanced Military Studies, 1992), pp. 26–7.
Both methods assume that an enemy CoG in

37. Steven Metz and Frederick M. Downey,
“Centers of Gravity and Strategic Planning,”
Military Review, April 1988, pp. 22–33, argue
that the concept can be useful but that much
work needs to be done to make it so. In contrast, T. M. Kriwanek, The Operational Center
of Gravity (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School
of Advanced Military Studies, 1986), pp. 20–1,
argues that Clausewitz’s ideas, rooted in industrial-age warfare, have little to offer to the
future. Both are victims of the Howard and
Paret translation.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

123

38. Cohen, “Strategy,” p. 365.
39. “Al-Qa‘ida (the Base),” International Policy
Institute for Counter-Terrorism, on the World
Wide Web at www.ict.org.il/inter_ter
(accessed 3 April 2002).
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THE JOINT FORCES AIR COMMAND PROBLEM
Is Network-centric Warfare the Answer?
Major William A. Woodcock, U.S. Air Force

The American military’s biggest problem? It lets technology drive strategy, rather than letting strategy determine technology.
BRIG. GEN. DON MORELLI, USA (RET.)

T

he marriage of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air component
commander concept represents a “military-technical revolution” in aero1
space command and control. The current system is cumbersome, and it is falling behind in its ability to deal with the fast-paced warfare of today. By its nature,
network-centric warfare (NCW) could address many of the shortfalls of the current joint air component system. It will not, however, change the fundamental
nature of war, nor can it solve all of the current problems of the joint forces air
component commander (JFACC). This article will examine the potential and
limitations of network-centric warfare in terms of command and control and in
the context of the JFACC.
Network-centric warfare—the “effective linking or networking of knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed”—promises
to raise command and control to new levels of efficiency.2 Conceptually,
NCW provides battlespace entities with “shared battlespace awareness” through
3
interconnectivity and networking techniques. These
Major Woodcock is a fighter pilot with fourteen years in
F-111 and F-16 aircraft, including Operations DESERT
techniques in turn allow the movement of informaSTORM and SOUTHERN WATCH. He was a member of
tion and decisions at rates and efficiencies previously
the Seventh Air Force staff, Weapons and Tactics, asunattainable. These “virtual organizations” can use
signed to the Korean theater joint forces air component
commander, involved in all aspects of air operations
“common operational pictures” to “self-synchronize,”
center functions. A 2001 graduate of the Naval War
potentially reducing the fog and friction of war as
College, he received the Red River Valley Fighter Pilot’s
4
well as shortening decision and execution times. The
Association Award for an earlier version of this article.
He is currently assistant director of operations of the 555
ability to relay a common picture of the war and share
Fighter Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy.
information with geographically dispersed sensors,
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1
decision makers, and weapon platforms would reduce
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the time it takes them collectively to observe the situation, orient themselves to
5
the problem, decide what to do, and act. Such faster decision making would increase the flexibility, lethality, and speed of airpower.
Nonetheless, and for all that network-centric warfare promises to bring to the
joint forces air component commander, there are problems that it cannot fix.
Conflicts in or problems with doctrine, inadequate or convoluted command
and control structures and procedures, and poor decision making will remain.
In any case, it cannot change the nature of warfare. “War is an act of human in6
tercourse”; the technology of NCW can go only so far to correct uniquely human problems. Additionally, limitations are likely to arise in relation to the
specifics of required command and control systems, connectivity, or the validity
of the JFACC concept itself. These matters are necessarily beyond the scope of
this article, which assesses the likelihood that network-centric warfare can dramatically increase the efficiency and flexibility with which air warfare is
conducted.
In its current form, the joint forces air component commander is the central element of the concept that (in the view of the U.S. Air Force) combines centralized
command and control of air assets with decentralized execution of air warfare.7
Under joint doctrine, the joint air commander, whose function is to control air
and space power in a given area of operations, is appointed by and works directly
8
for the joint forces commander. The JFACC concept also incorporates key tenets of specifically Air Force airpower doctrine: “Air and Space power must be
controlled by an airman who maintains a broad strategic and/or theater perspective in prioritizing the use of limited air and space assets to attain the objec9
tives of all U.S. forces in any contingency across the range of operations.”
History is full of examples of the perils of dividing up airpower assets and of the
10
advantages of centrally controlling them. The Air Force believes that parceling
airpower out to various agencies and among various tasks will negate its inherent qualities of mass, flexibility, and transcendent scope—that is, its freedom
from limitation by geography, water depth, road conditions, etc. The service’s
doctrine declares that the joint forces air component commander should be “an
airman who maintains a broad and/or theater perspective,” for reasons of perspective that would become particularly relevant with the advent of networkcentric warfare.
THE ISSUES
As a preliminary to evaluating NCW’s potential contribution, it is important
to understand the problems and issues of the current organization and tasks
of joint forces air component command. Most prominent are a myriad of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
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difficulties arising from centralization: most of the functions for which the joint
air commander is responsible—planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, and
executing air operations in accordance with the joint forces commander’s objec11
tives—are conducted in a single air operations center. The first of this category
of issues is that the concentration of tasks makes the air operations center (or
AOC) a critical—and vulnerable—node in the command and control of a major
element of U.S. military forces. Its destruction would virtually cripple air operations. All of the air operations center’s functions are singular; there are no backups for them. The system has no “redundancy” in this respect; it cannot deal
with a loss of the AOC.
Second, due to its size—it has a staff of roughly 1,300 and considerable equipment and other infrastructure—the air operations center is both cumbersome
12
and difficult to move. Deployment requires a substantial logistical effort. The
large “footprint” of an air operations center also puts a premium on physical
plant; AOCs must now be housed in large, hardened facilities. Any sensitivity of
host nations to the presence of a large number of Americans and representatives
of U.S. coalition partners adds to the problems of locating the center.
In addition, the AOC’s large size makes it difficult to establish aboard a ship.
The absence of the sea-basing option in a world in which suitable facilities
ashore may not be available is a serious limitation. An afloat joint forces air component commander would enjoy greatly increased flexibility, especially in situa13
tions in which the Navy provides the preponderance of airpower.
The current structure is also inflexible with regard to contingencies and circumstances. The war in Kosovo highlighted this deficiency. As the Defense Department
later reported to Congress, “Operation Allied Force highlighted the need for the Department to develop expeditionary air operations centers and equip them with supporting resources and manpower to enable U.S. forces to create combined air
14
operations centers that can be tailored to the crisis at hand and deployed quickly.”
Under the current structure, the command and control of aerospace power
resides by definition in a single person. The amount of information and the
scope and rapidity of decision making involved in planning and executing an air
campaign is enormous, far beyond the physical capabilities of any one human
15
being. In practice, the bulk of this effort is shouldered by the air operations
center staff. However, the commander, in person, remains the final authority—
and is therefore a single point of failure. If the joint air commander were somehow removed from the battle, the ramifications could be catastrophic.
A final problem related directly to centralization is that keeping an air operations center staff trained for its wartime functions is a mammoth task. Command and control involves perishable skills that atrophy in the absence of
training. The experience of ULCHI FOCUS LENS, a joint and combined command
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26
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and control exercise series conducted by the Seventh Air Force in the Republic of
Korea, is illustrative. To assume its wartime configuration for these evolutions,
the Seventh Air Force’s air operations center requires hundreds of augmentees
from other commands. Many more people are needed just to run the simulation
and represent the roles of the various coordinating entities. An exercise like
ULCHI FOCUS LENS is productive and effective, but it is expensive and time consuming, and it meets the training needs of only a single JFACC.
Aside from the specific problems caused by the centralized nature of the current structure, there are fundamental weaknesses in several basic procedural areas. A number of processes that have been reasonably effective in the past are no
longer able to meet the demands of modern warfare.
The first of these is the air tasking order, the single-source plan for all air operations in an area of operations in a twenty-four-hour period. The air tasking
order assigns to individual units their targets, weapons, and arrival times over
those targets. Second, it tells all
“players” what will be going on
For all that network-centric warfare promises
around them as they execute their
to bring to the JFACC, there are problems that
missions; this “deconfliction” is
it cannot fix.
critical to the execution of aerial
operations, to avoid fratricide and
duplication of effort and increase the safety of flight. Already, however, a given
day’s air tasking order takes anywhere from thirty-six to forty-eight hours to
16
produce. By the time the order is issued, the majority of its assumptions, analyses, and targeting decisions are out of date.
A second issue is that of target recognition and identification, one of the most
severely limiting factors in the high-speed warfare of today. The need for speed is
particularly critical in the prosecution of “time-sensitive” (that is, moving) surface targets. The problem they represent is not new but is receiving increased visibility in light of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mobile
surface-to-air missile launchers, and theater ballistic missiles. Too often, by the
time the target is analyzed and identified, it is no longer visible. The limiting inherent factors in the prosecution of fleeting targets are the processes of detection
and identification. Current technology has not caught up with requirements;
these tasks are not being performed rapidly enough. Another vital piece of the
identification puzzle is the threat of fratricide. In DESERT STORM, coalition
17
forces suffered 107 casualties to friendly fire. In a casualty-conscious world,
and for a technologically advanced military, this is unacceptable.
This litany of problems with the joint forces air component command structure of today, as long as it is, is not all-inclusive. There are other problems, such
as service doctrine disputes, connectivity, and joint integration. NetworkPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
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centric warfare cannot address them; however, it has great potential to bring improvements to the particular problem areas we have discussed.
WHAT NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE CAN DO FOR THE JFACC
Network-centric warfare’s major contribution in the arena of command and
control will reside in its ability to assimilate large amounts of data, translate the
data into coherent and useful information, and provide conduits that allow the
key decision makers to communicate and collaborate at speeds currently unrealized and then quickly pass their decisions to weapon platforms. Additionally,
NCW will distribute shared “awareness” to all battlespace entities. It is these
qualities that must be capitalized upon if the current shortcomings of joint
forces air component command are to be alleviated.
By its very nature, the connectivity NCW provides permits decentralization
of the joint forces air component command infrastructure. Networking would
enable a “virtual” air operations center;18 its functions would no longer need to
be collocated. The vulnerability of the AOC would be reduced, and therefore
that of the command and control system as well—it would no longer have a single “pressure point.” A geographically dispersed system is, by nature, less susceptible to attack and collapse. Additionally, networking would allow for parallel
operations, and thus for redundancy at critical nodes. For example, an alternate
joint air commander and staff, themselves geographically distributed, might
monitor operations; should the JFACC be forced to move or be lost in combat,
the alternate could take over operations seamlessly. Single-point failures could
virtually be eliminated; the robustness of such a system would be invaluable as
the intensity of warfare increases.
The ability of NCW to decentralize functions also makes possible
“reachback,” by which functions could be located in relatively safe locations,
19
perhaps the continental United States. Even well to the rear, such functions remain on the network, connected to all the other nodes. The ability of an air operations center simply to “reach back” to a Defense Department agency, say, for
support would yield several benefits.
First, it would reduce the size of the center’s staff. The fact that not all segments of the AOC staff deploy would mean less equipment, fewer people, and a
smaller support base to be moved forward. This in turn makes the air operations
center more able to use austere facilities. It also minimizes U.S. and coalition
presence on foreign soil.
Second, the joint forces air component commander could move aboard ship.
As we have seen, JFACCs are currently hindered from moving to sea by the size
20
of their staffs and the command-and-control systems they require. Afloat operations are advantageous for several reasons in addition to those already noted.
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In a given situation, a carrier battle group may be first on the scene; when the
main focus of effort shifted toward the land, the transition to a shore-based joint
air commander would be greatly eased if an organization were already functioning at sea. Afloat operations may not always be the option of choice, but networkcentric warfare promises to make them a viable option.
Third, NCW-based reachback would allow specialized agencies to participate
effectively in forward operations. In so complex an undertaking as national security, pockets of special expertise and capability inevitably emerge. Such organizations such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, CHECKMATE, and many others provide unique “skill sets” in
21
vital disciplines. However, in an era of reduced manning and uncertain budgets, they are less and less able to send forward fully capable detachments to support staffs in combat areas; network-centricity would allow joint air commanders
and their staffs to tap such expertise at its various sources, rapidly, efficiently,
and as they need it; networking would also allow air operations centers to delegate some of their workloads.
As an example of the force-multiplying effect of rear-area expertise in the
planning and execution of air warfare, take the case of hardened, deeply buried
targets, today an emerging “target set.” Vital enemy command-and-control and
weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities are typically protected in this way. Locating them and gathering and analyzing intelligence on them are difficult and
time-consuming tasks. Network-centric organization would allow data to be
sent, for instance, to the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, which possesses the specialists and analytical tools necessary to discern whether valid targets have been
found and if so, to determine the best way to attack them. Their solutions will
probably be of better quality than those air operations centers could produce
themselves.
Finally, no two scenarios are the same, a reality that places a premium on the
flexibility of an air operations center. Not all components of the notional AOC
structure are needed in all situations. Network-centric warfare would allow the
joint forces air component commander to tailor a virtual organization to the
task at hand. By virtue of such NCW fundamentals as reachback and networking, only organizations necessary for a given mission need be “brought to the
fight.” This point is particularly relevant for such major headquarters as regional
commands; indeed, the current crisis management philosophy of European
Command is to build joint task forces from the ground up, tailoring them to meet
22
particular crises. This approach represents a marked departure from the tradi23
tional concept of standing task forces and air operations centers; networkcentric warfare should give regional and joint task force commanders the ability to
form trained air component command structures on short notice.
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Network-centric warfare will mitigate a subtle danger inherent in reliance
upon a centralized decision-making entity—the equating of the concepts of
“command” and “control.” They have been inexorably linked for years, but they
are very different notions. Command has been defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces
24
in the accomplishment of the mission.” “Control,” joint doctrine declares, “is
25
inherent in command.” Even so, “control” embraces the “procedures employed
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces
26
and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.” In short, command is
authority, and control is a process. Ultimately, command authority over a joint
force’s air and space assets rests
with its air component comThe system has no “redundancy” in this respect: mander; network-centricity will
it cannot deal with a loss of the air operations significantly enhance the JFACC’s
center.
ability to exercise it. Improved
connectivity with subordinates
will enhance the joint air commander’s ability to “direct people and organizations
27
into actions to accomplish missions.”
Networking will also allow joint forces air component commanders to delegate control more effectively. The primary rationale in the past for centralized
command and control was that generally only the commander had “the whole
28
picture.” NCW makes it possible to extend, to levels not previously feasible,
“distributive control”—delegation of responsibilities and processes to levels or
organizations best suited to them—and thereby achieve not only lessened vulnerability but faster decision cycles and operational tempos. In a network-centric
force, vital information is distributed to all appropriate levels of control, depending on the mission; experts in particular disciplines—given the knowledge
and authority required to assess, decide, act, and control—can achieve smaller
and more efficient response cycles than were ever before possible.
Properly trained subordinates, with clear and firm guidance from the joint
forces air component commander, will be informed and connected decision
makers. In a network-centric system, however, the onus is on commanders to
ensure that a correct understanding of their overall intentions and the objectives
of particular operations pervades the control structure. “Mission-type orders”—telling subordinates what needs to be done, not how—issued through a
network in conjunction with air tasking orders will provide control elements the
29
guidance they need. Properly designed and reinforced by education, training,
and doctrine, centralized command and decentralized control would allow the
joint forces air component commander to employ aerospace power with maximal effectiveness.
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Training, however, as we have pointed out, is one of the most pressing shortcomings of air component command. The level of skill in the command and
30
control of aerospace power is presently inadequate. Here again, networkcentric concepts would bring in a new era.
The current effort in the Air Force to eliminate the expertise problem is the
31
“AOC as a Weapons System” program. The concept is to make the training of
members of centers mirror that given for weapon systems, such as fighters and
bombers. AOC staffs will be required to maintain complex qualifications commensurate with their wartime roles. Presently, initial training is given at the
Command and Control Warriors School, a division of the Command and Con32
trol Training Innovations Group at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Final missionqualification training is accomplished within the assigned air operations centers.
The current major deficiency is fidelity; interactions with agencies that are geographically distant or not manned in peacetime must be simulated. Networkcentric organization, because it would keep the entire virtual AOC connected at all
times, would raise the frequency and quality of training.
33
Theoretically, virtual battles can be fought within the existing network;
however, that involves large, cumbersome, off-board computer systems, such as
a system known as the Air Warfare Simulator. NCW architecture would allow
higher-fidelity training by connecting existing systems so as to replicate an ac34
tual battle space. Its “virtual environment” capabilities could simulate battle
35
spaces within the architecture of the system. Since all involved entities would
be connected to the system anyway, deployments of masses of people and equipment to support training would be eliminated. Network-centricity would improve the realism and value of war gaming and training, at a great reduction in
cost.
This capability would also mean that more people could be trained per unit
of time in AOC operations. Since airpower is an inherently joint endeavor, combined and joint training is crucial. With the necessary equipment, allies and
other services could train in the virtual environment. Joint forces air component
commanders of other services—anywhere, including aboard ship—could train
with a virtual air operations center. In the process, joint air commanders could
tailor their organizations and think out exercising lines of communication,
command-and-control relationships, information flows, and decision-making
processes in advance. Air operations centers should not be limited to ad hoc,
“come as you are” responses to crises; network-centric warfare can bring this
principle to reality.
One of the fundamental characteristics of network-centric warfare—flexibility through ability to share battlespace awareness—can directly address
one of the most cumbersome and inflexible aspects of the current joint air
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component system, the air tasking order. As noted earlier, production of ATOs
is a lengthy process. Because they represent an entire theater’s air effort, they can
36
be over nine hundred pages in length. NCW offers a more responsive and less
burdensome approach. Shared battlespace awareness, in the form of a common
operational picture, would already be available to all players; in fact, they would
have a degree of situational awareness not previously possible. Tasking could be
transmitted to individual subordinates, in plain view of all interested parties.
Because the orders could therefore be timelier, they could better reflect changing
battlespace situations. Additionally, fratricide could be virtually eliminated. Because all commands would possess a real-time and accurate “picture” of the battle space, even in the heat of battle they would be able to identify definitively
their targets prior to engaging them; their displays would alert them if they were
about to engage a “friendly.”
Further, a well-fused picture would bring improvements to another area we
have mentioned as a weakness: the detection, identification, and prosecution of
time-sensitive surface targets. 37
The necessary advances—more
By the time the air tasking order is issued, the
responsive tasking of intelligence,
majority of its assumptions and targeting
surveillance, and reconnaissance
decisions are out of date.
assets; rapid sharing and analysis
of the raw information; and transmission of high-fidelity, “targetable” data to a
weapon platform in time to use it—will be hallmarks of network-centric
warfare.
The prosecution of moving surface targets and theater missile defense
(TMD) have many information needs in common, including timely detection,
accurate analysis and identification, and immediate communication with weapons systems capable of engaging targets. In a networked environment, there is
no necessity, as now, to compete for this information (which might be closely
held by agencies for classification or bureaucratic reasons); it can be shared between and collaborated on by people not necessarily at the same location. Such
collaboration in real time constitutes “self-synchronization,” a prerequisite for
38
the quick and efficient prosecution of such difficult but important targets.
Agencies and commands specializing in moving ground targets and TMD, respectively, can collaborate not only in analysis but in selecting the best means to
strike the target. A weapon platform normally assigned to one of these functional areas can be used to attack a target of the other. With the proper delegation of control, both surface and theater-missile targets could be disposed of
with rapidity not possible today.
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WHAT NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE CANNOT DO
For all of the capabilities that NCW could bring to joint forces air component
commanders and their air operations centers, there are several things that cannot be expected from it. Above all, NCW cannot replace people. Warfare is a
uniquely human endeavor. Technology can allow war to be waged more efficiently but cannot change its nature. In the very nature of things, human judgment will always be required in the planning and execution of operations in
39
wartime: “Human flexibility and common sense transcend the realm of logic.”
Such intangibles as personal experience, intuition, insight, and charisma will
always be prerequisites of effective leadership. Network-centric warfare can certainly aid in the decision-making process, but it cannot replace the decision
maker. Let us take a historical, and dramatic, example.
Shortly after the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) came
on line, it detected what appeared to be a launch of intercontinental ballistic
missiles from the Soviet Union. A committee instantly convened to determine
whether an attack was actually in progress. One of its members recalled that the
Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was in New York at the time. It seemed
highly unlikely the Soviets would launch an attack with their leader so exposed;
the committee accordingly decided that what looked like a Soviet missile launch
was not. It was later determined that the powerful BMEWS radars had been receiving returns from the moon. This possibility had not been anticipated, and
the BMEWS software had erroneously interpreted the indications as a missile
40
launch. Not every contingency can be imagined when systems are being developed; human decision makers must be the final authority.
41
Another problem from the human perspective is information overload.
Network-centric organization, if not properly regulated, can actually add to the
friction of war by inundating decision makers with data. A related danger is
blind trust in technology, the common perception that data from a machine
must be accurate. Some commanders tend to discount human analysis and act
42
instead on the basis of “infallible” computer-derived solutions. Obviously, machines are fallible, because the people who design, produce, and program them
are fallible. Information technology cannot “heal” itself of bad logic or flawed
data. Consequently, caution must be exercised; too much of the wrong information can be more dangerous than too little of the right information.
Further, network-centric warfare will not change the principles of sound
command. There is a tendency among senior commanders to extend their direct
control to lower and lower levels. One reason is that all senior commanders were
once commanders at lower levels, and some of them feel they know those jobs
better than the people now in charge there. NCW can, in fact, facilitate
micromanagement at levels and to degrees never before attainable. With instant
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connectivity with all players and a resultant false sense that they know everything about every aspect of the battle, commanders and senior civilian authorities may be tempted more strongly than ever to assert themselves in
inappropriate ways. In the words of a former commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Charles C. Krulak, “Molecular management of our forces is not the
43
school solution.” Only trust of subordinates, gained through education,
proper doctrine, and training, can lessen this problem.
The air operation over Kosovo was by far the most “connected” conflict the
44
United States has yet fought. As such, it provides a glimpse of the potential
dangers inherent in network-centric warfare, by highlighting the miscarriages
that are already possible. Stories are told of strategic and operational commanders
directing at the tactical level. For instance, the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe had in his office a terminal that allowed him to view what Predator un45
manned aerial vehicles in the air were seeing. During one mission, three vehicles
that looked like tanks appeared on the supreme allied commander’s screen. He
picked up a telephone, called the joint forces air component commander, and di46
rected that those tanks be destroyed. With a single call, based on incomplete information, all the levels of war, from strategic to tactical, had been short-circuited.
Top-down control exercised to this extreme is potentially quite dangerous. As
we have seen, the volume of information that is and will be available during
combat situations is beyond the ability of one person to grasp. It is for this reason that Air Force doctrine calls for unity of command and requires the joint
forces air component commander to “maintain a broad and/or theater perspec47
tive.” Network-centric organization cannot be allowed to obviate this fundamental requirement.
Network-centric warfare seems to possess the peculiar and unfortunate quality of magnifying the consequences of bad doctrine and bad decisions.
Ironically, the formal and cumbersome processes of command and control
served in the past to dampen and somewhat mitigate such effects. In World War
II, Adolf Hitler was very much involved in his army’s day-to-day battles.
Thinking that he knew what was going on at the front—that the radio, teletype,
and telex were giving him up-to-the-minute reports—Hitler would send detailed orders. In fact, however, there was an inherent and substantial time lag in
the reporting system. By the time his orders were received back at the front they
had typically been overtaken by events and simply added to confusion. By default, field commanders who were effective in combat made the necessary decisions. Those who waited for Hitler’s delayed guidance or tried to implement it
after the fact were crushed by the enemy.48
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TRAINING, SPEED, TRUST, AND EFFICIENCY
From the foregoing analysis, several recommendations can be made. The first is
that advantage be taken of network-centric concepts to make the air operations
center lighter, less centralized, and more flexible. The need to deploy air operations centers rapidly into dynamic and unanticipated situations mandates this.
The constructs of expeditionary warfare need to be applied to command and
control systems and architecture. It can be accomplished through reachback and
networking, as already described.
Second, in a NCW environment, the concept of “control” needs to be reevaluated as something separate from “command.” The argument that control needs
to be restricted to higher headquarters because only they have all pertinent information is no longer valid. Network-centric warfare promises to make a common operational picture available at all levels of control. This distributed
knowledge, allowing all commanders to distribute a sense of their purposes
equally widely, will allow control of assets at lower levels. That, in turn, will
speed the decision-making process.
Third, NCW should be used to train JFACCs and their staffs “jointly.” Networking geographically dispersed entities and services will enable robust and realistic training scenarios at a fraction of the cost of today’s single-location
exercises. It will become practical to exercise command-and-control structures
more often and across service boundaries. Such training, in the air-component
community, will serve three purposes: it will allow commanders to prepare their
staffs to respond properly in time of crisis; it will develop and inculcate doctrine
and resolve interservice disputes; and it will enable organizations to train as they
will fight. In this way trust and confidence will be built among joint forces air
component commanders and their staffs, and also among higher authorities toward their subordinates. This trust and confidence should reduce the temptation
to micromanage; as Air Force service doctrine states, the focus of the joint forces
49
air component commander needs to remain at strategic and operational levels.
Finally, the development of network-centric systems needs to focus on making the control of airpower more efficient. The air tasking order process needs to
be replaced. The moving surface target problem needs to be solved. In general,
joint forces air component commanders and their operations centers need to
operate with greater speed and efficiency. Properly developed, network-centric
warfare will allow all these things to happen.
The application of network-centric principles to the joint forces air component
commander concept would represent a large leap ahead in the command and
control of air assets. Many of the shortcomings of the present system could be
resolved using NCW principles and technology; others could not be. However,
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the truly important goal is to prevent technology from driving theory. Technology represents capabilities, present and future. It is not enough to say, “What can
technology do?” We must ask, “What do we need it to do?” Network-centric warfare is a tool; if it is to be useful, it must have a defined purpose. There must exist
well-thought-out doctrine to guide its development. We have discussed here
possible first principles by which to shape the evolution, and initiate the integration, of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air component
commander.
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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Sir:
I think Richard H. Kohn [“The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the
United States Today,” Summer 2002, pp. 9–60] is largely correct, based on my
twenty years of participation/observation. There are two areas, however, where I
think he may be missing something. One is the so-called Republican affiliation
of the military officers. You do find a preponderance of what used to be called
conservative—we now call it paleoconservative—viewpoints in the military. But
in party affiliation, due to the merger in ideologies of the two major parties in
the last thirty years, a pretty fair representation of officers consider themselves
independents, Democrats (hawkish, often southern Democrat in ideology, and
libertarian-leaning), as well as registered Republicans.
For paleoconservatives (holding registration cards of several different political parties), an alarming trend in current politics in the Pentagon is the emergence of neoconservative political appointees, who in fact have ideological
roots in the hawkish Democratic politics of Senator Scoop Jackson in the
1950s–1970s. As discussed in a 1990 Heritage Foundation interview with Senator Joe Lieberman, a Scoop Jackson Democrat (like himself) or neoconservative
supports “both a strong international presence for the United States and a positive role for the federal government in creating a better economic life at home”
(http://www.policyreview.org/summer90/lieberman.html). Richard Perle, of
course, was a staffer for Scoop Jackson under Carter, and both he and Mr.
Wolfowitz officially left the Democratic Party in the late Carter/early Reagan administrations. If you trace the political roots of many who make policy today in
President Bush’s inner circle, you will find similar trends.
These trends have direct implications for defense, sometimes toward adventurism, and we are all watching closely. Strikingly, the new National Security
Strategy is notable in that it is itself a military, or at least militaristic, strategy
that in a very real sense supersedes the upcoming National Military Strategy. Yet,
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appropriately and traditionally, the military in the Pentagon didn’t participate
in the development of the NSS but instead take it for guidance as we develop the
NMS.
Thus, the political ideology or advocacy of the officer corps cannot be discussed accurately without a reflection of the political evolution of the Republican Party itself in the same time frame. Current Republicans making policy are
neoconservatives, closer ideologically to traditional Democrats than any other
modern U.S. political party. In fact, we have to go back to the Whigs of the
mid-1800s, precursors of Lincoln’s Republican Party, to find similarly nationalistic advocacy of major federal/congressional intervention in domestic as well as
international affairs.
My second point is that there are two classes of flag officer, and these are not
distinguished in Dr. Kohn’s article. There are those who intend after retirement
to work for the military industrial complex (either as CEOs, advisers on boards,
or lobbyists for business interests), and there are those (apparently far fewer in
number) who will retire their stars entirely and do something else. Generals and
admirals know in which group they are while still on active duty, and what they
want for themselves afterward drives them, perhaps, to stray (as Kohn suggests)
from the sole defense of the Constitution into proposing and lobbying within
the system for particular policies.
I am very happy with the oath I took twenty years ago, and I believe my understanding of the Constitution has been strengthened by my military experience. It is a good oath, and if followed, it would address many of the problems
that Kohn describes. I am also happy to be retiring soon from a military businessplace that I think has become at best a Spartacracy, at worst a self-licking ice
cream cone.

KAREN KWIATKOWSKI
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force
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JOHN BOYD, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE CAREERISTS

Sir:
As the author of seven novels and three nonfiction books, I know better than
most the truth of the axiom, “A book is like a mirror. If an idiot looks in, you cannot expect an apostle to look out.” Nevertheless, I am bewildered at what Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Whiting saw when he looked at Grant Hammond’s
biography of Colonel John Boyd [The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, reviewed in Spring 2002, pp. 89–104].
If he sees Hammond’s book as focusing on Air Force persecution of Boyd,
then either he sees visions in cloud formations or I need a remedial reading
course. I read a book about a brilliant thinker who faced bureaucratic opposition to his work, not a book about a persecuted officer.
Whiting takes a gratuitous swipe at Hammond when he says Hammond
“even senses persecution” in how the Air Force memorialized Boyd at the
Weapons School. Here’s what happened. When Congressman George
Nethercutt asked the Air Force to develop a fitting memorial to Boyd, he was told
that Hammond’s book would be sufficient. Nethercutt insisted on something
more concrete—thus Boyd Hall, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The highlight
of the building dedication was to be a speech by a one-star general. The original
draft was twenty minutes long. A retired four-star said Boyd was not worth
twenty minutes, to cut the speech in half. That was not persecution. It was jealous, careerist minds at work.
Whiting also uses a sometimes-crutch of reviewers in that he criticizes
Hammond for what the book is not, rather than what it is. This would be akin to
Whiting’s mother criticizing him because he was not born a girl, or because he
joined the Air Force rather than the Navy.
Finally, Whiting reveals the traditional mind at work when he says that in air
combat technology is more important than maneuverability. This is nonsense.
Technology has taken such great leaps in the last decade or so that we may be approaching that situation, but Whiting’s glib assertion misses a serious point.
During the Vietnam War the F-4 and the F-111 were on the very cutting edge of
technology. The missiles used in Vietnam were on the cutting edge of technology. Those aircraft and those missiles were, not to put too fine a point on it, failures. Technology failed, and there was little maneuverability.
Boyd is the reason the F-15 and F-16 have such maneuverability today (although “missionizing” the aircraft degraded their performance far below what it
was originally). The Air Force was on the way to producing a ponderous aircraft
with a variable-geometry wing—an updated F-111—that, in turn, Congress
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would almost surely have refused to authorize. Had Boyd not given America the
F-15, the Air Force would have been forced to buy the Navy F-14.
Grant Hammond wrote a good, solid book, and it deserves more serious
treatment than that afforded by Whiting.

ROBERT CORAM

Atlanta, Georgia
Author of Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War,
Little, Brown, November 2002

GREENHOUSE GASES AND GLOBAL WARMING

Sir:
In his article “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls” (Naval War College
Review, Spring 2002), Stephen Walt strongly criticized the Bush administration
for its “undiplomatic rejection of the Kyoto Protocol” because it was a unilateral
decision to advance U.S. interests. However, nowhere does he address either the
urgency (or lack of it) or the effect of ratification on the U.S. economy and national security. The purpose of this note is to examine briefly the science behind
the protocol and show that the Bush administration’s decision was the correct
one.
The fraction of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere has been slowly but
steadily increasing since systematic observations began a century ago. Little concern was evident until the mid-1980s, when some researchers suggested that
CO2 would warm the atmosphere by absorbing infrared radiation emitted by the
earth. Environmentalists soon joined on an international scale to clamor for
stringent controls on the sources of CO2. The result was the Kyoto Protocol cited
above.
The protocol, which is both lengthy and complex, requires large reductions in
CO2 emissions. (The United States would have to reduce CO2 emissions to a level
7 percent below that of 1990 by the years 2008 to 2012—this despite the steady
growth of the U.S. population and the phase-out of nuclear power generation.)
The “Third World,” including the giants China and India, is exempt. Despite
this exemption, Third World countries would, under the terms of the Protocol,
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accrue “credits” for emissions, which they could sell to the “First World.” In
other words, the protocol would become an instrument for transfer of wealth
from nations such as the United States to Third World elites, a sort of international welfare scheme under a misleading name.
Carbon dioxide molecules can warm the atmosphere through changes (“excitation”) in their vibrational and rotational properties. (For CO2, such excitation
occurs in the infrared part of the electromagnetic spectrum, in which the earth
is an efficient emitter. Heating of the atmosphere occurs by transfer of energy
from CO2 to air molecules via molecular collisions.) This compound is not the
only atmospheric greenhouse gas, for several others, such as nitrous oxide (N2O)
and methane (CH4), are also covered by the Kyoto Protocol. However, water vapor, which cycles through the atmosphere in about a week via evaporation from
oceans, lakes, and rivers followed by condensation and precipitation, is far and
away the most important greenhouse gas, because it is plentiful in the atmosphere and it strongly absorbs infrared radiation emitted by the earth. Absence
from the atmosphere of water vapor would make the entire earth like the Sahara
Desert—or, to state it more dramatically, like Mars. In contrast, CO2, with a
cycle duration of, according to recent analysis, thirty to fifty years, is much less
plentiful and absorbs infrared radiation more weakly than does water vapor.
The major removal mechanisms for CO2 are absorption by vegetation and the
oceans.
Other phenomena also strongly influence the heating and cooling processes.
For example, clouds formed during the condensation of water vapor reflect sunlight, causing solar radiation reaching the earth to be reduced. Thus, warming of
the atmosphere causes increased evaporation of water vapor and more low
cloud cover, yielding a “negative feedback” that acts as a thermostat. However,
high-altitude (cirrus) clouds tend to trap the earth’s radiation, enhancing the
greenhouse effect. To account for all of the phenomena that control atmospheric
temperature, one must solve in some manner the various hydrodynamic, thermodynamic, and radiative transfer equations that describe the motion and thermal
behavior of the atmosphere. Atmospheric scientists have constructed giant
computer programs (“models”) to solve these equations, but they are necessarily
limited in their simulation of the real atmosphere. For example, they cannot,
perhaps never will, realistically simulate clouds; the oceanic models that must
form an essential part of the simulation are quite primitive; and the geometry
used in the models is much too coarse grained. (It is interesting to note that the
models cannot even predict the present climate.) The early models predicted a
temperature rise of 4.5° C (8° F) for a doubling of atmospheric CO2. The most
recent simulations, made with much-improved models, predict a rise of only
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about 1.5° C (3° F) in the mean atmospheric temperature. In other words, as the
models have improved, the predicted temperature rise has steadily decreased.
We know from geologic records, tree rings, and human records that the mean
temperature of the atmosphere has varied markedly during the past million
years. The most glaring aspect of the record is the series of glacial periods, at
least partially associated with the earth’s orbital characteristics, which last on average about ninety thousand years, with “interglacial” periods of about eleven
thousand years. A more recent feature of the record is the “little Ice Age,” which
lasted from the end of the fourteenth century until about 1850, when began a
gradual temperature rise that essentially ended in 1940. This period, which was
characterized by low agricultural productivity and frequent famines, may have
been due in part to reduced energy output by the sun; sunspot activity was abnormally low during much of the period of low temperature.
The rise in mean atmospheric temperature during this century is often cited
as evidence of the warming effect of CO2. Those who cite this “evidence” fail,
however, to mention that nearly all of the warming occurred before 1940, as the
earth recovered from the “little Ice Age.”
What of the most recent record? Atmospheric temperature measurements
are routinely made at airports, in urban areas, at sea, etc. They are also made by
balloon-borne radiosondes and (since 1978) by satellites. While the surface
measurements do show a small temperature rise (about 0.6° F since 1980), they
are contaminated by the so-called “urban heat island” effect. Urban areas and
airports have been emitting greater and greater amounts of heat energy as a result of growing human activity that has nothing to do with the greenhouse effect. Corrections applied to the surface data are unreliable, because a large
degree of estimation is involved.
Balloon-borne radiosonde and satellite measurements of the temperature of
the “free atmosphere” (i.e., at heights that would capture any heating caused by
CO2) are far more reliable. Although the records are characterized by a wild oscillation, one can compute a trend line using standard spreadsheet methods. The
observed temperature change decreases slightly with time for the balloon data
and is essentially zero for the satellite measurements. The National Academy of
Sciences has recognized the conflict between satellite and surface temperature
measurements as a major problem with no known explanation.
U.S. energy consumption in 2000 was more than 10 percent larger than in
1990. Thus a 7 percent decrease from 1990 consumption would really mean either a 15 to 20 percent drop below 2000 levels or a very substantial increase in tax
rates to purchase “credits” from Third World countries. Despite claims by treaty
proponents to the contrary, such a reduction in use would have severe economic
consequences, because of the strong dependence of our economy on energy.
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William Nordhaus of Yale University has calculated the cost to the world economy of “stabilizing” the climate to be $12.5 trillion (1989 dollars). Since the
United States consumes about 25 percent of the world’s fossil fuels, the cost to
this nation would be in excess of three trillion dollars, an enormous stress to
place on its economy. The national defense would also suffer, because of the
enormous fuel requirements for training the armed forces, not to mention those
for combat, as in Afghanistan. All this when there is no credible evidence for
global warming due to carbon dioxide emissions.

ROBERT C. WHITTEN

Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
Commander Whitten is a retired NASA research scientist who has performed extensive research in the atmospheres of the earth and other planets. He holds a Ph.D. in
physics from Duke University.

KRUPP CALIBERS

Sir:
Professor Frank Uhlig’s review of Richard Worth’s Fleets of World War II [Summer 2002, pp. 167–8] stated that the German 280 mm gun was not the 11.1
inches (283 mm = 11.14 inches) given by Mr. Worth. This is incorrect. All Krupp
guns of nominal 280 mm size were actually of 283 mm land-to-land bore diameter exactly (new gun), from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War II.
Krupp had two sorts of guns. In one group were internal designs with oddball
diameters usually given (for some reason) in texts as the nearest five or ten millimeters or so; the nineteenth-century Krupp “17 cm” gun was actually 174 mm,
for example. Even the Krupp “150 mm” guns had various actual diameters of
148–152 mm, depending on the date made and gun model. The other comprised
foreign-design/specified guns (many from treaty requirements), which were
made to exact sizes matching their book values. The World War II naval 20.3 cm
(eight-inch) and 380 mm (very close to fifteen-inch, 381 mm) guns are examples. However, there is no doubt about the Krupp “28 cm” guns all being 283
mm, since there are blueprints of the guns and projectiles available for all
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models, including guns of this size made by Krupp for other nations. They are all
the same diameter, though varying considerably in projectile length, weight, and
practically any other possible way.

NATHAN OKUN

Port Hueneme, California
Professor Uhlig replies:
My thanks to Mr. Okun for bringing to our attention this new information.
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THE WISDOM ON TERROR

Sam J. Tangredi

Captain Tangredi is currently a senior fellow at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the
U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Postgraduate School
and was also a federal executive fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University. He earned his Ph.D. in
international relations from the University of Southern
California. Among other assignments, he commanded
USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) and was head of the
Strategy and Concepts Branch, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations. He is author of All Possible Wars?
Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025 (NDU Press, 2000) and editor of
Globalization and Maritime Power (NDU Press, 2002).
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1

Harmon, Christopher C. Terrorism Today. Portland, Ore.:
Frank Cass, 2000. 316pp. $24.50
Pillar, Paul R. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001. 272pp. $26.95
Campbell, Kurt M., and Michèle A. Flournoy. To Prevail:
An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism.
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2001. 416pp. $18.95
Jacquard, Roland. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden:
Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood. Durham,
N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 2002. 293pp. $18.95
Henderson, Harry. Global Terrorism: The Complete Reference Guide. New York: Checkmark Books/Facts On File,
2001. 300pp. $16.95
Smith, James M., and William C. Thomas, eds. The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational
and Organizational Factors. Colorado Springs, Colo.: U.S.
Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2001.
284pp. (No price given) (available at www.usafa.af.mil/
inss/terrorism.htm).
Peters, Ralph. Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing
World. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2002. 353pp.
$22.95

The shock of the 11 September attacks prompted an immediate renewal of public interest in books on terrorism, a genre that attracted considerable attention
in the 1970s but had since maintained primarily an academic readership. Sales
of books on terrorist groups, Islamic fundamentalism, and American policies
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toward terrorism skyrocketed. Some are reissues, some are newly published
scholarly works, while others advocate specific policies to be followed. To understand the current wisdom on this topic requires an examination of all three
categories.
Christopher Harmon is currently on the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. His Terrorism Today was published two years prior to
“9/11,” yet it remains the best single volume on post–Cold War terrorism, because of its “straight ahead” style that leads the reader through the types, techniques, and objectives of various groups without an excess of academic jargon.
He approaches the subject with thoroughness and a distinct effort to reduce its
apparent complexity to simpler, actionable concepts. Harmon’s ultimate purpose is to inspire and assist counterterrorist planning by pointing out popular
misconceptions about terrorists’ motives rather than laying down a series of direct policy recommendations.
Particularly refreshing for an academic volume is Harmon’s underlying (but
not overwhelming) sense of moral indignation—a sense that strengthens the
book rather than makes it suspect. There is no “one man’s terrorist is another’s
freedom fighter” waffling for Harmon. He provides a simple, compelling definition: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.” The key words are, of
course, deliberate and systematic physical harm to innocents (civilians) as a strategy for war. In Harmon’s construct, terrorism remains an offense against humanity, requiring a combination of vigorous national policies, international
law, and global cooperation that holds no sympathy for pseudo-heroic gestures
by supposed leaders of the oppressed.
Paul Pillar’s Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy was published in January 2001,
making it slightly more current than Harmon’s book. It is less a history and more
a balanced recommendation for policy, which, unfortunately, means that the
book’s “balanced approach” appears to lack the necessary intensity of a “post–9/11”
world. However, Pillar’s contribution is to place terrorism into the overall context of foreign policy—our and theirs. His focus is on the state sponsorship that
is inevitably required for successful international terrorism—a position that differs greatly from the current interpretation that global terrorists are independent
of state support, operating solely from areas of complete lawlessness.
While admitting that weak states such as Afghanistan or Somalia might be
convenient bases for terrorist training and planning, Pillar maintains that it is
the actions of governments through covert financing, moral support, or tacit
agreements to ignore terrorist infrastructures (as long as they are not the targets) that determine the success or failure of terrorism. From this perspective,
the tolerance of terrorist groups by Greece, a Nato ally, is as disturbing as that of
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hostile regimes, although it has been somewhat mitigated by the recent arrest of
those identified as members of the revolutionary organization 17 November.
Pillar argues that terrorism is “a problem managed, never solved.” He believes
that constant, unwavering diplomatic and economic pressure on those nations
that are tolerant of terrorists, along with rewards for cooperating with the
United States, are the most important tools to stop terrorism. Pillar was formerly the chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, a fact that in itself provides
insight into why the U.S. government views policies toward Iraq and other rogue
states as primary elements in the war against terrorism.
To Prevail won the race among think-tank efforts as the first to publish
counterterrorism policy recommendations after “9/11.” A product of a task
force consisting of more than twenty-four scholars and analysts from the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the book figuratively, if not literally, was begun on 12 September 2001, reflecting the long-standing CSIS research program on emerging national security threats. Its speed of publication
and origin could be considered two strikes against the book were it not for the
editorial and organizational talent of its two principal authors, Kurt Campbell
and Michèle Flournoy, both former deputy assistant secretaries of defense. They
have crafted a balance between individual analyses of the varied tools of
counterterrorism, such as coalitions, military capabilities, intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance, with
region-by-region assessments of current terrorist threats and foreign government responses.
To Prevail approaches post–Cold War terrorism as a “new form” of threat in
which psychological effects are subordinate to actual violence—in other words,
killing is now just as important as creating fear in the target audience—and
state-sponsorship plays a less important role (in contrast to Paul Piller’s view).
As examined in the chapter “Globalization Goes to War,” the tools that have
made for a more open world (cheap air travel, the Internet, cell phones, personal
freedom, and the ubiquitous media) have also magnified both the capabilities
and effects of global terrorism. Like other elements of globalization, restrictions
on these tools would come at considerable cost. An effective response requires
that the U.S. government protect the gains of globalization at the same time it attempts to defend against terrorism. To balance openness with protection obviously requires great care; hence, To Prevail is the most directly prescriptive of the
books under review, with eighteen detailed recommendations for the president
and Congress.
Some of these recommendations run counter to conventional wisdom. For example, the book recommended that Congress not create a Department of Homeland
Security, arguing that such a major institutional change diverts attention from
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actual counterterrorism activities. Current organizational structures are seen as
sufficient, if increased coordination and oversight is applied by the White
House. Also recommended is the firm establishment of homeland security as
the primary (if not sole) mission of the National Guard, whose duties are currently split between domestic response and overseas warfighting. An intriguing
recommendation is the creation of a nonmilitary homeland security service
corps, leading to congressional examination of “the merits of mandatory national service given the challenges of a new age.” The book’s own orientation is
split between recommending immediate, decisive action against terrorists and
concern for long-range efforts to ameliorate the so-called “root causes” of terrorism. The focus on potential causes for terrorism (poverty, perceived exploitation, unequal benefits of globalization, etc.) and de-emphasis on the importance
of state sponsorship creates the most significant intellectual contrasts between
the CSIS effort and Harmon and Pillar’s works.
Roland Jacquard’s knowledge of terrorist activities, gained through researching and writing a dozen books on terrorism, is only exceeded by his incredible
timing. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden was originally published (in French)
the same week as the September attacks. The core of the book is a brief biography of bin Laden, focusing on his role as recruiter and transporter of fundamentalist Muslim fighters as mujahedeen in Afghanistan’s war with the Soviet
Union, and later as terrorists. The key ingredient bin Laden provided to those
with an irrevocable hatred of the West was great amounts of money—enough to
make suicide into an effective weapon.
Jacquard is director of the Paris-based International Observatory on Terrorism and has been a consultant to the United Nations Security Council. In April
2001, Jacquard was able briefly to interview bin Laden himself by phone. As is
clear from responses to Jacquard’s questions, bin Laden sees no reason to hide
his hatred for Jews and Christians (no matter what their nationality or politics)
or his desire to obtain nuclear and biological weapons. In detailing the thoughts
and attitudes of bin Laden’s recruits (particularly those al-Qa‘ida members with
European citizenship) the book makes evident the underlying sense of anarchy
and war-lust that permeates the bin Laden “brotherhood.” A completely Muslim
(and thereby peaceful) world may be their eventual, theoretical objective, but
killing a few non-Muslims (while possibly achieving martyrdom) is a fine goal
for now.
Jacquard’s text provides few new revelations for the “post–9/11” reader, but
its fascinating details certainly make al-Qa‘ida seem, in retrospect, a most
obvious global threat long before September 2001. In preparing the Englishlanguage edition, Duke University Press doubled the number of pages by adding
interview transcripts, copies of translated al-Qa‘ida documents (some had been
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smuggled out of Afghanistan to sympathizers in Europe), and other reports collected by the author. However, like the text, none of them is a revelation, but all
fascinate nevertheless. Jacquard points out that bin Laden’s so-called “will,” a
document that circulated in London and Beirut in October 2001, portrays an
enduring linkage between himself and Hassan ibn al-Sabbah, founder of the
eleventh-century Assassins. Whether or not bin Laden is dead, his goal is for the
myth of unstoppable Muslim terrorists to survive. The document grandly
warns, “After me, the world of infidels will never again live in peace.”
Portraying terrorists with their own words and documents is a key feature of
another well-timed publication, Henderson’s Global Terrorism. In it you will
find the Website addresses for such Internet-minded terrorist groups as Hamas.
Like most Facts On File books, this one is authoritative but not dull and lives up
to its objective to provide a one-stop reference of “how to research terror.” In addition to technical, well-referenced discussions of how to define terrorism and a
survey of existent terror groups, the book strongly focuses on legal issues, with a
chronology of counterterrorist laws and court cases. Demonstrative of this focus
is an appendix containing the text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, but the annotated bibliography would appeal to more than just
legal researchers. It is tough to find a more current initial starting point for any
research project on contemporary terrorism.
The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response began as a conference
sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (or INSS,
located at the Air Force Academy) in July 1998. The book was published in 2001
and is a compilation of ongoing research by thirteen participants rather than a
conference report per se, which allows some of the individual chapters to retain
considerable “post–9/11” relevance. Even though many of the contributors are
the usual suspects in the scholarly study of terrorism and others are spokesmen
for federal agencies extolling their counterterrorism efforts, there are several
controversial and contending conclusions that require examination.
For example, Bruce Hoffman, the long-standing “dean” of counterterrorism
and counterproliferation at RAND, argues that the U.S. interpretation of how to
deter terrorism is flawed. Qaddafi, he argues, did not stop sponsoring terrorist
activities after the EL DORADO CANYON strike on Libya, he simply moved to less
spectacular, less attributable acts. Even if such “traditional” retaliatory
counterstrikes are presumed to have worked in the past, they no longer retain
much validity against today’s global terrorists. Hoffman agrees with To Prevail
that post–Cold War terrorists differ greatly from their predecessors; they are
subject to neither rational deterrence nor evidence of counterproductive effects
on their putative goals. In fact, the need for preemption, which was in 1998
conceptually integrated into the Clinton administration’s counterproliferation
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policy (to which Hoffman, among others, contributed), is an undercurrent
throughout the many chapters of the book. This might indeed be a revelation to
those who view the current administration’s emphasis on developing preemption strategy as something entirely new. In the chapter by James J. Wirtz of the
Naval Postgraduate School, the link is made between counterterror and
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism, like weapons
of mass destruction, is viewed as an evolving asymmetric tool of forces too weak
to fight the U.S. military conventionally. Wirtz differs, however, from Hoffman
and others in his view that “traditional” military forces may indeed retain a considerable deterrent and responsive role.
The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response makes it clear that well
before “9/11” all the experts viewed al-Qa‘ida as a severe threat. However, no one
expected an attack so severe. Reviewing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
Hoffman wondered whether it was even possible to “topple the North Tower.”
Thus the book underscores its predictions on the unpredictability but exponentially increasing danger of the “new” global terrorism.
Stylistically, Beyond Terror is in a category of its own; reading it is a plunge
into a pool of fine literary imagery. In a fairer world, Ralph Peters would be recognized as one of the premiere essay writers in America today. He is that good.
His subject matter, however (defense strategy, military ethics, and the clash of
tribal warriors versus modern soldiers), deters the editors of most highbrow literary journals from admitting him into their pantheon. Peters applies a novelist’s skill (he has published nine) to his exposition of future threats the United
States may face. Of course, it is doubtful that Peters, a retired Army officer, unabashed American patriot, and iconoclastic realist who has actually seen some
of the world’s meaner backstreets, would feel terribly comfortable in a modern
literary temple. His writing has more the intensity of an Old Testament prophet
pointing out the pretentions of worldly kings.
Beyond Terror is a collection of eighteen essays that fully display Peters’s talents, many of which were previously published in Parameters, the Washington
Post, and elsewhere, although not assembled until after “9/11.” Those familiar
with his work know that Peters does not view post–Cold War terrorism as something new. It is simply a feature of the return of the savage-warrior—men from
decaying societies, unable to compete in a globalized world, who hold the fantasy of a glorious, imperial past and whose self-esteem is built on the power of
violence. In Peters’s construct, such men have more in common with criminal
gangs than soldiers—which is undoubtedly why many terrorist groups have no
qualms about financing their activities through drug and prostitute smuggling,
bank robbery, kidnapping, etc. Neither diplomatic negotiations nor efforts to
ameliorate “root causes” have much effect on current terrorists—although they
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26
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may help in stemming the tide of future recruits. To appeal to or appease the apparently intelligent and sophisticated leaders and sponsors of terrorism (or even
the less sophisticated foot soldiers) is a mistaken policy. Most of them have no
understanding or acceptance of the social norms of modern society. As Peters
puts it, “A cell phone held to the ear does not mean a modern mind is at work on
the other side of the eardrum.”
Peters advocates increased American knowledge of, involvement in, and
developmental assistance for the struggling nations of the world (with logical
priorities rather than open-ended assistance), along with unrelenting, remorseless destruction of the warrior-terrorists and their leaders. What is needed is neither policy nuances nor governmental reorganization but a willingness to fight
intelligently and over the long term in a brutal arena, with the difficult choices,
casualties, and inevitable collateral damage that it entails. This requires a sense
of humility and respect for non-Western cultures, along with steady pull on the
trigger when violence threatens. As Peters advises in his most suggestive essay,
“When Devils Walk the Earth,” we must be willing to “whenever legal conditions
permit, kill terrorists on the spot. . . . This is war, not law enforcement.”
How can one distill this current wisdom on terror? The most effective way is
to point out the differences. The volumes by Harmon, Pillar, Campbell and
Flournoy, and Smith and Thomas (USAF, INSS) all see a restructured post–Cold
War terrorist threat that, especially after “9/11,” requires new and dynamic policies by the U.S. government. All view homeland security as important, but Pillar
differs from Campbell and Flournoy and many of the contributors to the INSS
volume in his insistence that it is the domestic actions of foreign states that are
the keys to diminishing terrorism. Counterterrorism is therefore a critical element of our overall foreign policy, not a separate war.
Campbell and Flournoy advocate considerable homeland security efforts
(and a war against terrorist groups, rather than states) but see victory in ameliorating the “root causes” that induce sympathy for the putative goals of the terrorists. In contrast, Harmon and many of the INSS contributors see a more
direct course to victory through military and police action. Henderson’s reference guide seems to suggest that counterterrorism belongs almost exclusively
within the sphere of criminal justice. Jacquard and Peters, while potentially sympathetic to the need for a more just global environment, maintain that the “root
causes” of terrorism remain within the psyches of the terrorists themselves,
whose leaders are hardly poverty-stricken or oppressed. Fighting poverty may
be a just policy, but crushing the will of the terrorists by defeating, killing, or jailing them would prove even more effective.
Jacquard’s and Peters’s emphasis on the terrorist psyche has recently acquired its
own terminology. Writing in the August/September 2002 issue of Policy Review,
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Lee Harris proffers the term “fantasy ideology” to describe the motives of
al-Qa‘ida and similar groups. To these groups the United States is merely a stage
prop, and whether Americans are terrified or not, change policies or not, or even
solve the Palestinian issue is almost inconsequential. The point of their action is
how it makes them feel about themselves as glorious martyrs in a sort of Islamic
“dungeons and dragons” world where the will of God has no need for
cause-and-effect logic. Harris commends President George W. Bush for initially
using the term “evildoers” to describe the “9/11” hijackers, despite media howls
at the “lack of sophistication” that the reference to evil indicates. Jacquard and
Peters, like Harris, will admit that although al-Qa‘ida also sees their enemies as
“evil,” they are nevertheless themselves committed “doers” of things that are not
logical, effects-oriented, or even moral from their own religious standpoint. But
like the Columbine High School killers, their deeds transform them from outcasts into masters of their universes.
The use of “evildoers” can actually be a summary method to categorize the
books under review. Three texts logically support its use, three find it “less than
sophisticated” or “less than helpful,” and one is mixed on the subject. Such is, in
itself, an accurate breakdown of the differing strands of current American wisdom on terror.
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Francis G. Hoffman

Mahnken, Thomas C. Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2002. 176pp. $27.95

The significance of this slim book to today’s nascent military transformation is
entirely out of proportion to its size. Thomas Mahnken, professor of strategy at
the Naval War College, has produced a compact and highly relevant work of
scholarship that warrants attention from serious students of military innovation. Mahnken deftly corrects the orthodox view, expressed best by Stephen
Rosen, about the limited role of intelligence in spurring military adaptation.1
On the basis of extensive archival materials drawn from reports and correspondence of American military attachés and intelligence agencies, the author traces
how well U.S. military planners were informed about developments in Germany,
Great Britain, and Japan between the world wars. The implications that can be
drawn from this work are profound.
Sir Michael Howard once quipped that whatever vision of future warfare the
armed forces were focused on, whatever concepts or capabilities the military was
2
pursuing, he was sure it was going to turn out wrong. Given the ambiguity of the
future, however, he suggested the real trick is not to be too badly wrong and to
react quickly. As Mahnken unfolds the facts, it becomes evident that despite its
limited size and resources, American intelligence up to 1941 kept policy makers
informed about technological developments and emerging concepts being pursued overseas. With some exceptions, they did not get it too badly wrong.
Uncovering Ways of War examines nine examples of interwar innovation. Of
these nine historical examples, American intelligence provided advance warning in six. U.S. observers identified ongoing armor programs in Britain and Germany, as well as landing craft designs to support Japanese amphibious tactics.
Mahnken credits with partial success American efforts to discern Japanese surLieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman is a Marine Reserve
face warfare capabilities, although the full impact of
infantryman who graduated from the Naval War Colthe Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was missed. He also
lege in 1994. He recently served on the U.S. Commission
notes the imperfect recognition of German tactical
on National Security/21st Century and is now with
EDO Corporation at the Marine Corps Warfighting
aviation advances by Army Air Corps officers, who
Laboratory, Quantico, Virginia.
were blinkered by the orthodoxy of strategic bombing
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1
dogmatically asserted by airpower advocates on both
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sides of the Atlantic. Also overlooked by the U.S. intelligence arm were German
technological efforts in rocketry that led to the V-1 and V-2, and British radar
advances. Another genuine surprise was the massed air strikes perfected by Japanese naval aviation.
However, noticeably absent in this book are the German interwar submarine
developments, an area that the historian Holger Herwig once addressed in an es3
say, “Innovation Ignored.” That the U.S. Navy and its intelligence arm would ignore such an ungentlemanly tool is understandable. Naval planning efforts
focused on War Plan ORANGE and derived their energy from the belief that a war
against Japan would be decided in a Mahanian clash of battle lines somewhere in
the Pacific. The major debate was between battleships and carrier aviation. The
idea that the submarine could develop into a strategic weapon was overlooked,
since, in the words of Samuel Eliot Morison, “too many envisaged this war as a
4
succession of Jutlands, to be decided by big guns on battleships.” Inexplicably,
the lessons of World War I were ignored, and the United States was unprepared
5
both materially and technically to cope with the U-boat.
Having missed Germany’s hidden submarine program and offshore technical
developments from 1925 to the late 1930s, the Allies repurchased antisubmarine
6
warfare lessons in the North Atlantic at a dear cost. Germany unleashed its sea
wolves on Britain’s precarious oceanic umbilical cord to the New World and
found easy pickings. The U-boats enjoyed a brief “happy time,” sinking hapless
7
British merchant ships with very few losses of their own.
Fortunately, Germany had started the war with only thirty-seven U-boats and
could only maintain a few at sea at any one time. Admiral Karl Dönitz focused
his wolfpacks on sinking seven hundred thousand tons each month, a goal that
would cripple Britain’s economic and military situation and cause food and raw
material shortages. The effectiveness of the German effort was short-lived, however, as the Royal Navy dusted off its World War I lessons. In short order, convoys, escorts, and airborne surveillance dented the U-boat scourge. Radar,
direction finding, and sonar developments further complicated the lives of Germany’s U-boat crews.
When America entered the war, the Navy’s war planners and intelligence appeared to have been in a vacuum for nearly two years. Dönitz brought the war to
America’s very doorstep and took advantage of its lack of experience. In Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (roll of the drums), Dönitz urged his crews to strike “a
blow against the United States as sudden and as blaring as a beat on a kettledrum.” Although he even now had only ninety-one boats, the results were
remarkable. The U-boats called it a “second happy time,” as they sat outside
brightly lit U.S. ports along the East Coast waiting for fat and unprotected
U.S. tankers.
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The war’s first four months have been described as the U.S. Navy’s worst de8
feat, “an unparalleled massacre.” All told, about 2.5 million tons were sunk in
the Atlantic in the first half of 1942, at the cost of only eight U-boats. General
George Marshall wrote to Admiral Ernest J. King urging him to stem the hemorrhage: “Losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean
now threaten our entire war effort.” King’s own antisubmarine-warfare expert
told him bluntly in June 1942, “The Battle of the Atlantic is being lost.”
Ultimately, convoys, escorts, better intelligence, radar and sonar, and air patrols turned the tide. By May 1943, known as “Black May” to the German crews,
the Allies were winning the battle in the Atlantic. While some historians make
light of the impact of the U-boat, most concur with Morison’s assessment,
“There is no denying that the submarine was the greatest threat to Allied victory
9
over the Axis.” There is also no denying that U.S. intelligence and naval planners
failed to appreciate the threat or prepare for it.
It is not clear why Mahnken overlooked this case. As an example of surprise
and the clandestine development of asymmetric capabilities, the German
U-boat is highly relevant today. We live in an age where dual-use technologies
are burgeoning, where new combinations of asymmetric tactics and advanced
technologies are possible, and where unconventional approaches are the rule,
not the exception. In an age where we assume overwhelming military superiority, the motivation and potential for surprise are striking. “The tendency to concentrate on the familiar at the expense of the novel,” Mahnken keenly notes,
“carries with it the danger of mirror-imaging.” There is little doubt that mirror-imaging influenced naval planners in the interwar era. Thus, an understanding of the origins of this intelligence and planning failure is in order and should
10
be incorporated into the key lessons of Uncovering Ways of War.
The submarine example does not diminish the utility of Mahnken’s research
or conclusions; quite the contrary. The principal finding from this spare and
occasionally dry effort is not that intelligence is always clairvoyant. Instead, the
book suggests that there are certain times when U.S. intelligence is well suited to
identifying adversary innovations, indicators of when policy makers may want
to be more cautious. Mahnken’s careful research highlights that U.S. intelligence
entities have been inclined to monitor the development of established weapons
over new systems (battleships, aviation, armor over rocketry); more successful at
detecting combat-proven technology and doctrine than new ideas (armor, aviation, and Japanese landing craft vice radar); and better at identifying military
technologies and concepts in which the services were interested (armor and aviation over submarines).
These conclusions do not augur well for America’s interests. They suggest
that the future holds numerous other surprises for U.S. national security policy
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makers. If our intelligence agencies are inclined to monitor established weapons,
we could overlook many advances in robotics, information warfare, and biological systems. If our intelligence efforts focus solely on battle-proven technologies,
we could be rudely surprised when a long peace is quickly shattered and we find
that some adversary has beaten us to the punch in space. If American intelligence analysts remain solely interested in the concepts or dogmas du jour of
their own military, the United States could be overtaken by an enemy unencumbered by parochialism or complacency. If 11 September 2001 revealed anything,
it is the consequences of illusion and myopia. The author aptly observes in his
conclusion, “to be successful, the United States will have to resist the ever present
temptation of hubris.”
This is a wonderfully researched and compressed analytic history that belongs on the shelf of every serious student of the U.S. military. Mahnken has extended his growing reputation for timely and strategically relevant research. Any
senior policy maker contemplating the transformation of the U.S. military in the
midst of a rapidly changing world should read this book closely. It is important
not to be too wrong at the start.
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Donald Chisholm

Terry, Addison. The Battle for Pusan: A Korean War Memoir.
Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 2000. 233pp. $19.57
Roe, Patrick C. The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean
War, June–December 1950. Novato, Calif.: Presidio. 2000.
466pp. $34.95
Edwards, Paul M. To Acknowledge a War: The Korean War in
American Memory. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000.
176pp. $69.95

Mathew Ridgway apparently originated the sobriquet “forgotten war” in his
1967 book The Korean War, a parable intended to instruct about Vietnam. It was
an apt label, for not only was the Korean War undeclared, it followed in the long
shadow of national weariness from World War II, involving only a fraction of the
number who fought in that war. The U.S. population and economy were never
fully mobilized to support American efforts in Korea, and the ambiguous conclusion to the conflict was less than satisfying to a nation that historically prefers
black-and-white beginnings and endings in armed conflicts.
Although forgetting Korea might be entirely understandable, apart from
honoring the memory of Americans who fought and died there, other sound
reasons suggest that it is well to study its lessons. The Korean War was the first
war prosecuted against a communist opponent. It was the first American land
war on the Asian continent. It was the first war to be prosecuted under the aegis
of the United Nations, and it constituted the opening armed aggression in the
Cold War by the Soviet Union and its sometime Chinese ally.
Wars (and Korea is no different) typically generate a wide range of accounts
written for an equally broad variety of reasons. These accounts tend to appear in
waves over time. First come the journalistic reports
Donald Chisholm is professor of Joint Military Operawritten and published during the actual conflict,
tions at the Naval War College. He is the author of
Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and Developalong with “instant” histories produced by military
ment of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System,
public affairs officers. These in turn are followed by
1793–1941, which received the Rear Admiral Samuel
the first-person narratives, oral histories, and biograEliot Morison Award for 2001. He is presently at work
on a book on the planning and execution of the amphibphies of pivotal figures, along with the official, popular,
ious operations of the Korean War.
and professional histories. Inasmuch as history tends to
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1
reflect the values and concerns of the society and era
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during which it is written (as opposed to the era about which it is written), different emphases and interpretations also emerge with the passage of time.
Thus with the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War’s onset, the concomitant
aging of its veterans, heightened interest in reunification of the Korean Peninsula,
availability of formerly classified U.S. documents, and the opening of Soviet and
Communist Chinese files has come a surge of new accounts of that conflict.
As Samuel Eliot Morison observed nearly four decades ago, “Personal narratives of wars by statesmen, generals, and admirals are fairly numerous; but accounts by private soldiers and ordinary seamen are exceedingly rare, although of
high value to historians and great interest to general readers.”* We are fortunate
indeed to have such an account from Addison Terry, who was a second lieutenant of field artillery in the 7th Infantry Division when he suddenly found himself in Korea in early July 1950 as a forward artillery observer in the 25th
Division’s 27th Regimental Combat Team in the Pusan perimeter—until August,
when he was wounded and evacuated. Terry penned his memoir while convalescing. He put the manuscript aside, only to discover it forty-seven years later
while going through old files in the family barn. Except for minor editing and
some new introductory material, Terry’s account remains as fresh and immediate as it did when he was an observant twenty-three-year-old junior officer.
Terry’s tale evokes what must be the near-universal experiences of the infantryman at the pointy end of the spear in a hard-fought conflict—periods of
quiet punctuated by relatively short violent episodes and tactical movement;
great effort simply to effect the basic requirements of existence, such as eating,
sleeping, and sanitation; exposure to the extremes of the elements; and very little
sense of the larger context within which orders are being received and executed.
The depth and breadth of perspective inevitably truncate, while release is found
in small pleasures like canned peaches in the rations or a shave with hot water.
The Battle for Pusan is the bookend to Joseph Owens’s memoir of his experiences from Inchon to Chosin as a 7th Marines weapons platoon lieutenant (like
Terry, Owens was wounded), and James Brady’s similar account in The Coldest
War of his own experiences as a young Marine officer in Korea. Terry’s work also
compares favorably to Robert Leckie’s record of life as Marine rifleman on
Guadalcanal, Eugene Sledge’s With the Old Breed, and James Fahey’s chronicle,
Pacific War Diary, 1942–1945, of a seaman’s experience in a World War II light
cruiser. As such, the book is entertaining for the general reader and tremendously instructive for the junior officer who would like a better understanding
of what real combat feels like.

* Samuel Eliot Morison, foreword to James J. Fahey, Pacific War Diary, 1942–1945 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1963), p. ix.
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Patrick Roe’s experience began as a young intelligence officer in the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, a position that offered him a broader view of the conflict than
most other junior officers (Terry, for example) were afforded. Like Terry’s work,
The Dragon Strikes constitutes an attempt to make sense of the events in which
Roe was caught up, particularly during the months of October through December 1950. Rather than a memoir, however, Roe has produced a remarkably well
written and insightful historical analysis of the role the Chinese played in Korea,
simultaneously tempered and given texture and passion by his own experience.
In this, he surpasses Russell Spurr’s earlier work on the same subject in Enter the
Dragon (Newmarket Press, 1998). Relying on a mixture of primary documentary sources and published works, The Dragon Strikes provides a cogent, penetrating, and nuanced analysis of the key actors, their beliefs and motivations,
and the events that led to China’s participation in the war, and the particular
means by which it actually intervened.
Such analyses of our opponents are undertaken but rarely, in part because of
the understandable desire to tell the story from our perspective, and in part because of the difficulty of accessing reliable information about their perspective—
language differences render the task difficult; defeated foes are either dead or
only selectively cooperative at best (the post–World War II U.S. Navy technical
mission to Japan commented, for example, that the officials it interrogated remembered only what they chose to remember), entirely uncooperative at worst;
and key documents rarely survive (the Japanese destroyed many of their plans
and orders for their final defense of the Philippines). Unvanquished foes such as
the Chinese, of course, need not be accessible at all, particularly since they remain active opponents.
However, if somehow Roe’s book had become available just after the war, it
would have done much to improve our practical understanding of our foe.
Nonetheless, we should be grateful to have it now. Roe describes the events that
led to the Chinese intervention in Korea, particularly the role the Soviets played
in that decision, and the internal dynamics among the top Chinese leadership
with respect to the intervention and prosecution of the war. Remarkably, Roe’s
analysis reveals that the Chinese developed and executed brilliant plans while simultaneously committing stupendous blunders based on a gross misreading
and underestimation of American resolve and military capabilities, which derived apparently from the extreme insularity of their leadership, from Mao on
down. At the same time, Roe provides a fast-paced narrative of the military operations in the mountains of North Korea, which he effectively integrates with
his account of upper-level Chinese decision making. This is a unique book, well
worth reading.
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Now for the book To Acknowledge a War. Author of two previous annotated
bibliographies on the Korean War, Paul Edwards has this time penned a work
that is neither history, historiography, nor annotated bibliography. Although
containing pieces of each, this ambitious tome attempts to understand the specific ways in which Americans remember the Korean War, or perhaps more
properly, as Edwards contends, fail to acknowledge the war, if not completely
forget it. Edwards believes this American attitude has prevented an effective understanding of the war, clouding American national security decision making.
He makes specific statements about the particular ways in which given aspects
of the Korean War (such as the air war) are described and analyzed, along with
assertions about how wars in general are remembered. He concludes that substantively, the Korean War provided a “useful, even pragmatic model, one that
was eventually used in the Persian Gulf War. The Korean War was fought with
conventional (not nuclear) weapons, a limited war in terms of both anticipated
success and deployment, and of a primary (and primarily political) goal.”
Edwards’s perspective is an interesting one with much promise, but this relatively short book (a monograph really) remains better in the contemplation
than in the execution. It attempts to cover too many aspects of the Korean War in
too few pages. Perhaps Edwards could not decide what the book was to be about.
Given its broad goals, this reviewer was puzzled by the substantial attention the
book tenders to certain subjects of lesser importance—for example, Lieutenant
Eugene Clark’s reconnaissance of Inchon Harbor prior to the landing—while it
says little of the combat readiness of American occupation troops in Japan. This
book would have benefited from a sharper focus on no more than a couple of
themes. If, as Edwards avers in his introduction, the Korean War was a “major
factor in establishing the modern concept of the limited war,” he would have
been well served to pursue this premise systematically and thoroughly, along
with one or two others, and omit other lines of exposition.
With further passage of time our willingness to address and analyze the Korean War and its lessons for present and future national policy should only improve. Ironically, because the passage of time also means that those who fought
in the war will soon be gone, our ability to perform that analysis will be increasingly constrained. These three volumes, Patrick Roe’s especially, have added
measurably to our understanding.
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Douglas Kinnard

D’Este, Carlo. Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life. New York: Henry
Holt, 2002. 848pp. $35

Dwight D. Eisenhower, affectionately known as Ike, was in the center of major
world events for two decades in the mid-twentieth century. As a soldier in World
War II, he commanded the Allied armies that defeated the Axis powers in the
Mediterranean and Europe, and in the following decade he served two terms as a
very popular president. With this long and interesting volume that ends on VE
Day, 8 May 1945, Carlo D’Este, a military historian, joins a distinguished list of
Eisenhower biographers that includes Stephen Ambrose, Peter Lyon, grandson
David Eisenhower, and, most recently, Geoffrey Perret.
“I come from the very heart of America,” Eisenhower said in his famous
Guildhall address in London 12 June 1945, celebrating the Allied victory over
Germany. The heart of America was Abilene, Kansas, where he grew up and from
which he left for West Point on a June day in 1911. D’Este covers in detail Eisenhower’s early years in Abilene as one of six brothers brought up by parents David
and Ida in an atmosphere of religion, discipline, and love. Though poor and
from “the wrong side of the tracks,” the Eisenhowers lived comfortably. An average student and considered something of a roughneck, Dwight Eisenhower enjoyed sports, camping, and hunting.
Accepting Stephen Ambrose’s misperception of Ike’s father David as unsuccessful, D’Este goes one step farther: late in the book he calls David “an abject
failure,” implying that Ike’s extraordinary creativity and ingenuity appeared ex
nihilo. In fact, David Eisenhower’s work as a dairy mechanic required creativity
and ingenuity, and he, as well as Ida, considerably inDouglas Kinnard, a West Point graduate, served in
combat in World War II, Korea, and twice in Vietnam,
fluenced each of their sons’ development.
the second time as a brigadier general. Retiring in 1970
Far from a paradigm in dress gray, Cadet Eisento pursue an academic career, he received his Ph.D. from
hower ended up with a disciplinary ranking of 125th
Princeton University, then joined the political science
faculty at the University of Vermont. Since becoming
out of 164 members of his class. In academics he did
emeritus he has taught at a number of universities,
better, although by his own admission he was a “lazy
including the Naval War College. The author of numerstudent.” What really motivated Ike was athletics, and
ous books, his most recent is Eisenhower: SoldierStatesman of the American Century, published 2002
in this, as well as in other areas, he displayed a real talby Brassey’s.
ent at stimulating cooperation among others. D’Este
develops all these characteristics of young Eisenhower
Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1
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and expands on them, introducing a theme important in understanding the future General of the Army: “For all his gregariousness, Eisenhower was a solitary
man. When not showing off the side of his personality he wanted the world to
see, Eisenhower found solace by himself, often on the steep banks overlooking
the Hudson River.” Ike graduated with the West Point class of 1915, which would
one day become the most famous in the school’s history, producing fifty-nine
generals—“the class the stars fell on.”
That autumn the Great War, which had started in 1914, was hopelessly deadlocked on the western front. The United States was very much at peace, though,
when Second Lieutenant Dwight D. Eisenhower took up his duties at Fort Sam
Houston, Texas. On his first tour as officer of the guard he was introduced to
eighteen-year-old Mamie Doud, who was wintering there from Denver with her
parents. Intrigued, Ike began a pursuit that culminated in their marriage the following summer. Beginning here, and continuing throughout the book, D’Este’s
treatment of Mamie is very detailed and effective in providing a greater understanding of Dwight Eisenhower the man and the soldier.
When the United States entered the war in the spring of 1917, Ike, like all career officers, hoped to get into combat, but that was not to be. Eventually, he
commanded a tank training center near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and although
he did well, he was depressed, feeling that he had missed the greatest war in history. D’Este covers the period in a straightforward way, concluding, “For all his
success as a trainer and troop commander, Eisenhower’s future remained
clouded as the United States approached the decade of the Roaring Twenties,
during which its armed forces all but vanished.” It was this time, however, that
brought Ike into contact with three generals—Fox Conner, Douglas MacArthur,
and George Marshall—who were to influence his future profoundly.
Assigned in 1919 to Camp Meade, Maryland, then home of the Tank Corps,
Eisenhower met George Patton. (D’Este published the definitive biography on
Patton in 1995 and never lets us forget him throughout this book.) Patton, in
turn, introduced him to Brigadier General Fox Conner, a military intellectual
and formerly General John J. Pershing’s chief of plans and operations in the
American Expeditionary Force. Conner was impressed with Eisenhower and a
couple of years later arranged for his assignment to Panama, where Conner
commanded a brigade. He became a father figure and mentor to Ike, insisting
that he commit himself to a study of military history, which they would then discuss in detail. In a chapter on this period, titled “The Man Who Made Eisenhower,” D’Este really makes Ike come alive—warts and all. Conner’s influence
did not end with Ike’s return to the United States; rather, he arranged for his
protégé to attend the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26

168

War College: Winter 2003 Full Issue

REVIEW ESSAYS

165

It was there that Eisenhower first stood out from his contemporaries. The indifferent student of West Point days graduated first in his class at the Army’s most
competitive school.
In the fall of 1929 Eisenhower was assigned to the War Department, where he
initially worked on problems of mobilization and procurement should the
United States become involved in another war. About a year after Ike’s arrival
Douglas MacArthur became Army chief of staff. Soon coming into contact with
Major Eisenhower, he was impressed enough to have Eisenhower assigned to his
office as a personal assistant. This relationship was complex and at times turbulent. It continued throughout the 1930s, both in Washington, D.C., and, from
late 1935, in the Philippines, where the now retired MacArthur was military
adviser to the first Philippine president, Manuel Quezon. D’Este analyzes well
the complexities of the relationship of these two strong-willed men, a relationship that had a major impact on Ike’s future career. The author summarizes,
“Despite their diverse personalities, Eisenhower was capable of separating MacArthur’s virtues from his shortcomings and making the most of them . . . and
was smart enough to realize how much he had to learn from MacArthur.”
When World War II broke out in Europe in September 1939, Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower could not wait to be assigned to troop duty. Despite pleas from
MacArthur and Quezon to remain, he headed for Fort Lewis, Washington, in
late 1939. With the Army just commencing a great expansion, Eisenhower experienced several different assignments with troop units for the next year and a
half, as well as a promotion to full colonel. By the summer of 1941 he was chief of
staff to Lieutenant General Walter Kreuger, who commanded the Third Army,
which was about to begin the famous Louisiana Maneuvers. No maneuver has
ever been covered by more correspondents, and Ike was a great hit with the
press—far out of proportion to his role. As D’Este sums it up: “Staff officers do
not provide leadership, nor do they command. . . . However improbable the reasons, Eisenhower’s performance was recognized by those who counted.” The reporters liked this approachable colonel who could explain in clear terms what
was happening. Chief of Staff George Marshall made a point of meeting Ike
when the maneuver ended. Two days later Eisenhower was promoted to brigadier general, and five days after Pearl Harbor he was transferred to Marshall’s office in the War Department.
In the second half of this long volume the author covers Eisenhower’s spectacular rise from Marshall’s plans officer to commander of American forces in
Britain, and in that same year of 1942 to the command of Allied forces in the
Mediterranean. Subsequently, his selection as supreme commander of the Allied
invasion of Northern Europe (Operation OVERLORD) projected Eisenhower
onto the world scene. In this section D’Este’s coverage of the man who was to
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lead the greatest invasion in the annals of military history is absorbing and at
times provocative, as well as refreshingly demythologizing.
Though the American navy had won a historic battle against Japan at Midway
in June 1942, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November (Operation
TORCH) was the first American combat against German forces. It was a time of
learning both for the forces and the Allied commander, whose problems embraced the political, strategic, logistical, and operational dimensions of warfare.
At the political level Eisenhower’s problem was to balance the requirements
of the alliance with British, French, and American self-interest. As D’Este puts it:
“The reality was that, like it or not, Eisenhower was both a military commander
and a politician in the swamp of intrigue in North Africa.” At the strategic level
the major failure was in not securing Tunisia until May 1943. For this D’Este correctly places the blame not on Eisenhower but on the higher leadership of the
American military: “Responsibility for not securing Tunisia in 1942 rested not
with Eisenhower but with Marshall and Ernie King, whose insistence on invading Casablanca traded the strategic advantage of landings in eastern Algeria for
the security of Gibraltar.”
At the operational level, the battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943 is usually cited as the nadir of the American forces’ performance in North Africa. As
World War II combat went, the battle was minor, but it was a baptism of fire
against the Germans for American forces and Eisenhower. The author’s judgment of Ike at Kasserine (“his performance was miserable”) is perhaps warranted, particularly in Ike’s toleration of his ground commander, Major General
Lloyd Fredendall, who had been foisted on him by Marshall.
The war in North Africa ended on 13 May after Eisenhower’s forces linked up
with Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s British Eighth Army, resulting
in the surrender of over a quarter of a million German troops. Eisenhower faced
many frustrations during TORCH, such as having to make political decisions on
matters beyond his control, confronting logistical problems on a major scale,
and above all, dealing with the inexperience of American troops. This was not
the end of the problems he would face in the Mediterranean; in fact, just ahead
lay Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily. Space does not permit commentary
on that operation, but readers will find D’Este’s three chapters on HUSKY and
the early Italian campaign that followed to be both graphic and perceptive in
their assessments of both British and American commanders. D’Este’s judgment
of Eisenhower’s performance is unsparing.
During the Mediterranean campaigns Eisenhower was on a learning curve,
but in this reviewer’s opinion he performed as well as anyone could have, given
the circumstances. In any case, for Ike, a consummate if reluctant staff man
throughout his earlier career, Mediterranean operations were a professional
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Rubicon. On 7 December President Franklin D. Roosevelt, en route home from
the Teheran Conference, met Eisenhower in Tunis. Sitting down next to him in a
sedan, the president said, “Well, Ike, you are going to command OVERLORD.” This
appointment as supreme Allied commander of the 1944 invasion of Europe was to
make Eisenhower one of the most famous Americans of the twentieth century.
The final third of the book is concerned with Ike’s service as supreme commander. To stay within the confines of a review, I will restrict my comments to
certain problems of coalition warfare that D’Este stresses. During the period of
preparation for D day Churchill attempted unsuccessfully to thwart the tendivision Allied landing in southern France (ANVIL) scheduled for 15 August. His
goal was to divert the forces to the Italian front for eventual employment in a
thrust toward Vienna. D’Este develops this matter in detail and inter alia makes
two significant points—that the issue was really a clash of wills between Roosevelt and Churchill, with Eisenhower caught in the middle; and that Eisenhower,
who in the end prevailed, had his own agenda—to ensure that OVERLORD did
not lose emphasis to operations in Italy, a secondary theater.
The two chapters leading up to D day and on the day itself are superb. The invasion was surely the most complex and masterful military operation ever conducted. D’Este creates a sense of the great pressure Ike felt in making the final
decision to invade on 6 June after a one-day delay because of a gale in the English
Channel. Pondering, he finally turned to his Allied commanders and said, “OK,
we’ll go.” Ike’s great crusade had begun.
In his discussion of the great race across France in August 1944, followed by
the fall campaigns leading up to the Battle of the Bulge, D’Este is discerning in
analyzing British-American divergences. These were no longer muted, as they
had been over ANVIL, and now the British point man was Field Marshall Montgomery rather than Churchill. The principal strategic issue was the broad-front
strategy desired by Eisenhower versus the narrow-front thrust across northern
Germany favored by Montgomery. A collateral issue woven in by the author was
that of personality problems between Eisenhower and Montgomery, and between Montgomery and General Omar Bradley, commander of the Twelfth
Army Group. The picture D’Este paints of Bradley makes him look less like the
self-effacing country boy who made good and more like a territorial bureaucrat
who nurtured grudges, particularly when placed under Montgomery’s command during the Bulge. It should be stressed, however, that whatever the importance of personalities, the basic issues between the British and Americans were
clashes of legitimate national interests.
On the broad-front versus narrow-front issue, D’Este draws a reasonable
conclusion: “Not only was it politically impossible to have permitted the British
to run the war by means of a narrow front, but there is ample evidence to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
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question if such a drive could have been sustained beyond the Ruhr.” Parenthetically, Ike in a sense called Montgomery’s bluff on this question when he approved MARKET GARDEN, the airborne operation to seize Arnhem in September
1944, thus opening the gates for a narrow thrust to Berlin. It was “a bridge too
far,” resulting in ten thousand casualties and the destruction of the British 1st
Airborne Division, proving that the Germans were far from beaten or vulnerable to a thrust across their northern flank.
In the final phase of the war, the winter-spring offensive of 1945, D’Este emphasizes the Soviet issue, in particular the question of who would capture Berlin.
This became yet another British-American controversy. Eisenhower felt that the
decision arrived at earlier at Yalta to divide Germany into occupation zones
made the Allied capture of Berlin irrelevant, considering the potential American
casualties. Why not let the Russians do it? Churchill protested that an Allied failure to take Berlin would “raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future.” In
his analysis the author comes down on the side of Eisenhower’s decision to halt
at the Elbe, then adds that the “resulting bloodbath of Allied casualties would
have all but ruined Eisenhower’s reputation”—a secondary reason at best, compared to avoiding unnecessary casualties to Allied forces. In future years the
Berlin issue was to plague Eisenhower, being raised as late as his 1952 presidential campaign.
The book concludes on 7 May 1945, at Supreme Headquarters in Reims,
France, with the signing of the German instrument of surrender. After tiring of
his staff ’s efforts to write a grandiloquent message to the Combined Chiefs officially informing them of the surrender, General of the Army Eisenhower quickly
wrote one himself: “The mission of this allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local
time, May 7, 1945.” It was typical Ike.
D’Este’s objectives were to introduce Eisenhower to new generations of
Americans “who know too little of this remarkable man” and to provide a fuller
understanding of the man himself. He succeeds admirably on both counts with
this engrossing, thoroughly researched, well written, and provocative partial biography. D’Este has done perhaps the best work to date, giving the reader a feel
for the inner Eisenhower, well concealed behind that infectious grin. In the process the author also does an excellent job fleshing out the powerful figures with
whom Eisenhower interacted, including MacArthur, Marshall, Roosevelt, Churchill, and a host of American and British military leaders. Readers, even those already familiar with the subject, will find the book compulsive reading—but
should not plan on doing it in one evening. In sum, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life is
by any standard first-rate and confirms D’Este as among the best of American
military historians.
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A NEW DISORDER
Newhouse, John, ed. Assessing the Threats. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2002.
119pp. $20

It is no cliché to argue that the terrorist
attack that befell the United States in
September 2001 was a climacteric event,
a watershed in the post–Cold War world.
Henceforth, all analyses of American national security policy will demarcate
events as having occurred either before
or after the horrendous events of that
day.
While some issues like national missile
defense, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism predated “9/11,” others arose out
of the rubble of the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon: the threat of sophisticated global terror networks dedicated to
the perpetration of violence against the
United States and its interests; the imminent danger of weapons of mass destruction (especially in the hands of rogue
states or in those of international terrorists like al-Qa‘ida); and the profound,
ongoing debate among America’s national security elites over the pursuit of a
multilateralist foreign policy or one underwritten by unilateralism.
In Assessing the Threats, each of these issues is addressed with varying degrees of
emphasis by a group of international
scholars. The book was conceived as an
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effort to examine threats to security and
stability cross-nationally. The quality of
the research conducted by each of the
contributors, and the timeliness of their
inquiries make this work a valuable resource
for readers of the Naval War College Review.
John Newhouse is an experienced strategic
policy analyst who is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information,
under the auspices of which the present
work was undertaken.
Newhouse plants himself firmly in the
multilateralist camp, in an article with
the same title as the book: “Nothing less
than sustained multilateralism will enable
major powers to neutralize the interactive problems of terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction.” In another salient
observation, Newhouse contends that
“Russia’s warning system against submarine missile attack, designed around a
new generation of satellites, is still inoperable.” In this assertion, Newhouse has
confirmed that Russia has no credible
defense from fleet ballistic missile submarines of the Trident II type, armed
with D-5 missiles.
Such asymmetries between the strategic
and financial capabilities of the United
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States and Russia are confirmed by
Alexei Arbatov, the veteran Russian analyst of American institutions and foreign policy. In his “Russian Security
and the Western Connection,” Arbatov
describes the destabilizing effect the
American abrogation of the ABM
Treaty would have upon Russia’s conventional forces. They would be degraded to the point where they would
be “hardly sufficient for even one local
contingency and several peacekeeping
operations.” Like Newhouse, Arbatov is
particularly critical of the present
American foreign policy, arguing that
the “quality and wisdom” of its design
is no longer commensurate with the financial and military power of the
United States.

current perceived U.S. penchant for a
triumphalist unilateralism, Delpech
would echo Aeschylus in Prometheus
Bound and envelop or constrain Pax
Americana with the bonds of
multilateralism.
I was struck by the book’s lack of a
comprehensive introduction or concluding chapter to sum up and assess
the future in a meaningful way. Instead,
the reader is left with several conclusions, which detracts from a sense of
cohesion about the book’s contents.
Nevertheless, each individual contribution has something of value to offer,
and taken in that context, each is significant to our understanding of the power
calculus at work today.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Similarly, Ivan Safranchuk has presented an equally fascinating tour
d’horizon in his analysis of “An Array of
Threats to Russia.” Safranchuk effectively entombs the Cold War with the
argument that today Russia’s primary
strategic posture is defensive. This
point is demonstrated by his assertion
of Russian action. Surrounded by
pariah regimes such as exist in Iraq and
Iran and possessing the potential for
deploying weapons of mass destruction,
Russia, Safranchuk argues, now accepts
penetration of its Central Asian and
Caucasus borderlands by the United
States. This is a theme worth exploring.
Thérèse Delpech’s query with reference
to “A Safe and Secure Europe?” echoes
British foreign secretary Douglas
Hurd’s contrapuntal prediction of a decade ago of “a new disorder,” against
former President Bush’s proclamation
of a “New World Order.” Delpech portrays the “9/11” attacks as events
“which gave asymmetric warfare a horrific shape.” In order to “tame” the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/26

Defense Contract Management Agency, Dayton

O’Hanlon, Michael E. Defense Policy Choices
for the Bush Administration. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 244pp. $18.95

O’Hanlon presents his blueprint for
how U.S. resources should be spent
based on thorough strategic and military assessments. He recommends that
the Bush administration set priorities
and make the difficult choices. However, the terrorist attacks of “9/11” and
the completion of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have
changed fiscal conditions and defense
strategy.
O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in foreign
policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of numerous
books and articles on U.S. defense strategy, with special emphasis on defense
budgets and military technology. His
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comprehensive analysis and extensive
footnotes not only demonstrate his
deep knowledge of the subject but also
reinforce the complexity of strategic
and force planning decisions.
The book addresses “two major theaters
for war,” defense strategy, military
readiness and modernization, overseas
troop commitments, homeland defense,
national missile defense, offensive nuclear forces, and U.S. force planning
implications if the United States assists
Taiwan in defeating a hypothetical Chinese blockade. Each chapter describes
and assesses the strategic environment,
then offers comprehensive suggestions
for modifying the 2001–2005 resource
allocations.
A central theme throughout this work
is that the defense budget is unlikely to
make substantial gains and that the
Bush administration must balance
competing defense requirements. Even
with the large plus-up in the fiscal year
2002 defense budget, the military is still
fiscally constrained due to the demands
of the “procurement holiday” (the period after the Reagan administration’s
massive military buildup in which adequate funds were not provided to modernize existing weapons—without the
constant increase of new modern weapons, the need to replace old equipment
is exacerbated) and the war on terrorism. Overall, O’Hanlon believes in buying more existing weapons than
developing expensive next-generation
weapons. The author states that the
1997 QDR’s plan for modernization is
excessive. Rather than rush to transform most weapons, O’Hanlon recommends taking a patient, balanced
approach, such as buying less advanced
hardware for the large, main weapon
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systems while “aggressively modernizing electronics, munitions, sensors, and
communications systems,” giving a
higher priority to research and development and joint experimentation. For
example, he recommends that the Navy
cancel its variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter, purchase the 1997 QDRproposed quantity of F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, and procure additional F/A18C/Ds to meet fighter aircraft force
structure requirements. O’Hanlon estimates this mixture of planes would
“save more than $5 billion over the next
decade.” Using the same philosophy,
O’Hanlon suggests that the Air Force
reduce the procurement quantity of
Joint Strike Fighters from 1,700 to five
hundred and purchase 1,200 more F-16
aircraft. The savings from these changes
could fund new technologies to make
the military more deployable and
lighter, as well as “small numbers of
next-generation major weaponry as ‘silver bullet’ forces.”
In another chapter, O’Hanlon recommends reducing the operational tempo
by dropping overseas troop commitments, stating that a service member is
“away from home at least 15–20% of
the time,” due mostly to deployments
and training. According to the author,
250,000 service members are either
based or deployed overseas. O’Hanlon
advocates maintaining a U.S. presence
in regions with key strategic interests
and scaling back in other regions. For
example, the number of Marines on
Okinawa should be reduced from
eighteen thousand to approximately
five thousand, because the deployment is
“not militarily or strategically essential—
and . . . is on balance harmful to the
U.S.-Japanese alliance.” As a substitute
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for personnel, he recommends positioning additional equipment on the
island in case of a regional crisis. Secondly, O’Hanlon proposes that the
Navy take another look at its full-time
presence in the Mediterranean. He believes that “NATO’s southern flank and
Israel’s western flank no longer constitute strategic vulnerabilities in the
post–Cold War era.” If a threat no longer exists, eliminate carrier deployments that are carried out only to
reassure allies and give “psychological
comfort.” Reducing unnecessary deployments, shifting bases closer to contested regions, and rotating crews to the
ship instead of returning the ship to
port will decrease the operational
tempo of the sailors, eliminate the need
for two carriers, and generate savings.
The recommendations made in this
work in early 2001 could have given the
Bush administration some policy options and provided alternatives for the
2001 QDR. However, many of
O’Hanlon’s arguments have been overtaken by world events. Nevertheless,
O’Hanlon’s exhaustive research and insightful analysis make this an interesting book for readers of strategy and
force-planning decision making.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI

Lieutenant Colonel
Naval War College

Khalilzad, Zalmay, et al. The United States and
Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001. 260pp.
$20

The United States and Asia presents a
cogent analysis of U.S. strategic planning in Asia, sweeping from Japan to
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Pakistan. The study’s specific focus is
development of policy options and recommendations, looking out at an approximate twenty-year horizon into the
future, especially analyzing and noting
implications for Air Force planning. A
result of Project AIR FORCE’S work on
future asian security, this book was prepared by a team of RAND specialists,
with the help of senior U.S. Air Force
leadership, and with editorial comment
by U.S. foreign policy officials. It benefits from the strengths of the team approach without the flaws of design by
committee. It succinctly presents the
thoughts and findings of the research
group in clear, thought-provoking
prose and figures.
The brief introduction stresses the need
to prevent latent rivalries in Asia from
upsetting the twenty years of relative
peace between 1980 and 2000. The
challenge for the United States is to develop policies that will continue to promote a stable Asia compatible with U.S.
interests—in short, to succeed in a
quest for “dynamic peace.”
The scene is set with a discussion of the
range of international trends and problems in Asia, including possible Korean
unification, the U.S.-Japan relationship,
China’s emerging profile, India’s ambitions, Pakistan’s difficulties, Russia’s future, disputes in the South China Sea,
stresses on Indonesia, and Vietnam’s
significance. Although necessarily a
whirlwind tour and not for country
specialists, these are short, basically fair
synopses. Additionally, the book includes four longer appendices by area
specialists that add considerable detail
to the earlier descriptions of changing
political-military environments in
Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia,
and South Asia.
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Although the book discusses terrorism
and Islamic fundamentalism, the events
of the past year argue for more analysis
of these topics in any strategic discussion, especially as they relate to South,
Central, and Southeast Asia.
In the strategy section, key U.S. objectives in Asia are defined as continued
economic, political, and military access,
and the prevention of the rise of a regional power or coalition that would
prevent access to the region. Discussed
strategic options for achieving these objectives include strengthening U.S. hegemony, forming a “condominium”
with one of Asia’s major powers, acting
as a “balance” in a multipolar regional
power system, creating a comprehensive collective security system, and U.S.
disengagement. Each approach discussed is discarded as either too
expensive, too fraught with domestic
problems, too subordinate, or too ineffectual historically. The study then recommends a strategic approach that is
flexible and pragmatic, involving elements of most of these strategic options. Bilateral relationships should
push toward multilateralization, creating a larger core partnership including
the United States, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and perhaps Singapore, the
Philippines, and Thailand. At the same
time it advocates a balance-of-power
strategy among the rising powers of
China, India, and Russia that will prevent these states from either threatening each other or “bandwagoning” to
undercut U.S. interests. It encourages
promotion of a security dialog among
all the states of Asia and encourages
others to enter the U.S.-led multilateral
framework. It suggests maintaining flexible relations with as many countries as
possible to support the formation of ad
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hoc coalitions to deal with emerging regional problems. The study goes on to
outline more than a dozen ways this
strategy could be adapted to implement
U.S. policies in Asia.
In the military section, observations are
made about U.S. force structure in Asia,
with some suggestions for reconfiguring
military presence given anticipated
changes in the Asian environment. The
study predicts that North Korea may
not require that all U.S. military forces
leave South Korea if and when Korea
unifies, so it suggests the option of
maintaining one of the two main operating air bases in Korea. The study also
recommends expanding base facilities
on Guam. Beyond that, it recommends
making arrangements to use existing
bases in Asia, both U.S. and foreign,
through diplomatic means. In this way,
the United States would remain neither
overcommitted nor undercommitted.
This section is enhanced by the inclusion of a series of schematic maps and
tables that identify and assess U.S. air
bases in Asia. The maps are especially
useful in assessing U.S. Air Force capabilities for crisis response in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
An important recommendation is made
to improve the U.S. Unified Command
Plan either by including Pakistan under
the Pacific Command, as India is, or by
establishing a coordinating committee
for daily communication.
Concluding military recommendations
are for buildup of Guam as a major hub
for U.S. power projection in Asia, cooperation of the U.S. Air Force and the
Navy to maximize joint leverage, and
review of the Air Force future force
structure, looking toward longer-range
combat platforms, including heavy
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bombers, arsenal planes, and longrange, high-speed strike craft.
Concluding strategic recommendations
include maintaining open lines of communication with as many parties in
Asia as possible, maintaining U.S.
transparency so that U.S. objectives are
clearly understood, and expanding the
net of U.S. security partners.
This RAND outline of a comprehensive, realistic, flexible U.S. strategy in
Asia, with appropriate military reconfiguration, is an important contribution
to our search for continued stability in
this part of the world.
GRANT F. RHODE

Brookline, Massachusetts

Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The
Case for Invading Iraq. New York: Random
House, 2002. 384pp. $25.95

The United States and its allies once
more stand on the brink of war with
Iraq. What makes this war different,
however, is that its primary goal is to
replace the dictatorial regime of
Saddam Hussein with a democratic
form of government. In the opinion of
the Bush administration, removal of
Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction will bring stability to the Middle East and the world. While there is
consensus to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons, there is disagreement among the experts as to how to
accomplish it. Kenneth Pollack is a specialist on Iraq whose experience as an
analyst for the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security
Council gives him a unique vantage
point from which to comment on U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East. In
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The Threatening Storm, Pollack posits
that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the
only logical means to end Saddam’s regime. This argument results from a
thorough discussion of the rise of the
current regime and of Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors and the West,
followed by a painstaking analysis of
the several options available.
In the case of Iraq, says Pollack, our vital national interest, as well as that of
the entire world, clearly lies in the economic stability of the region based on
ability to export crude oil without interference. Following the Gulf War of
1990–91, the United Nations implemented a number of measures to contain Iraqi ambitions. A short time later,
teams of weapons experts entered the
country to locate and destroy chemical
and biological weapons stockpiles and
production facilities. In 1998 Iraq threw
out the inspection teams, and for the
past four years, notes Pollack, the Iraqis
have allegedly been reacquiring chemical and biological weapons and have
reenergized their research programs to
develop nuclear weapons. Some world
leaders and strategists have proposed
five options for dealing with what they
claim is a clear and present danger to
their vital national interest in the Persian Gulf. These options are containment, deterrence, covert action, the
“Afghan” approach, and invasion.
Containment has been the policy since
the end of the Gulf War. Originally, it
had two key components: weapons inspections and economic sanctions.
With the eviction of the weapons inspectors, economic sanctions became
the sole functioning component of the
policy. The oil-for-food program and
smuggling, as well as reluctance on the
part of some allies, notably France and
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Russia, to abide by the terms of the
United Nations resolutions have served
to undermine the sanctions effort. Consequently, Saddam has been able to
acquire continuing funding for his
weapons of mass destruction programs.
Pollack maintains, therefore, that neither reimplementation of sanctions nor
unilateral imposition of sanctions by
the United States will work, because
they either do not have meaningful support from the international community
or will place the United States in conflict with its allies. In addition, sanctions would not be the most effective
way of quickly overthrowing Saddam’s
regime.
If the United States accepts the view
that Iraq should occupy a lower priority
in American policy, says Pollack, it
must choose a policy of deterrence. Pollack explains that deterrence relies on
the threat of American military action
against Iraq to ensure regional stability,
which assumes that the one deterred is
concerned about the consequences of
continuing to act uncooperatively. In
Saddam’s case, that is not a part of his
psychological profile. Pollack, therefore, rules out deterrence as a viable option, because it would leave Saddam
“free to acquire nuclear weapons” and
would be a hope against the odds that
American use of power would be sufficient to keep him in his pen. This scenario, says Pollack, is very risky and
very dangerous.
The United States has tried covert actions before with little success. Covert
actions, such as assassinations and
coups, are extremely complicated operations, and the risk of failure is high.
However, short of actually removing
Saddam from power, covert actions can
set the stage in terms of intelligence
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gathering, communications, and liaison
work for a successful change in government. However, this approach, though
useful, would also not meet the stated
objective of quickly overthrowing
Saddam’s regime.
The fourth option, the “Afghan approach,” limits the use of force to special operations troops and precision
aerial bombing. In addition, there is the
issue of using opposition forces to
accomplish the overthrow and reestablishment of government. Unfortunately,
Iraq’s opposition forces are much
weaker than, and not as well organized
as, those in Afghanistan. This option
too represents a lengthy engagement
without guarantee of success.
Each of these four options has loopholes that could leave Saddam Hussein
in power. Pollack believes that the only
real solution is an invasion of Iraq by
conventional ground and air forces.
Pollack argues his case well, going beyond the vituperative pronouncements
of the administration to link operational objectives to national strategy,
but he does not spend much time on
the reconstruction of the country,
which is, after all, the reason for invasion in the first place. He does make
two noteworthy points, however: the
removal of Saddam would allow for
withdrawal of most of U.S. forces in the
Persian Gulf region; and second, with
its wealth in oil, Iraq can pay for its
own reconstruction. Naturally, there
are advantages and disadvantages to
each option, and critics abound, but for
Pollack the question is “not whether
[we invade], but when.”
Public opinion polls may show general
support for a war in Iraq, but many
people remain doubtful of the need for
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war or for U.S. involvement. Though
this book is out to sell a policy option,
Pollack’s detailed analyses provide
readers with an excellent basis for understanding the situation in the Middle
East.
PRESTON C. RODRIGUE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers,
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. New York:
Free Press, 2002. 288pp. $25

This is an extraordinarily timely work,
published when the United States may
be about to conduct large-scale combat
operations in the Middle East. It examines the relationship in a democracy between military and political leadership,
“or more precisely, . . . the tension between two kinds of leadership, civil and
military,” especially in time of war.
Two themes run implicitly throughout
the book. First, war is about more than
purely military considerations (Clausewitzians, rejoice!), and consequently
“war statesmanship . . . focuses at the
apex of government an array of considerations and calculations that even
those one rung down could not fully
fathom.” The resultant differing imperatives at each level explain much of the
inherent tension between civilian and
military leaders over strategy.
Second, the essence of successful wartime leadership depends crucially on
the civilian leadership’s receiving constant, reliable “truth” from its military
commanders. The hierarchical military
structure militates against delivery of
harsh facts or unpleasant news; as per
Winston Churchill, “the whole habit of
mind of a military staff is based on
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subordination of opinion.” Hence the
importance of civilian leaders constantly
asking questions, forcing military leaders
to lay bare their assumptions and explain their reasoning, because nothing
else will force the harsh but vital intellectual debate about whether military
plans actually will achieve the desired
strategic ends. Military expertise is not
decisive here; as David Ben-Gurion
noted, “In military matters, as in all
other matters of substance, experts
knowledgeable in technique don’t decide, even though their advice and
guidance is vital; rather an open mind
and a common sense are essential. And
these qualities are possessed—to a
greater or lesser degree— by any normal man.”
Citing Samuel Huntington’s classic The
Soldier and the State, Cohen describes
the “normal” theory of civil-military
relations, “which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian
control of the military is that which
maximizes professionalism by isolating
soldiers from politics, and giving them
as free a hand as possible in military
matters.” This idea is widely and often
unquestioningly accepted by serving
military officers, reinforced by the apparent lessons of Vietnam, when such
tenets were held to be violated, in contrast with the successes of DESERT
STORM, when the military was ostensibly properly left alone to win the war.
Indeed, for civilians to “ask too many
questions (let alone give orders) about
tactics, particular pieces of hardware,
the design of a campaign, measures of
success, or to press too closely for the
promotion or dismissal of anything
other than the most senior officers is
meddling and interference, which is inappropriate and downright dangerous.”
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Cohen suggests that this is simply
wrong. “The difficulty is that the great
war statesmen do just those improper
things—and, what is more, it is because
they do so that they succeed.” He tests
his thesis using case studies of four
great and successful war leaders—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau,
Churchill, and Ben-Gurion. Each man
led a different kind of democracy under
extraordinarily difficult circumstances,
“meddled” greatly in military and strategic affairs, was subject to and driven
by the normal pressures and constraints
in his respective state, confronted great
changes in the ways and means of conducting warfare, and had difficult relationships with his senior military
leaders.
In none of these cases was there a fundamental doubt about the subordination of military leaders to civilian
control. However, the acceptance of the
legitimacy of that control coexisted,
and still coexists, with “a deep undercurrent of mutual mistrust,” based on
major differences in outlook, experience, temperament, and culture. Such
differences are exacerbated in wartime,
because unlike other professions such
as law and medicine, a military leader
rarely has actual war-making experience at senior levels, so in a sense he is
no less a “novice in making the great
decisions of war” than his civilian
counterparts. Thus, while “for a politician to dictate military action is almost
always folly,” as Churchill noted, “it is
always right to probe.” That is the common element in these cases—each
leader insisted on close and frequent
contact with his senior military officers,
often to their discomfiture and resentment. Lincoln wrote probing letters to
his generals and “exercised a constant
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oversight of the war effort from beginning to end.” Clemenceau, to the dismay of the French high command,
insisted on frequent firsthand visits to
the front lines to observe the performance of senior military leaders and
review the selection of generals down to
division command. Churchill’s queries
and interventions were legion.
Cohen notes that the United States has,
for the past four decades, essentially
“waged war according to the ‘normal’
theory of civil-military relations,”
whereby politicians “refrain from engaging in the kind of active, harassing,
interventionist probing of the military
leaders about military matters” that
characterized his four great leaders,
contrary to the received (but wrong)
wisdom in the U.S. military. In consequence, “loose assumptions, unasked
questions, and thin analysis” led to catastrophic failure in Vietnam.
More recently, the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, by making the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs the president’s chief military adviser, serves to separate further
the civilian and military leadership
realms. One of the baleful consequences
of “letting the military do their jobs,”
essentially independently of the political leadership once the shooting started,
was the premature end to DESERT
STORM, in which the military was chiefly
responsible for two critical decisions—
General Colin Powell recommended an
early end to the fighting, and General
Norman Schwarzkopf made concessions at Safwan that allowed Saddam
Hussein to survive internal revolts that
might have ended his regime. Missing
in both decisions was clear civilian
control of events. There is little indication of civilian leadership asking the
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necessary probing questions and providing key guidance.
These issues are especially salient now,
as the United States contemplates undertaking military operations that
would have profound strategic and political implications, and when indications of significant differences exist
between civilian and military leaders
concerning strategy and objectives, be it
against terrorism or militant Islam.
Eliot Cohen is professor of strategic
studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. A prolific author on strategy, he
has served on the Office of the Secretary
of Defense policy planning staff and is
currently a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising the secretary of defense. Supreme Command is a must read
for the highest civilian and military
leadership and should also rank high on
military professional reading lists.
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Bacevich, Andrew J., and Eliot A. Cohen, eds.
War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global
Age. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001.
223pp. $22.50

During the 1999 Nato-U.S. war against
Serbia over Kosovo, an unprecedented
number of strategic and defense thinkers published their opinions on what
became known as Operation ALLIED
FORCE. Most thought and comment at
the time was extremely critical of the
Clinton administration’s efforts to formulate and execute the operation.
Critics bemoaned a warfighting policy
that appeared pointed in the direction
of a new Vietnam, focusing on gradual
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escalation of air strikes without the
threat of ground forces. In the end, the
Nato coalition forces appeared victorious but weighted with the indefinite
mission of peacekeeping in that troubled and violent province. The leader of
the Serbian effort, Slobodan Milosevic,
ended up on trial for war crimes at the
Hague. The leader of the Nato-U.S.
armed forces, General Wesley Clarke,
left his post shortly after the victory under circumstances that looked at the
time like a relief for cause. In late summer 2002, Nato soldiers continued their
frustrating mission of keeping ethnically divided Kosovars from killing each
other—welcome to “Victory,” post–
Cold War style. While such behavior
and commentary seem unusual, the real
issue is this: does the 1999 Kosovo
“war” provide a signpost for future
conflicts in the early twenty-first century, or is that conflict an aberration
best relegated to discussions among
armchair warriors comfortably fortified
with vintage brandy?
In their book War over Kosovo, Bacevich, Cohen, and their contributors
make compelling arguments that the
Kosovo War is a signpost, a cautionary
tale of the extent and limits of post–
Cold War superpower politics. Besides
the articles by the editors, the contributions are by William Arkin, James
Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Alberto Coll, and
Michael Vickers.
Readers should note well that this is a
book with an attitude. Its articles, uniformly excellent and insightful, accept,
even embrace, controversy. Given the
nature of the war, such a position for
the book should seem normal.
William Arkin’s lead article, summarizing the history of the conflict, should
become the standard for historians and
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strategists seeking to understand the
war in some form less than book size.
Arkin advises readers not to be deceived
by appearances or Powerpoint briefings
on just what decided victory for the
Nato allies. The article certainly should
replace the disingenuous official
Kosovo report by the secretary of defense used in the curriculum of the
Naval War College and other service
schools.
However, the Arkin piece is only the
appetizer. There is insufficient room to
highlight all the fine articles in this review, but two struck this reviewer between the eyes. In the first, Anatol
Lieven warns American “hawks” not to
believe Kosovo is a model for future
wars but that the conflict “will persuade
. . . adversaries to confront the West indirectly, using nonstate actors.” This
was written before 11 September 2002.
Lieven points out that the chaotic, decentralized, and violent nature of likely
future conflict environments, including
Afghanistan, can negate the hightechnology advantages of the West,
forcing the fighting down to earth on
conditions more to the liking of the enemy. Reading Lieven, and then watching General Tommy Franks tell U.S.
troops in Afghanistan that the war will
be a long one, made this reviewer’s
hands cold and sweaty. In the second
article, Andrew Bacevich conducts a revisionist tour de force describing the
evolution of the Clausewitzian “remarkable trinity” as it applies to the
United States, focusing especially on the
latest changes effected by the Clinton
administration and first demonstrated
in Kosovo. At the risk of simplification,
Bacevich would have the current trinity
composed of a globally involved government able to use a professional, not
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conscript, armed force wherever it
wants in face of an uninterested public—
as long as the conflict is quick and
bloodless. Whether or not one agrees
with Bacevich’s premise and findings,
the power and flow of the author’s conceptualization is truly impressive.
This is a necessary book for those who
teach and practice national security.
The writing and thinking are deep and
compelling. One must congratulate the
editors for their selections. One also
must hope that defense decision makers, as well as students who will form
the next generation of leadership, will
read and pay serious attention to the
works in this book.
JON CZARNECKI

Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program

Locher, James R., III. Victory on the Potomac.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002.
507pp. $34.95

Jim Locher describes the history of the
intense bureaucratic struggle to redesign relationships between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, secretary of defense, the president, and Congress. The prolonged
struggle culminated in the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986. This document is
thought by many to be the most sweeping military reform of the last forty
years. Senators Barry Goldwater and
Sam Nunn believed the system was broken and consequently was providing
low-quality military advice to the
secretary of defense. Others, particularly the service chiefs and the secretary
of defense, strongly disagreed with this
assessment. Victory on the Potomac
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represents a dramatic, detailed, and
sometimes entertaining description of
the prolonged hardball political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting between those for and those against
reform. Locher colorfully describes the
tactics and personalities of the key figures involved in the debate. He begins
with the long and difficult history of efforts made during the Harry Truman
and Dwight Eisenhower era to reform the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to strengthen the
role of its chairman. Locher then focuses on Senator Goldwater, Senator
Nunn, Representative Ike Skelton, Representative Bill Nichols, and key staffs’
detailed strategy for reform. Their efforts led to bitter confrontations with
senior military and civilian leaders who
held the view that proposed legislation
would cripple the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s
influence. Of particular interest is Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s total
opposition to the legislative proposals
and his tactics to outflank the legislators and, indeed, at times to outflank
his own boss, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Locher also describes
the particular difficulties for senior military officers favoring reform. Individuals like Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.,
exhibited the utmost delicacy in balancing personal beliefs with the Pentagon’s
antireform stand.
Although the book emphasizes the
Goldwater-Nichols struggle, it is a textbook on the complexities and strategies
of bureaucratic politics fought for high
stakes between the legislative and executive branches. Emotion, parochialism,
and legitimate beliefs conflict and, at
times, become highly personal. Students of government politics will find
that the book adds generously to insights on the dynamics of gaining
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support for, or fighting against, significant legislative proposals. Readers with
serious interest in national security policy formulation will benefit from the
detailed examination of how arguments
are developed, coalitions are constructed, and past history (such as Lebanon and Grenada) is marshaled to
support either side of a debate. Those
who favored reform will marvel at the
persistence and political skill of the advocates. Those opposed will, no doubt,
regard many of the described political
tactics as unfair and perhaps unethical.
In an excellent epilogue, Locher reiterates the original purposes for the legislation and uses them to evaluate the
present success of the GoldwaterNichols Act provisions. His analysis has
balance and notes that the behaviorial
changes sought have not been fully realized, but he does conclude that the legislation “made significant and positive
contributions in improving the quality
of military advice.” Locher observes
that this judgment is shared by principal customers of the Joint Staff and by
senior Joint Staff practitioners. Those
who believe that significant improvement has resulted include former
secretary of defense Dick Cheney,
Colin Powell, and General John M.
Shalikashvilli. In a separate book of his
own, Admiral Crowe, the first chairman
under Goldwater-Nichols, noted that
the increased authority of the chairman
was a significant benefit and not overly
contested by the heads of service. Increasing the authority of the regional
commanders was thought to add much
to their capability for fulfilling warfighting roles. General Powell added
that the Joint Staff had “improved so
dramatically [that] it had become the
premier military staff in the world.”
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The epilogue also examines disappointments, including the observation that
“the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its
needs for Joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.”
Locher is a graduate of West Point and
the Harvard Business School. He was a
leading Goldwater-Nichols strategist on
the staff of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. He is the authority on
the detailed political pulls and tugs that
brought Goldwater-Nichols into existence. While Locher strives for a balanced analysis, his commitment to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and his own
key role in that process result in a more
detailed examination of the proponents’
view while giving less detail to the arguments of the opponents. Some of the
opponents he classifies as excessively parochial, while others are characterized as
ignoring obvious system flaws.
Goldwater-Nichols has had an unquestioned major effect on the Joint Staff
process and on officer education. It is
and will be for many years, the subject
of intensive debate and analysis.
Locher’s book will be an important reference in this debate (and in turn, his
article “Has It Worked? The GoldwaterNichols Reorganization Act,” in the
Autumn 2001 issue of this journal, is a
good introduction to it). I strongly recommend that anyone interested or involved in the national security process
read this book. It describes democracy
at work and just how hard that process
can be.
WILLIAM TURCOTTE

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
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Shachtman, Tom. Terrors and Marvels: How Science and Technology Changed the Character and
Outcome of World War II. New York: William
Morrow, 2002. 360pp. $26.95

Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the
influence of science and technology on
World War II needs less “gee whiz” and
more John McPhee. As in the war itself,
the author’s strategic decisions are critical to the book’s successes and failures.
The successes can be quickly acknowledged. The book is well written.
Shachtman shows a good familiarity
with the oral histories and memoirs of
the most prominent scientists. He is interesting when identifying personalities
and providing biographical material to
enliven the narrative. He also correctly
treats most of the significant scientifictechnical developments of the war: the
exploitation of the electromagnetic
spectrum for command and control,
navigation, and target acquisition;
guidance systems for such ordnance as
acoustic torpedoes and proximity-fused
shells; nuclear weapons; signals intelligence; jet propulsion; and chemical and
biological warfare.
Now I’ll drop the other cyclotron. Terrors and Marvels does too little with too
much, and it suffers from Shachtman’s
attempt to be international and chronological. Except for the fact that somehow the Allies “did better science” than
the Axis (all those refugees from Nazism certainly helped), the author offers
little explanation of how all these Allied
wonder weapons, crypto dominance,
and radar-sonar devices came about. If
Shachtman had written separate chapters on his prize weapons, one would be
far the wiser about the scientific and
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political dimensions of technological
innovation. He is blissfully ignorant of
a decade of writing about the process of
military-technical innovation in the
twentieth century. The book has no
compelling theme or interpretive core.
Although this reviewer usually grimaces
when graduate students invoke such deities as Thomas S. Kuhn and Michel
Foucault, this book would have benefited from more theoretical structure.
Terrors and Marvels might also have
profited from more attention to innovations that did not involve the gallant
struggles of Nobel laureates in physics
and chemistry to convince knownothing politicians and generals to
adopt their latest schemes to win the war.
Storytelling conquers all. From the perspective of military logisticians and
commanders, innovations in food processing, materials research, automotive
engineering, computer technology, synthetics, and chemical explosives were
war winners too. Schachtman gives
them all short shrift. His discussion on
preventive medicine and the treatment
of combat trauma wounds is particularly limited, given the rich multivolume official histories of the U.S.
armed forces medical establishments in
World War II.
Part of Schachtman’s difficulty is that
he really does not know much about
World War II, apparently alternating
carelessly between the books of Martin
Gilbert and Richard Overy—who, of
course, are blameless for his series of
gaffes. A few samples should suffice:
Ishii Shiro’s final rank was lieutenant
general, not major (p. 318); Iwo Jima
was prized as a fighter base and emergency landing site, not a B-29 base
(p. 298); Japanese troops did not land on
Bataan in December 1941, and they did
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not seize “American garrisons at Shanghai and Tientsin,” since the 4th Marines
and 15th Infantry had already departed
(p. 166); the 17 August 1943 Eighth Air
Force raid on “Schweinefurt” [sic] was
made by 230 B-17s, not 376, and German flak accounted for only six bombers
from the 1st Bombardment Wing, which
lost thirty B-17s to German fighters. In
fact, the entire first paragraph of chapter
7 is riddled with fiction. The sparse
account of Allied military medicine ignores a central fact and accomplishment—wounded survival rates were
important but not as important as the
number of American wounded who
returned to a duty status of some sort.
The number of wounded combatants
who lived to fight another day is dramatized in the story of Company E,
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
immortalized in word and videotape by
historian Stephen Ambrose. Another
slip is Shachtman’s sketchy account of
the role of operations research and
analysis mathematics; it ignores a massive literature on operations research in
air warfare, logistics, and antisubmarine
warfare—a literature that Shachtman
apparently does not know.
In sum, a single volume on the influence of scientific and technological innovation on World War II would be
welcome. Terrors and Marvels is not
that book.
ALLAN R. MILLETT

Ohio State University

Norris, Robert S. Racing for the Bomb: General
Leslie Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man. South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press,
2002. 722pp. $40
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Today, when a major weapons system
commonly takes decades or more to develop, it is hard to imagine that the
greatest weapon system of them all, the
Manhattan Project, took just three
years from start to detonation over Japan. Those three years were the stuff of
high technical and engineering drama:
vast new industrial facilities were constructed in secret across the United
States, two billion dollars were spent
without congressional oversight, new
scientific laboratories were secluded in
the high desert, and a unique U.S.
Army Air Forces B-29 unit was created.
All this took place under the direct
command of Major General Leslie
Groves, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
whose management style set a norm for
large systems-development programs
that persists today.
In the popular recollection of the
Manhattan Project, the physicists Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo
Szilard, Edward Teller, and the Los
Alamos Laboratory dominate. They are
attractive figures who have remained in
the public eye. Yet Groves, never a popular or sympathetic personality, was the
man who put it all together. As such, he
is worthy of serious attention.
Robert Norris, research associate with
the Natural Resources Defense Council
and scholar of nuclear issues, has written a long-overdue biography of General Groves. While the central theme of
this work is Groves’s leadership of the
Manhattan Project, Norris does a thorough job of integrating into the story
his formative years, family, Army career
prior to the project, and postwar role in
establishing a national policy for atomic
weapons.
The sheer audacity and scope of the
Manhattan Project remain impressive
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today. Based on theory and some critical experiments at the University of
Chicago in the late 1930s and bolstered
by a letter from Albert Einstein to President Franklin Roosevelt, the United
States in 1942 committed itself to building an atomic bomb.
Groves, who had had a distinguished
career as an Army engineer and had
been the overseer of the building of the
Pentagon, was selected to head the
Manhattan Project in August 1942.
Within just a few months, Groves
brought together some of the best engineering officers in the Army, initiated
vast land acquisitions for several large
industrial operations for the purpose of
isotope separation, established the basic
technical compartmentalization policies
that shaped the entire project, and
brought into the program a number of
prominent industrial corporations to
build and run the plants. As the project
grew, Groves fought for and won the
highest priority for critical materials
within the government’s wartime allocation scheme, cornered the world market for uranium ore, set up the Los
Alamos Laboratory, and appointed
Oppenheimer as director.
Groves was a technically shrewd and
aggressive man with complete confidence in his own judgment and willingness to take enormous technical and
industrial risks with untried processes.
His most remarkable talent was the
ability to oversee and pursue alternative
technical development lines until one
or another was proven successful. In
two important cases he made such
high-risk decisions—isotope separation
and bomb design.
Separation of uranium isotopes on an
industrial scale was a critical step in the
bomb manufacture. At the time, there
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seemed to be three competing methods:
gaseous diffusion, thermal separation,
and electromagnetic separation. Each
method had its advocates and its virtues. None was proven. While the scientific community dithered over the
best technical method, Groves charged
in and, with real managerial brass, initiated simultaneous and parallel development of all three separation methods,
making the largest bet on the gaseousdiffusion method at Oak Ridge.
As the engineering worked out, using
the partially enriched product from the
thermal and the electromagnetic separation processes as feedstock for gaseous diffusion gave accelerated results,
and the enriched uranium was ready on
time for the bomb.
Initially, there were two quite different
design approaches to building the
bomb. The most obvious was the gun
assembly technique, in which two
subcritical masses of enriched uranium
were explosively driven and held together until nuclear fission began and
was sustained. This design became the
“Little Boy” bomb that was dropped on
Hiroshima in the world’s first atomic
attack.
However, theory held that the use of
plutonium would produce a far more
efficient means of nuclear detonation.
Plutonium is an artificial element, bred
in a uranium-fueled reactor that is
formed into a hollow sphere and
implosively crushed with high explosives until a nuclear detonation occurs.
This proved to be a demanding technical problem requiring massive industrial sites for plutonium production at
Hanford, Washington, and nearly all
the talent at Los Alamos to calculate
and form the sphere and the surrounding high explosives.
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Again, Groves made the call, and both
avenues were followed, at great cost,
until the TRINITY test at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, proved the plutonium
implosion, which was used in the “Fat
Man” bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians have devoted nearly as much energy
to debating who made the decision to
use the bomb as was released in the
atomic explosions. Norris goes into this
in some detail, looking specifically at
Groves’s role in decision making. He
concludes that, as is commonly the case
with large weapons development projects in wartime, the momentum of the
project drove the outcome. The bomb
was ready, an invasion of Japan looked
to be murderously costly, momentum
carried the day, and the bomb was
dropped on Japan.
Norris’s book is a fine complement to
Richard Rhodes’s The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (1986), in which Rhodes
covers the physics of the bomb. Both
books chronicle events that changed the
world.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE

Joint Warfare Analysis Center

Wright, Patrick. Tank: The Progress of a Monstrous War Machine. New York: Viking Penguin,
2002. 499pp. $29.95

The tank constitutes perhaps the most
readily identifiable symbol of land warfare. From its initial appearance during
World War I to the final stage of the
Gulf War, its considerable impact on
the outcome of some of last century’s
most significant wars is not in doubt.
Whether battles were fought on the
plains of Eastern Europe or in the deserts
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of the Middle East, the opponent that
made better use of the tank generally
emerged victorious. In the early
twenty-first century, the tank remains
the dominant instrument of land warfare. Indeed, the fact that the world’s
most powerful armies—including those
of the United States, Germany, Israel,
Russia, and China—continue to organize their ground forces around the
tank strongly suggests that its preeminent position is unlikely to be challenged any time soon.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the tank has
been the focus of a substantial amount
of literature. Most studies of the tank fit
into at least one of three basic categories: describing the tank’s actual part in
a particular war, analyzing its operational role in a particular army, or assessing the general theory behind
armored warfare. Studies that address
the tank’s past across time and space—
indeed, that go beyond the narrow confines of the battlefield itself—are rather
rare. This paucity of studies is apparently what spurred Patrick Wright, a
professor of modern cultural studies in
Great Britain, to produce this accessible, if flawed, history of the tank in the
twentieth century.
Wright adopts a chronological approach to his subject. He begins with
the first tentative use of the tank by the
British on the western front during the
First World War. He reasonably implies
that the tank had a certain shock value
on the battlefield but that it did not
contribute in any meaningful way to
Germany’s eventual defeat. The tank really came into its own during the interwar period. One of the best chapters in
this book traces the evolving military
philosophies of the major European armies during this era, especially the
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German and Russian preference for
maneuver warfare, with the tank as a
central component of the “combined
arms” team. World War II, he agrees,
demonstrated just how dominant the
tank could be on the mechanized battlefield, most astonishingly in the hands
of the Germans on both the Western
and Eastern Fronts and, later, in the
hands of the Soviets as they drove into
Central Europe.
The tank continued to be a “winning
weapon” in the postwar world too, as
Wright acknowledges in his discussion
of the Israeli experience with armored
warfare in the Arab-Israeli wars from
the 1956 Sinai campaign through the
1967 Six-Day War, to the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. Among the most stimulating material in the book is Wright’s description of Major General Israel Tal’s
philosophy of armored warfare, which
resulted in the design and construction
of the innovative Merkava tank. Tal, of
course, is the Jewish state’s most highly
regarded armored warfare specialist.
Wright also traces the tank’s part in the
Gulf War and muses about its potential
utility in an age of “digital” combat. All
in all, Wright manages to convey a
sense of the tank’s contribution to war
in the twentieth century.
Yet this book still suffers from a curiously unbalanced presentation. While it
is surely legitimate for the author to
write a history of the tank that goes beyond its successes and failures on the
battlefield—one that delves into the
tank’s broader cultural relevance—
Wright appears to have forgotten that
its primary influence has always been
on the battlefield itself. Thus, on the
one hand, undeniably major tank battles, like those that occurred at Kursk
during the Second World War and in
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the Sinai during the Yom Kippur War,
are examined in a cursory fashion. On
the other hand, undeniably minor episodes in the tank’s past, like the defacement of a memorial to Soviet troops in
postcommunist Czechoslovakia, are the
recipients of lavish coverage (relatively
speaking). Wright may favor cultural
over military affairs, but this sort of
bias should not serve as a license to
present a skewed picture of history.
Furthermore, the author writes from a
left-wing perspective, which he is honest enough to admit frankly. Such a
perspective is not inherently objectionable; however, when it leads to dubious
judgments about what to incorporate as
part of the tank’s history, it becomes a
problem. Thus he includes a long digression that probes in excruciating detail
J. F. C. Fuller’s bizarre Weltanschauung
and obnoxious racism. It would have
been sufficient for Wright simply to
mention in passing that, whatever
Fuller’s insights into armored warfare,
he was also an unsavory character with
extreme right-wing views. Likewise,
Wright spends the better part of a chapter examining a storage contraption for
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homeless people that bears only a superficial resemblance to a tank. This
specific detour seems intended to chide
the United States for its treatment of
the less fortunate rather than to illuminate the tank’s cultural relevance. A historical treatise, to put it bluntly, should
not be used as a vehicle for airing political views.
These criticisms should not be taken to
mean that Wright’s book is ultimately
unrewarding. To the contrary, it can be
consulted with profit by anyone who
has an interest in the tank. The book is,
after all, well written, well organized,
and filled with fascinating tidbits of information. However, it must be approached with a degree of caution. It is
not the judicious and dispassionate account that one would expect from a
professional observer but instead a polemic against a weapon and the ends to
which man has put it. The book should
be read with that notion firmly in
mind.
DAVID RODMAN

Dix Hills, New York
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FROM THE EDITORS
EDITORSHIP OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Dr. Thomas B. Grassey, editor since 1993 of the Naval War College Press (which
publishes this journal), has, at the invitation of the President of the Naval War
College, become the College’s first holder of a new chair of ethics and leadership.
His editorship of the Naval War College Review ended with the Autumn 2002 issue. Dr. Catherine Kelleher will serve as acting editor while the College conducts
a formal search. Readers interested in being considered as the next editor of the
Naval War College Press are invited to request a copy of the position announcement from the office of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, at (401) 841-2200.
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER ELLER PRIZE
Commander Richard Mobley, U.S. Navy (Ret.), has been awarded the Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller Naval History Prize by the Naval Historical Center for his
“Pueblo: A Retrospective,” which appeared in our Spring 2001 issue. As the Director of Naval History describes it, “The author’s well-researched and written
narrative addresses how U.S. civilian and military leaders, despite the lack of reliable intelligence information, the absence of strong U.S. military forces in
Northeast Asia, and other difficulties managed to developed various plans of action and concentrate powerful air and naval units in the region within days.
President Lyndon Johnson decided not to use force to recapture the ship or free
her crewmen, but U.S. military forces were prepared to execute a number of options had he done so. Leaders preparing to deal with future crises will profit
from a reading of Commander Mobley’s article.”
The faculty of the Naval War College agrees. As announced in our Autumn
2002 issue, a selection committee chose “Pueblo: A Retrospective” as winner
of our Edward S. Miller History Prize. A later article by Commander Mobley,
on the Beira Patrol, appears in our Winter 2002 issue.
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